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Summary 
The mechanisms accounting for how negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), 
and low problem-solving confidence (PSC) increase worrying are poorly understood. One 
possibility is that these variables result in a detailed, analytical, and cognitively demanding 
form of information processing, known as systematic processing. This thesis examines 
whether worry promoters (negative mood, IU, and low PSC) increase an individual’s 
likelihood of deploying systematic processing. Furthermore, the impact of these variables on 
threat perception and coping beliefs – factors affecting both worry and systematic processing 
– is explored. Six studies were conducted. The first five utilised experimental manipulations of 
mood, IU and PSC, whilst the sixth used questionnaires. Systematic processing deployment 
was indexed by sufficiency threshold measures (confidence that processing goals are 
satisfactorily accomplished) and a questionnaire. 
 Participants induced into a negative mood had raised sufficiency thresholds; they 
were more likely to deploy systematic processing  
 High IU and low PSC manipulations did not cause an increase in the likelihood of using 
systematic processing, but these variables correlated with an increased likelihood of 
deploying systematic processing  
 Only negative mood correlated with increased threat perception when regression 
analyses were conducted controlling for each of the worry promoters 
 All three worry promoters correlated with decreased threat coping beliefs  
 A small negative correlation was found between worry and systematic processing  
 PSC showed some construct overlap with systematic processing. 
Consequently, negative mood states may encourage individuals to systematically 
process threats that they perceive. But worry is also defined by IU and low PSC, factors which 
diminish self-efficacy appraisals in the form of coping beliefs. These low coping beliefs may 
serve to dissuade the individual from typically deploying cognitively demanding systematic 
processing. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the role of systematic 
processing as a mechanism of perseverative worry. 
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An extract from ‘The Battle’  
 
She had to break into the prison where Hope was held hostage by Desperation and 
free Energy from the grip of Lethargy. These two generals would surely round up the rest of 
the troops, among them Activity, Achievement and Ambition. They might even mobilise the 
neighbouring warlords Love, Laughter and Liveliness.  
 The battlefield is bleak and surreal, like a Dali desert. Each side advances with 
alarming speed. Doubt confers with Inadequacy and they join forces to attack Self-belief. Guilt 
earmarks Enjoyment in the line-up. On the other side of the field, Sociability makes a bee-line 
for Isolation and Cheerfulness gives Grumpiness the finger. 
 At first glance their numbers seem evenly matched, but as they clash together with a 
whirring of weapons and war-like shouts an advantage becomes clear. The army of 
Desperation is fragmented, each fighting for their own selfish ends. They brawl with anything 
they can get their hands on and distract themselves with their own anarchical destruction. 
 The armies of Hope and Energy remain focused and united, sallying forward with 
Courage and Determination at the vanguard. Happiness, the elusive monarch, too fragile to 
fight, waits and prays at the rear. His bishop Faith stands beside him asking the heavens for 
victory today. Someone seems to be listening. The battlefield becomes more animated, the 
sullen sky parts to reveal a glint of blue. The ghosts of Happiness’ predecessors gain vibrancy 
and breathe again. These monarchs of the past march down Memory hill to spread the word. 
Hope’s army has been joined by Confidence, that indefinable deal-breaker. 
 The rout is over as soon as it is started. Lethargy limps off as fast as his languid legs 
will carry him. Desperation ignominiously flees with a flesh wound. Worry, that slippery 
turncoat, is taken as a prisoner of war, but will manage to sweet-talk his way to freedom in an 
hour or two. The battle is won, the enemies are fled and the exhausted soldiers retire to the 
taverns to celebrate. Humour and Amusement, the ever genial landlords keep the drinks 
topped up with Hope’s special brew and Laughter puts on a cabaret. No one has noticed 
Worry slip away into the night. 
 
Reproduced with permission. 
© Katherine ffrench-Constant, 2009. 
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1 The what, who, when and why of worrying 
“Worry – a God, invisible but omnipotent. It steals the bloom from the cheek and lightness from 
the pulse; it takes away the appetite, and turns the hair gray” – Benjamin Disraeli 
1.1 General Overview 
This thesis opens with an overview of the phenomenon of worry, with particular focus 
on the role of negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), and problem-solving confidence 
(PSC) in worry perseveration. Chapter Two details a different literature, that of systematic 
and heuristic information processing, and outlines the potential role of information 
processing styles in perseverative worry. Chapter Three covers the methodological 
approaches used to study worry and manipulate factors relevant to the worry process. 
Chapters Four to Eight contain the experimental work conducted for this thesis. Finally, in the 
general discussion in Chapter Nine, the experimental findings are summarized and integrated 
with existing theoretical models, before closing with a discussion of the limitations of the 
work, and suggestions for future research. 
1.2 Introduction 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it aims to provide an overview of the nature of 
worry and its significance in psychopathology, most notably Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD). Secondly, it introduces the three main independent variables in this thesis (the ‘worry 
promoters’1: negative mood, IU, and low PSC) and explores accounts of their role in worry. 
This provides a framework for the discussion in Chapter Two considering whether systematic 
processing could be a mechanism between these three key variables and worry perseveration.  
1.3 Worry and psychopathology 
Worry is something we all do from time to time. The general population has a good 
understanding of what someone means when they say that they are worried. Alongside 
depression, the term ‘worry’ is perhaps the most widely used psychopathology term by lay 
people. Academically and clinically, worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and 
images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, 
                                                     
1
 Throughout this thesis, negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty and low problem-solving confidence are 
jointly referred to as ‘worry promoters’, both for ease of expression and to reflect research showing that these 
variables increase worry levels  
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& DePree, 1983). Later definitions of worry incorporate problem-solving, e.g., “[worry] is seen 
as a constructive and appropriate task-oriented process that contributes to the solving of 
problems and the reduction of anxiety” (Borkovec, et al., 1983; Davey, 1994b, p. 327). The 
latter interpretation supports the dimensional nature of worry; worry is something that most 
people experience to a greater or lesser extent. Nonetheless, for some individuals worrying is 
highly distressing (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). 
Initially, some researchers and clinicians considered worry to be little more than the 
cognitive component of anxiety (e.g. O'Neill, 1985). However, the inclusion of worry as the 
cardinal symptom of GAD in the third revised edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), catapulted the status 
of worry to a phenomenon of interest, and research into worry blossomed. Davey (1993b) 
demonstrated that worry has its own cognitive profile, characterised by information-seeking, 
a monitoring cognitive style, and avoidant coping behaviours. Furthermore, worry scores 
were independent of trait anxiety. Davey, Hampton, Farrell and Davidson (1992) elucidated 
the differences between trait anxiety and worry. They found that worry correlates with 
adaptive problem-focused coping strategies and information processing, while trait anxiety 
correlates with low PSC, poor perceived personal control, taking responsibility for negative 
outcomes, heightened threat interpretations, and avoidant coping styles.   
A diagnosis of GAD is made if an individual presents with excessive worry that has 
occurred for more days than not during the past six months. The individual must report 
difficulties controlling worry, and experience three of the following on more days than not 
during the past six months: restlessness, feeling tired after less exertion than previously, 
concentration difficulties, irritability, muscle tension, and sleep difficulties. The worry must 
cause significant distress, and not be solely confined to another Axis I disorder subject matter 
(e.g., worries about cleanliness in an individual with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, DSM-IV-TR, 4th ed., text rev.). High worriers with 
GAD differ from high worriers without GAD in that those with GAD experience more negative 
intrusions, have less belief in their ability to remember things, possess more superstitious 
beliefs about the power of worry, and have raised beliefs about the danger and 
uncontrollability of worry (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004).  
GAD is highly comorbid with other psychological disorders. Bruce, Machan, Dyck and 
Keller (2001) report that comorbidity occurs in two-thirds of GAD cases. In their study, only 
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one participant out of 20 “pure” GAD patients remained free of comorbid conditions through 
eight years of follow-up. Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, and Mancill (2001) found that 
20% of individuals with an anxiety disorder had comorbid GAD. In terms of mood disorders, 
Brown et al. (2001) report that 14% of individuals with Dysthymia have comorbid GAD, as do 
25% of those with Major Depressive Disorder. These comorbidity figures do not take into 
account worry that occurs only in the context of a mood disorder (DSM-IV-TR prohibits a GAD 
diagnosis in these cases), and when such cases are included, comorbidity estimates rise to 
57%. Clearly, worry is an issue for many people experiencing psychological difficulties, and is 
not limited to those with GAD.  
Purdon and Harrington (2006) reviewed the role of worry in psychological disorders 
beyond GAD. They report that it plays a role in the anxious apprehension surrounding social 
and performance situations seen in Social Anxiety, in the concerns about Panic Attack 
symptoms in Panic Disorder, and in the fears about bodily symptoms in Hypochondriasis. 
Furthermore, worry has been implicated in checking and doubting subtypes of Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (Tallis & DeSilva, 1992). Worry also predicts treatment outcomes in 
psychosis. Individuals with persecutory delusions report greater worry as measured by the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and also 
higher levels of anxiety measured using the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & 
Steer, 1988), compared to non-clinical controls. Worry and anxiety significantly predicted 
persecutory delusions at three-month follow-up, with those scoring higher on measures of 
worry and anxiety at baseline showing less symptom improvement (Startup, Freeman, & 
Garety, 2007). 
High levels of worry do not always occur within the context of GAD. Ruscio (2002) 
reported that non-GAD high worriers far outnumber high worriers with GAD. Kertz and 
Woodruff-Borden (2011) found that individuals who exhibit high levels of worry (whether 
with GAD, with sub-threshold GAD, or without a GAD diagnosis) report poorer physical health, 
greater levels of stress, and increased sleep difficulties, compared to a control group who did 
not experience worry or GAD symptomatology. The GAD and sub-threshold GAD groups were 
indistinguishable on the measures of health, stress, or sleep. Worriers were also twice as 
likely as non-worriers to report inadequate social support. Given the similarities in the human 
cost to worriers with or without a diagnosis of GAD, it is important to understand worry 
beyond the GAD context. 
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1.4 The nature of worry thoughts 
1.4.1 Negative thoughts 
Worry predominately consists of negative thoughts, and is rarely experienced as 
images (e.g. Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). Stokes and Hirsch (2010) explored the impact of 
processing worry using verbal mentation (typical of worry) or imagery mentation (atypical). 
High worriers who used verbal processing showed a significant increase from time 1 
(baseline) to time 2 (after a mentation training phase and a five-minute worry period) in the 
number of negative cognitive intrusions that they experienced during a five-minute breathing 
focus period. Conversely, those who had used imagery processing showed a significant 
decrease in the number of negative intrusions that they experienced. This shows that verbal 
processing may also maintain, and even increase, negative thoughts.  
1.4.2 Worry content 
There is conflicting data regarding the topics that worriers worry about. Craske, 
Rapee, Jackel and Barlow (1989) found that participants with GAD worried more about 
illness, health, and injury than those without GAD. Sanderson and Barlow (1990) reported 
that the most common worry themes in people with GAD are family, finances, work and 
personal illness. Research has moved away from studying the content of worry to studying 
processes involved in worrying, which is likely to be more useful in determining effective 
treatments given the heterogeneity found in terms of worry content. Dugas, Freeston, 
Ladouceur, Rhéaume, Provencher and Boisvert (1998) suggest that the change in focus away 
from worry content is partly because the DSM-IV criteria for GAD dropped the DSM-III-R 
criterion that the individual worries about two or more topics. Dugas et al. (1998) also 
suggest that this change in focus may be attributable to the fact that worry content does not 
reliably discriminate individuals with pathological versus normal worry experiences. A fairly 
consistent finding, however, is that worriers generate more worry topics when asked what 
they worry about (e.g. Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997). 
Dugas et al. (1998) also demonstrated that worriers were more likely to worry about things in 
the future, particularly remote future events (e.g., their child becoming seriously unwell). 
Based on the principles of metacognitive theories of emotional disorders, Wells (1995) 
developed a metacognitive model of worry. The metacognitive model distinguishes between 
worries (Type 1) and appraisals of worrying (Type 2). An additional distinction is made 
between metacognitions that are positive beliefs about worry (e.g., ‘worrying keeps me in 
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control’) and negative beliefs about worry (e.g., ‘my worrying could make me go mad’), which 
includes worrying about worrying (meta-worry). Type 2 worry is evident in chronic worriers 
(Wells, 1994, 1995). 
1.4.3 Anticipating threat and solving problems 
Worry thoughts commonly involve negative outcome anticipation and attempts at 
problem-solving. Szabó and Lovibond (2002) used a diary-based approach to examine worry 
content. Content analysis demonstrated that approximately 20% of the worries listed were 
related to negative outcome anticipation and approximately 50% were related to problem-
solving. This suggests that once the worry process is initiated, individuals anticipate negative 
outcomes, but then spend significantly longer generating possible solutions to these potential 
negative outcomes. The relative amount of negative outcome anticipation versus problem-
solving content did not vary as a function of worry severity. This provides further support for 
the notion that high and low levels of worry differ in quantity but have less qualitative 
differences than a categorical model would suggest.  
1.4.4 Catastrophising 
During a worry bout, individuals typically generate thoughts about progressively 
worse outcomes, a process known as catastrophising, which is usually the result of pondering 
‘what if…?’ questions (Kendall & Ingram, 1987). Breitholtz, Westling, and Öst (1998) found 
that individuals with GAD were significantly more likely to report experiencing thoughts 
related to mental catastrophes when feeling anxious than individuals with panic disorder. 
Vasey and Borkovec (1992) considerably advanced the study of catastrophising by developing 
the catastrophising interview (CI) (see also Davey, 2006a). In this interview, the experimenter 
begins by asking “What is it that worries you about X?” where X is the participant’s current 
main worry. The experimenter repeats the question, substituting X with the participant’s 
answer to the first question, and so on. For more information on the CI, see Chapter 3 (Section 
3.2.2). Vasey and Borkovec (1992) found that worriers generated significantly more 
catastrophising steps than non-worriers. Furthermore, worriers experienced increased 
emotional discomfort as the CI progressed whereas non-worriers did not experience a change 
in emotional discomfort. However, it should be noted that Vasey and Borkovec (1992) did not 
control for the CI length, and as such, this effect may reflect that increased catastrophising is 
related to greater distress, rather than a difference in the way in which worriers react to 
catastrophic thoughts. Davey and Levy (1998b) found that worriers had a general iterative 
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thinking style as they engaged in catastrophising (perceiving progressively more extreme 
consequences) for both negative and positive topics. Worriers were also able to catastrophise 
a new hypothetical worry topic (‘being the Statue of Liberty’), which they had no previous 
experience worrying about. Therefore they could not have ‘practised’ thoughts about 
potentially negative outcomes. This finding counters Vasey and Borkovec’s (1992) suggestion 
that worriers generate more steps during the CI because they have more ready available 
access to memory stores of answers to ‘what if..?’ questions than non-worriers.   
1.4.5 Themes of personal inadequacy 
Davey and Levy (1998b) demonstrated that personal inadequacy commonly emerges 
as a theme in the worries of high worriers. They found worriers frequently couched their 
catastrophising steps in terms of personal inadequacy, such as “I’ll never be the best at 
anything”, “being at the end of my life with no future ahead and not having achieved very 
much” (Davey & Levy, 1998b, p.582). Davey and Levy (1998a) examined the types of 
statements associated with catastrophic worrying. They created a questionnaire by asking 
individuals to list the kinds of thoughts they had when they were thinking about something 
that made them feel worse. Using factor analysis, they determined that catastrophising is 
associated with four kinds of internal statements: (1) problem-specific pessimism, e.g., “There 
just seems to be no solution to this problem”; (2) personal inadequacy/incompetence, e.g., 
“Everyone can do better than me”; (3) personal despair/hopelessness, e.g., “How will I 
manage?”; and (4) need to analyse the problem, e.g., “I must consider all the options 
associated with this problem” (Davey & Levy, 1998a, p.24). These four factors predicted 
PSWQ scores after controlling for anxiety, depression, PSC and control, suggesting that the 
internal statements associated with catastrophising are an important part of pathological 
worry. 
1.5 Prevalence and epidemiology of worry 
1.5.1 Worry frequency   
In a sample consisting of adults and students, 38% reported worrying everyday 
(Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). The mean worry duration was 5-10 minutes, but some 
respondents endorsed fleeting worries, while others experienced worries that lasted one-two 
hours. Forty-two percent of Tallis et al.’s (1994) participants were aware of their worries 
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occurring at specific times of day. The most frequently endorsed times of worry were 9pm-
midnight (32.8%) and midnight-3am (25.9%). 
1.5.2 Rates of pathological worry 
Assessing precise rates of GAD prevalence is complicated by the changing diagnostic 
criteria of GAD between the third DSM edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and 
the current diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Nonetheless, 
Holaway, Rodebaugh and Heimburg (2006) reviewed the rates of GAD in international 
population-based surveys, and found an average current rate of 2.03% (range: 0.8%-3.7%), an 
average 12-month prevalence rate of 2.98% (range: 1.1%-5.1%), and an average lifetime 
prevalence of 4.99% (range: 1.4%-11.1%). 
1.5.3 The worry spectrum 
Worry can be a distressing, uncontrollable, catastrophic, perseverative process, but as 
demonstrated by the high frequency of worry in individuals for whom it does not reach 
pathological proportions, the worry process can also be normal (e.g., a coping strategy used to 
assist in problem-solving). Ruscio, Borkovec and Ruscio (2001) demonstrated using 
taxometric analytic methods that normal and pathological worry are best conceptualized as 
occupying extreme ends of a single continuum, rather than as discrete entities. Explanations 
of worry need to account for worry at both ends of the continuum, and high levels of worry 
both with and without GAD.  
1.5.4 Worry across development 
The frequency and severity of worry varies across age groups. Younger adults are 
reported to worry more than older adults, with young females worrying the most (Hunt, 
Wisocki, & Yanko, 2003). However, this is dependent on the measure of worry. Hunt et al. 
(2003) found that young adults (18-25) worried more when assessed using the PSWQ, but 
older adults scored higher on the subscales of health, family concerns and world issues on the 
Worry Scale for Older Adults – Revised (Wisocki, 1994). The majority of studies examining 
changes in worry behaviour over time have used cross-sectional designs, and where 
longitudinal assessment of worry has been undertaken, it has not been across the lifespan, but 
instead has focused on one age period, such as teenage years (Hale, Klimstra, & Meeus, 2010) 
or university students (Swerdzewski, 2008).  
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1.5.5 The role of gender in worry 
Females experience (or at least report) greater levels of worry than males (Robichaud, 
Dugas, & Conway, 2003). An explanation for this finding comes from Barahmand (2008) who 
demonstrated that, in adolescents at least, positive beliefs about worry were a key 
determinant of worry levels, and that females were more likely to endorse these beliefs. 
However, Barahmand (2008) did find that male adolescents were more likely to report 
greater negative problem-orientation, which is another worry predictor. It is unclear why 
females hold more positive beliefs about the utility of worry than males. Robichaud et al. 
(2003) review work by Stavosky and Borkovec (1988), Gove (1980) and Rosenfield (2000), 
who suggest respectively that worry is seen as a feminine gender role stereotypic trait, that 
women experience greater levels of stress due to lower-status positions in society and the 
home, and that females show greater tendencies to internalise versus externalise problems. 
Robichaud, et al. (2003) found that gender played a role in confidence, as measured by the 
lack of confidence subscale of the Worry Domains Questionnaire (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 
1992). Robichaud et al. (2003) found that females reported less confidence than males. 
Females also scored higher on the measure of negative problem orientation, which is contrary 
to the finding of Barahmand (2008). This contradiction could be due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, the developmental time frame is different; Barahmand (2008) examined adolescents 
aged 16-19 and Robichaud et al. (2003) examined students aged 18-37. Secondly, the 
participants came from different cultures; Barahmand’s (2008) participants lived in Iran, 
while Robichaud et al.’s (2003) lived in Canada. Thirdly, different measures of negative 
problem orientation were used. Barahmand (2008) used the Negative Problem Orientation 
Questionnaire, while Robichaud et al. (2003) used the Social Problem-Solving Inventory-
Revised Short Form (D'Zurilla, Maydeu-Olivares, & Kant, 1998).  
1.5.6 Marital status 
Hunt et al. (2003) found that individuals who were single endorsed more PSWQ items 
than those who were married or widowed. However, as mentioned above, younger 
individuals report higher levels of worry, and are less likely to be married than older 
participants. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of age and marital status.  
The research reviewed in this section indicates that worry occurs across demographic 
groups, but finds that worry is most common in single females in early adulthood. The 
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experimental work conducted in this thesis utilizes samples representative of this 
demographic group who are at an increased likelihood of experiencing worry. 
1.6 Factors implicated in worry perseveration 
Worry can be understood within a biopsychosocial framework; worry is associated 
with neuroanatomical differences (e.g. Mohlman, et al., 2009), functional brain differences 
(e.g. Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Wong, 2005), and greater levels of anxious and rejecting 
parenting (Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, & Hülsenbeck, 2000). However, worry is 
predominantly a product of cognition, involving thoughts about imagined negative outcomes 
and the generation of problem-solving strategies.  As such, approaching understanding worry 
from a cognitive stand-point will probably be the most fruitful avenue and the basis for the 
most successful psychotherapies for worry-based problems. In this section, three important 
variables implicated in worry perseveration are covered: negative mood, IU, and low PSC.  
1.7 Negative mood 
Chronic worriers experience endemic negative mood (Meyer, et al., 1990). A detailed 
discussion of the conceptualisation of negative mood is beyond the scope of this literature 
review but in this thesis, the understanding of negative moods is based upon Watson, Clark 
and Tellegen’s (1988, p. 1063) definition that negative mood is “a dimension of subjective 
distress and unpleasurable engagement”. The association between negative mood and worry 
may emerge from the negative cognitive processes associated with chronic worrying such as 
negative outcome anticipation (Szabó & Lovibond, 2002), processing negative thoughts 
(Borkovec, et al., 1998), catastrophising (Davey, 2006a), and personal inadequacy appraisals 
(Davey & Levy, 1998b). However, a number of studies support the view that, rather than 
simply being a consequence of worrying, negative mood is a causal contributor. Johnston and 
Davey (1997) found that inducing a negative mood resulted in significantly more 
catastrophising steps being generated during a CI than positive or neutral moods. This and 
similar studies (e.g., Startup & Davey, 2001) demonstrate that negative mood has a causal 
effect on worry perseveration, and is not simply an outcome of worrying. 
 There are a number of candidate mechanisms that potentially explain why negative 
mood states increase worry, including that negative mood (1) provides information about 
whether task goals are met (mood-as-input hypothesis) (e.g., Meeten & Davey, 2011); (2) 
facilitates retrieval of material that is congruent in valence (Bower, 1991); (3) primes the 
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retrieval of semantically similar material (Neely, 1977); (4) raises an individual’s performance 
standards (e.g., Scott & Cervone, 2002); (5) increases an individual’s desire to understand the 
cause of their mood with the goal of ‘repairing’ the negative mood state to a more positive one 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983); (6) intensifies the persuasiveness of strong messages (e.g., Briñol, 
Petty, & Barden, 2007); (7) evokes appraisals of uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001); and (8) 
either independently, or as a result of some or all of points 1-7, alters the way in which 
individuals process information, resulting in systematic information processing (e.g., Bohner, 
Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988).  
1.7.1 Mood-as-input Hypothesis 
 Worry is typically open-ended; there is no definite end-point. Consequently, an 
individual must make a decision about whether to continue with their worry bout, or 
terminate it. These decision processes may be unconscious, but can nonetheless be 
communicated in verbal form (see Wells, 2006, for the same description of metacognitive 
beliefs). The decision will be determined by (1) an individual’s goal for their worrying (e.g., 
‘resolve a problem’, ‘feel prepared’, ‘feel better’); (2) the stop rules that are derived based on 
the worry goals (e.g., ‘I must continue to worry until I have resolved the problem’, ‘I must 
continue to worry until I feel prepared’, I must continue to worry until I feel better’); and (3) 
the information used to decide whether worry goals are met.   
There is usually a lack of objective evidence to help the worrier identify if they have, 
for example, resolved their problem, and instead, it is suggested that individuals use their 
mood to decide if they have met their worry goals. According to mood-as-input theory, mood 
provides information about whether the stop rules have been met (Davey, 2006b). Stop rules 
are criteria for deciding when to stop a task, and as such, are conceptualised as decision rules 
(e.g., Vaughn, Malik, Schwartz, Petkova, & Trudeau, 2006). For example, if an individual is 
worrying, they may either apply an ‘as many as can’ (AMA) stop rule, whereby they believe 
that they must do as much worrying as possible, or a ‘feel like continuing’ (FLC) stop rule, 
which involves stopping when the worry process is no longer something they feel like doing 
(Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins, & Patterson, 2005). If an individual is in a negative mood 
and using an AMA rule, their negative mood suggests that the task has not been completed as 
much as possible (positive mood is usually experienced when a task is completed), and the 
individual is likely to persevere at the task. In contrast, an individual in a positive mood would 
interpret their mood in terms of having completed the task and will stop. For an individual 
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using the FLC rule, a negative mood would encourage the individual to stop the task sooner 
than if the individual was in a positive mood, as the negative mood would signal that the task 
was no longer enjoyable. 
 Over the past 10 years, a wealth of research has demonstrated that mood-as-input 
theory can successfully predict patterns of perseveration in analogue samples performing 
clinically-relevant tasks. Startup and Davey (2001) demonstrated that perseveration at a CI 
was greatest under a combination of a negative mood and use of the AMA stop rule, and a 
positive mood and use of the FLC stop rule. Furthermore, Davey et al. (2005) found that high 
worriers were more likely to use an AMA rule when approaching a worry task, and hence high 
worriers are more likely to perseverate given that they experience being in a negative mood 
more frequently than low worriers. Additionally, checking behaviour in OCD has been shown 
to fit the mood-as-input predictions, with more checking occurring when the AMA rule is 
deployed in the presence of negative mood, or the FLC rule is deployed in the presence of 
positive mood (Davey, Startup, Zara, MacDonald, & Field, 2003). Mood-as-input also 
accounted for patterns of depressive rumination when different moods were induced and 
stop rules were deployed (Hawksley & Davey, 2010). In terms of clinical populations, the 
combination of a negative mood alongside AMA stop rule deployment is of greatest 
significance, given that clinical populations experience heightened negative mood and possess 
dispositional characteristics that increase AMA deployment, such as perfectionism, IU, inflated 
responsibility and increased concern about making mistakes (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
1997; Stöber & Joormann, 2001b; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991; Wells & Papageorgiou, 
1998). 
 While the empirical data is consistent with mood-as-input theory, there is currently no 
independent evidence that individuals actually do use their mood as information. 
Furthermore, mood and stop rules may not be independent; mood may affect the goal an 
individual has for their worrying, and the subsequent stop rule that is deployed. In addition, it 
is unclear whether the positive/FLC configuration occurs during perseverative processes 
relevant to psychopathology. Elevated negative mood in worry is also partially supportive of 
other theories, which are outlined below. 
1.7.2 Mood congruent recall 
 Some suggest that negative mood states increase worry perseveration because these 
states facilitate the retrieval of information from memory that is congruent with the mood 
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state, i.e. mood congruent recall (e.g., Bower, 1991). However, Startup and Davey (2001) 
instructed participants to generate positive thoughts about a topic (positive aspects of being 
the Statue of Liberty). Individuals in a negative mood were able to generate more items in this 
reverse-catastrophising procedure than individuals in a positive mood, suggesting that a 
negative mood state is more accurately implicated in perseverative worry as a state that is 
associated with an iterative thinking style, rather than a state that leads to better recall of 
negative thoughts.  
1.7.3 Semantic priming 
 Semantic priming occurs when individuals are quicker to report items from the same 
semantic category as the prime. Neely (1977) presented participants with a prime (‘bird’ or 
‘xxx’) and found that participants were quicker to identify ‘robin’ as a real word when ‘bird’ 
was the prime, rather than ‘xxx’. In terms of the role that negative mood has on worry, such 
effects are likely to occur when word-based vignettes are used to induce mood states. 
Participants may generate more worry thoughts when in a negative mood because such 
thoughts emerge more rapidly due to the semantic closeness of the content of the worry with 
the negative verbal material in the mood induction vignettes. However, semantic priming is 
less likely to occur when non-verbal materials are used, such as music. Startup and Davey 
(2003) demonstrated that individuals would persevere with their worry when in a positive 
mood if they were using the FLC stop rule (i.e. the mood-as-input interaction effect) when 
music was used to facilitate mood states. As such, this effect is unlikely to be due to semantic 
priming.  
1.7.4 Raised performance standards 
Another possible mechanism of the link between negative mood and worry 
perseveration is that negative mood states may increase an individual’s performance 
standards. Derived in part from the finding that depressed individuals often have 
performance standards that exceed their self-efficacy beliefs (Ahrens, 1987, cited in Cervone, 
Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994), Cervone et al. (1994) examined the role that negative mood 
states have on performance standards. They induced negative, positive or neutral mood states 
using vignettes and asked participants to complete a questionnaire indicating their 
performance standards. Participants in a negative mood generated higher performance 
standards than participants in a positive or neutral mood. Those in the negative mood group 
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also demonstrated a greater discrepancy between their relatively high performance standards 
and their perceived self-efficacy.  
Scott and Cervone (2002) examined whether the increased performance standards 
obtained under negative mood states are the result of affective priming or affect-as-
information processes. They focused on the ‘discounting hypothesis’, which posits that if 
mood states have identifiable sources that are deemed irrelevant to the current task, then any 
effect of this mood on the judgement is eliminated. This is presumably because the individual 
does not use their mood as information. Scott and Cervone (2002) reasoned that, if an affect-
as-information process accounts for negative mood’s effect on performance standards, then 
when the mood source is made salient, participants should discount the informational 
properties of the mood state as irrelevant to their judgements about their performance 
standards. If an affective priming mechanism is in play, then it should not matter if the mood 
source is made salient, the spread of activation should still occur between interconnected 
cognitions, affecting judgements about performance standards. Half of the participants were 
alerted to the mood induction procedure prior to listening to the mood-inducing vignettes, 
and half were not. They found that participants in the non-salient negative mood condition 
reported raised performance standards, but that when attention was drawn to the fact that 
the negative mood experienced was due to the experimental procedure (salient condition) 
induced negative mood did not raise performance standards. This is consistent with an affect-
as-information process, but does not fit well with affective priming accounts, which indicate 
that associated networks are primed regardless of the emotional salience. It is plausible that 
raised performance standards are operationalised within the worry process through the 
adoption of AMA stop rules. This suggests that mood states and stop rules may not be truly 
independent. Indeed, Davey and MacDonald (2009) demonstrated that after undergoing a 
negative mood induction, participants were more likely to endorse using an AMA stop rule.  
1.7.5 Understanding and ‘repairing’ mood states: The role of emotion 
regulation 
 Schwarz and Clore (1983) report that individuals in a negative mood have higher 
motivation to search for information that explains their affective state than individuals in a 
positive mood. Worry has been proposed as a means of avoiding negative emotional 
experiences (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Worriers report that they worry to avoid/prevent 
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negative occurrences, and individuals with GAD endorse “distraction from more emotional 
topics” (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995, p. 26) as a reason for worrying.  
 Mennin, Heimberg, Turk and Fresco (2005) have suggested that the use of worry as a 
cognitive avoidance technique (Borkovec, 1994) is driven by an individual’s response to, and 
regulation of, emotional experiences. Gross (1998, p.275; cited in Mennin et al., 2005) defines 
emotional regulation as how individuals influence, control, experience and express their 
emotions. Individuals with GAD experience more intense emotions, poorer understanding of 
emotions, greater negative reactivity to emotional experiences, and are less effective at self-
soothing (Mennin et al., 2005). Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, and Mennin (2006) 
also demonstrated that students’ PSWQ scores were positively correlated with difficulties in 
emotion regulation, and PSWQ scores were negatively correlated with emotional acceptance, 
ability to engage in goal-directed behaviour, impulse control, clarity of emotional experiences, 
and access to emotion regulation strategies. However, PSWQ scores were not correlated with 
emotional awareness. High worriers are as aware as low worriers that they are experiencing 
an emotion; difficulties appear to surround regulating emotional experiences. Research into 
emotion regulation abilities in worriers is predominantly correlational. It is unclear whether 
having difficulties with emotion regulation leads to the adoption of avoidance techniques such 
as worry, or if worrying leads to less ability to effectively regulate emotional experiences.  
1.7.6 Intensified persuasiveness of strong messages 
 Typically, individuals in a negative mood are more persuaded by strong, compared to 
weak, messages, whereas individuals in a happy mood are equally persuaded by weak and 
strong arguments as they are less likely to engage in detailed processing of counter-attitudinal 
messages (Schwarz, 2002). Consequently, individuals in a negative anxious mood state may 
be more motivated to generate reasons why solutions to their worrisome thoughts are likely 
to be unsuccessful. Petty, Briñol and Tormala (2002) report that when an individual has 
predominantly positive thoughts in response to a message, increasing the individual’s 
confidence increases persuasion. Whereas when an individual has predominantly negative 
thoughts about a message, increasing the individual’s level of confidence in their thoughts 
decreases persuasion. As reported above, worriers experience high levels of personal 
inadequacy, and these beliefs are likely to be strengthened when in a negative mood 
(providing confidence in their judgement that they are inadequate), resulting in chronic 
worriers having less confidence that they can resolve their worries. In a series of experiments 
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conducted by Briñol, Petty and Barden (2007), participants were presented with strong or 
weak persuasive arguments, underwent a mood induction procedure, and then completed a 
thought-listing task. Participants in the sad mood induction condition were less confident in 
the accuracy of their thoughts than those in a happy mood, consistent with the notion that 
happiness is associated with self-validation. Consequently, the attitudes formed by individuals 
in a negative mood were less affected by argument quality than individuals in a happy mood. 
These differential effects were only found to occur when individuals were motivated to 
undertake deep processing; when motivation levels were low, participants showed mood 
effects on attitude formation regardless of the quality of the arguments. Given that worriers 
believe that worrying is necessary to avoid future threats (e.g., Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) 
they are likely to be highly motivated to examine worry thoughts.  
1.7.7 Uncertainty appraisals 
 Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined the role of emotions in certainty appraisals. 
Participants were induced to feel one of four emotions based on valence (positive vs. 
negative) and level of certainty (certainty vs. uncertainty): disgust (negative, certainty), fear 
(negative, uncertainty), happiness (positive, certainty), or hope (positive, uncertainty). 
Following the mood induction, participants were asked to make judgements about how 
certain they felt about their predictions for the forthcoming Year 2000. Those participants 
induced to feel emotions associated with certainty (disgust, happiness) were more certain 
about their judgements than participants induced to feel emotions associated with 
uncertainty (fear, hope). Mood valence did not affect the participants’ judgements. Given that 
anxiety is a negative emotion related to uncertainty, worriers are likely to have a heightened 
sense of uncertainty. Worriers are more intolerant of uncertainty than non-worriers (see 
Section 1.8) and thus may be more motivated to deploy strategies, such as prolonged periods 
of worrying, to avoid emotions associated with uncertainty.   
1.7.8 Increased deployment of systematic information processing 
 An additional way in which negative mood states may prolong worry periods is by 
increasing the scrutiny, attention, and effort devoted to processing information. A large body 
of literature supports the idea that individuals in a negative mood are more likely to deploy 
systematic (detailed, effortful) processing (e.g. Armitage, Conner, & Norman, 1999; Batra & 
Stayman, 1990; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Bohner, et al., 1988; Bohner, Crow, 
Erb, & Schwarz, 1992). Furthermore, many of the accounts provided above to explain the 
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relationship between negative mood and perseverative worry (increased recall of negative 
thoughts, raised performance standards, a desire to understand negative moods, attention to 
argument quality, and uncertainty appraisals) are all factors that would increase an 
individual’s motivation to process thoughts about an issue carefully. The notion that 
systematic processing may be a mechanism explaining the link between negative mood and 
worry is central to this thesis, and will be covered in detail in Chapter 2.  
1.8 Intolerance of Uncertainty 
1.8.1 Defining intolerance of uncertainty 
Worriers frequently couch their worries in the form of ‘what if?’ questions. Given that 
most worries are based on negative things that might happen in the future, it is difficult for 
the individual to know whether they will or won’t occur. This ‘not knowing’ is experienced as 
an unpleasant state and gives rise to IU. Birrel, Meares, Wilkinson and Freeston (2011) chart 
the changes in the way IU has been defined. Initially conceived out of the literature on 
intolerance of ambiguity (cf. Furnham & Ribchester, 1995), the definition has expanded 
following new insights in the way that IU is linked to worry, the processing biases that are 
present in those experiencing IU, and the nature of IU as a cognitive vulnerability factor for 
GAD. Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, and Dugas (1998) define IU as  “the way in which an 
individual perceives information in uncertain situations and responds to this information 
with a set of cognitive, emotional and behavioral reactions” (p. 141). Koerner and Dugas 
(2008) extended this definition by considering IU as a dispositional cognitive vulnerability 
factor for worry. They define IU as a “dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and its connotations and consequences” (p. 631).  
1.8.2 Intolerance of uncertainty and processing biases 
High IU individuals hold processing biases that result in the perception of ambiguous 
or uncertain events as threatening and intolerable (Butler & Mathews, 1983, 1987), despite 
the low probability of such events actually occurring (Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). 
Significantly, given these processing biases, high IU individuals also perceive negative events 
as more probable in uncertain situations than low IU individuals (MacLeod, Williams, & 
Bekerian, 1991). In addition, high IU individuals seek more information before making 
decisions that they are confident with (Carleton, Sharpe, & Asmundson, 2007). 
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1.8.3 Associations between intolerance of uncertainty and worry  
A number of studies have demonstrated that IU correlates with trait worry2 (e.g., Buhr 
& Dugas, 2006). In Dugas et al.’s (1998) cognitive model of GAD, IU plays a central role, and is 
posited to drive ‘what if…?’ questioning. Also incorporated in the model are beliefs about 
worry, poor problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance. Dugas et al. (1998) tested their 
model to see if these variables could successfully discriminate individuals with and without 
GAD. IU accounted for the most variance in terms of whether an individual had a diagnosis of 
GAD or not.  
Berenbaum (2010) included IU in his two-phase model of worrying. In this initiation-
termination model, the first phase is concerned with threat perceptions, which initiate 
worrying. The second phase is associated with factors involved in the termination of worry, 
which Berenbaum (2010) argued is closely related to the acceptance of uncertainty. 
Consequently, IU is likely to prolong worry bouts as individuals struggle to accept uncertainty.  
1.8.4 A causal role for intolerance of uncertainty in worry 
Changes in IU precede changes in worry levels during therapy (Dugas & Ladouceur, 
2000). Although not a direct assessment of whether IU is involved in the etiology of worry, 
this finding lends support to the idea that IU at least plays a maintenance role in pathological 
worrying. To examine whether IU has a causal influence on worry, Ladouceur, Gosselin and 
Dugas (2000) manipulated IU using a gambling procedure in which participants were 
motivated to win as much money as possible. One group of participants were told that their 
odds were better than a previous group’s odds (decreased IU) and another group of 
participants were told that their odds were worse than a previous group’s odds (increased 
IU).  Those in the increased IU group reported higher levels of worry than those in the 
decreased IU group. However, the questions examining IU and worry were linked to the 
specific gambling task in question, and it is unclear whether this finding extends beyond this 
particular context.  
Deschenes, Dugas, Radomsky and Buhr (2010) manipulated beliefs about IU by 
informing participants that uncertainty was helpful in solving problems (low IU) or that 
uncertainty was unhelpful in solving problems (high IU). They found that participants in the 
high IU group rated worry steps in a CI as significantly more likely than those in the low IU 
                                                     
2 De Bruin et al. (2007) found that, while IU predicted trait worry, there was little, if any association 
between IU and idiosyncratic worry bouts.  
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group. However, no difference was found in CI steps, but this is likely to be due to the 
experimental method differing from Davey’s (2006a) CI methodology. In Deschenes et al.’s 
(2010) methodology, participants were asked what they would be afraid of if their worry 
actually happened. This is more likely to make individuals examine whether their worry is 
actually likely to occur.  
1.8.5 Intolerance of uncertainty validity and specificity  
Buhr and Dugas (2006) examined the construct validity of IU. They found that worry 
was more related to IU than to intolerance of ambiguity. Additionally, IU was identified as a 
better predictor of worry than perfectionism and perceived control, and contributed unique 
variance not accounted for by these other cognitive factors.  Carleton et al. (2007) argue that a 
dimensional structure underpins IU. Indeed, one of the criticisms of the current IU construct 
comes from Birrell et al. (2011) who note that current definitions of IU are categorical in 
nature. Birrell et al. (2011) suggest that two factors underlie IU, as measured by the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale: (1) desire for predictability and active engagement in 
seeking certainty (which they argue represents an approach response to uncertainty), and (2) 
paralysis of cognition and action in the presence of uncertainty (which they claim is an 
avoidance response to uncertainty).  
Questions surround the specificity of IU to worry, and it seems IU is a transdiagnostic 
characteristic. A number of studies have shown the high IU is present in samples with 
depression (e.g., Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004), and IU predicts OCD severity (Calleo, Hart, 
Björgvinsson, & Stanley, 2010). Nonetheless, some authors have demonstrated that IU is more 
closely related to worry than to other psychopathologies (Dugas et al. 2004). 
1.9 Problem-Solving Confidence and Poor Problem-Orientation 
1.9.1 Problem-solving in the worry process 
Conceptualisations of worry suggest that worry serves a useful function in terms of 
problem-solving. For example, Borkovec et al. (1983) wrote that “[the] worry sequence seems 
to be initiated by a fear stimulus (environmental and/or imaginal) which elicits mental 
problem-solving activity designed to prevent the occurrence of traumatic future events 
and/or to devise coping strategies for such events” (p. 10). Furthermore, Mathews (1990) 
suggested that worry is deployed as a means of searching for ways to avoid aversive stimuli. 
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However, Mathews (1990) made the important distinction that it is the occasions when 
normal, adaptive problem-solving is unsuccessful that give rise to the mental processes 
labelled ‘worry’. 
1.9.2 Worry as disrupted problem-solving 
Davey et al. (1992) proposed that worrying may be an unsuccessful problem-solving 
strategy due to deficiencies in the problem-solving process. They suggest two potentially 
deficient aspects: (1) low PSC, and (2) adoption of coping strategies that focus on managing 
emotional reactions to the stress, rather than dealing with the cause. Davey et al. (1992) 
administered the PSWQ and the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner & Petersen, 
1982) and found that worry levels were significantly correlated with low PSC, and also with 
feelings of low personal control (over problems). However, when trait anxiety was partialled 
out, worry was no longer significantly associated with the negative aspects of low PSC and low 
personal control. Instead, with trait anxiety held constant, worry was positively correlated 
with problem-focused strategies of information seeking and active behavioural coping. In 
contrast, when worry was held constant, trait anxiety negatively correlated with PSC and 
perceived control. Given that Davey et al. (1992) found worriers have high levels of trait 
anxiety, the useful problem-focused strategies that the worrier deploys may be thwarted by 
the effects of their high levels of trait anxiety on their confidence that they have successfully 
solved the problem, preventing closure of the problem-solving process. The findings of Davey 
et al. (1992) support the notion that worrying is related to problem-solving, but it is not 
immediately apparent why, if worrying is related to positive components of problem-solving, 
trait anxiety is so highly associated with worrying. Davey et al. (1992) suggest that this is 
because individuals who are high worriers apply the problem-focused worry process to 
problems that cannot readily be solved. In situations where the individual has no control over 
the problem, such as receiving a diagnosis of a terminal illness, the problem-focused approach 
of information seeking may only confirm the individual’s view that the situation is 
threatening, and fail to provide solutions to deal with the forthcoming trauma. 
Further evidence for the link between worry and problem-solving comes from Belzer, 
D'Zurilla and Maydeu-Olivares (2002). They found that social problem-solving accounted for 
variations in trait worry (PSWQ) and catastrophising (Catastrophic Worry Questionnaire). 
More specifically, three dimensions of social problem solving correlated with worry: (1) 
negative problem orientation; (2) rational problem solving; and (3) impulsivity/carelessness. 
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The idea that worrying is related to problem-solving is also apparent in the beliefs 
worriers hold about their worries. Davey et al. (1996) generated the Consequences of Worry 
Scale (COWS) by asking individuals the ways that worrying made things either worse or 
better and subjecting their ideas to content analysis. Two groups of participants completed 
either the negative consequences of worrying scale or the positive consequences of worrying 
scale. Factor analyses revealed that both the negative and positive beliefs about worry made 
reference to problem-solving. The negative consequences scale consisted of three factors, one 
of which was that worrying exaggerates the problem, and the positive consequences scale 
consisted of two factors, both related to problem-focused coping: (1) worry motivates; and (2) 
worry helps analytical thinking.  
Szabó and Lovibond (2002) suggest that failure to bring problem-solving to a 
satisfactory conclusion is a mechanism of pathological worry. Solution selection (an index of 
the participant’s view of the success of the problem-solving process) was negatively 
correlated with trait worry proneness and frequency, and perceived uncontrollability of 
worry. The authors suggest that engagement in problem-solving is comparable across worry 
severity levels, but arriving at a satisfactory solution to problems is more difficult for chronic 
worriers. This difficulty may be because the solutions that chronic worriers generate are 
genuinely ineffective, or, as reported by Szabó and Lovibond (2002), it may be that their 
confidence in the solutions that they generate is undermined by IU and/or elevated evidence 
requirements. Szabó and Lovibond (2002) state “the data provide support for a 
conceptualization of worry as a thwarted problem solving process, falling on the continuum 
between a normal, constructive end associated with adaptive problem solving, and a 
pathological end associated with ineffective problem solving, and possibly, increased negative 
affect” (p. 176). 
Davey and Levy (1998a) generated items for a questionnaire about catastrophising by 
asking students the following: “when you start to think about a stressful, traumatic or difficult 
situation that you are faced with (e.g., exams, illnesses, financial problems, problems with 
relationships, etc), does thinking about these problems sometimes make them feel worse than 
they were when you started thinking about them? If so, please list below the kinds of things 
that you say to yourself that make these problems seem worse.” (p.23). A factor analysis of 
responses from 331 students who completed the 45-item questionnaire indicated a four 
factor solution. Factor 1 (30.3% of variance), consisted of 11 items, which referred to 
21 
 
problem-specific pessimism and perceived negative effects of finding or failing to find a 
solution (e.g.” there just seems to be no solution to this problem”; “whatever I decide to do I 
will regret”). This factor is not simply related to PSC, but rather it relates to whether the 
individual thinks that the problem is not inherently controllable. Factors 2-4 related to 
personal inadequacy, despair/hopelessness, and further analysis of the problem. In the 
second study in their paper, Davey and Levy (1998a) examined whether these factors were 
associated with worry-related psychopathology. They found that the first three factors 
(problem-specific pessimism, personal inadequacy/incompetence, personal despair/ 
hopelessness) were significantly correlated with trait worry (PSWQ), anxiety (Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale, HADS), depression (HADS), PSC (PSI), and beliefs about the 
negative consequences of worrying (COWS). Factors 2-4 (personal inadequacy/incompetence, 
personal despair/hopelessness, need to analyse the problem) correlated with positive beliefs 
(COWS), indicating that personal inadequacy/incompetence and personal despair/ 
hopelessness paradoxically correlate with both positive and negative beliefs about worry.  
Davey (1994) asked participants to complete the Coping Inventory for Stressful 
Situations (CISS; Endler & Parker, 1990), which measures three coping strategies (task-
oriented coping, emotional coping, and avoidance coping), the PSWQ, the Worry Domains 
Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, et al., 1992), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – trait measure 
(Spielberger, 1983), Miller Behavioural Style Scale (MBSS; Miller, 1987), Problem-solving 
inventory (PSI; Heppner & Petersen, 1982), and the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Inventory 
(MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). PSWQ and WDQ scores correlated significantly with trait 
anxiety, poor problem-solving and low perceived personal control over the problem-solving 
process. Effectiveness on the MEPS was not related to worry levels, suggesting that chronic 
worriers do not have objectively weaker problem-solving skills. The lack of an association 
between worry and problem-solving ability held at high and low levels of worry, and also 
when trait anxiety was controlled for.  
Davey (1993a) explored different coping strategies for dealing with threats. Two of 
the coping strategies, threat devaluation and positive reappraisal, were found to relate to 
adaptive problem-focused strategies. The coping strategy of denial, conversely, was related to 
problem avoidance. Davey (1993a) found that denial was most common in situations where 
individuals felt their situation was uncontrollable or where individuals had low PSC. 
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Consequently, the low PSC that worriers experience is a risk factor for opting to avoid 
problems rather than engage in more adaptive problem-focused coping strategies.  
An additional avenue of research relating to problem-solving and worry is the role 
that problem orientations play. Robichaud and Dugas (2005) define a negative problem-
orientation as “a set of dysfunctional attitudes toward social problem-solving” (p.391). 
Possessing a negative problem orientation correlates worry, and Dugas et al. (1997) found 
that it was the emotional problem-orientation subscale (and not the cognitive or behavioural 
subscales) that predicted worry. 
1.9.3 A causal role for poor problem-solving confidence in worry 
Studies that have directly manipulated PSC and examined its effect on worry are 
scarce. Davey, Jubb and Cameron (1996) manipulated PSC by providing false feedback about 
performance on the Means-Ends Problem-Solving task (Platt & Spivack, 1975). Participants 
told that they had done badly showed a decrease in PSC and generated significantly more CI 
steps than participants in the group told that they had done well. Consequently, low PSC 
appears to play a causal role in worry perseveration.  
1.10 Summary and concluding remarks 
Worry is a verbal process intimately linked to problem-solving. However, when this 
problem-solving process is thwarted, for example due to concurrent negative mood, IU, or low 
PSC, individuals are at risk of perseverative worry. Dominant models of worry emphasise the 
importance of negative mood, IU, and low PSC in the development of pathological worry. What 
is unclear is the exact mechanism that explains how these variables promote perseverative 
worry. Davey (2006b) comments “[t]he details of how causal relationships are mediated will 
be found in proximal explanations of the activity of worrying, which attempt to describe the 
causal interactions between variables which determine the onset, duration and sequential 
properties of worry bouts” (p. 218). The work in this thesis seeks to explore whether these 
key variables (1) lead to worry perseveration (i.e. are ‘worry promoters’); and (2) result in 
certain types of information processing styles being deployed that increase worry 
perseveration. As indicated in the section on negative mood and worry (see Section 1.7.8), one 
possible candidate is systematic processing. In the next chapter, the theoretical underpinning 
of systematic processing, the Heuristic-Systematic Model, will be presented and the possible 
links to worrying will be elucidated.  
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2 Information processing style and perseverative 
worry 
2.1 Introduction 
A great deal of attention has been paid to what information worriers process in terms 
of specific worry topics (e.g. Szabó & Lovibond, 2002) but very little research has been 
devoted to how worriers process this information. The worry promoters outlined in Chapter 1 
(negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty, IU, and low problem-solving confidence, PSC) may 
affect the way that worriers process information related to their worry and the goals that they 
hold for their worrying. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the theoretical rationale 
behind exploring whether systematic information processing acts as a proximal mechanism 
through which negative mood, IU, and low PSC exert their influence on worry. This chapter 
begins with a brief overview of dual-process models of information processing, before 
outlining the heuristic-systematic model (HSM). The key determinants of systematic 
processing will be covered, before turning to consider the application of systematic 
processing to perseverative worry.  
2.2 Dual-process models of information processing 
The 1970s and 1980s saw advances in dual-process models of information processing, 
which were invoked to account for numerous research findings in the social cognition 
literature that appeared contradictory to one another (Petty & Wegener, 1999). For example, 
negative mood states often inhibited attitude change (e.g. Zanna, Kiesler, & Pilkonis, 1970, 
cited in Petty & Wegener, 1999), but on some occasions they facilitated attitude change (e.g. 
Leventhal, 1970, cited in Petty & Wegener, 1999). A number of different dual-process theories 
have been proposed (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) but they share in common the assumption that 
human cognition relies on two modes of processing information: (1) a fast associative 
processing mode that has low cognitive effort requirements, and (2) a slower mode based on 
detailed processing which requires high levels of cognitive effort. Despite this shared 
assumption, the dual-process models differ in regard to their exact definitions of these two 
processing modes and the relationship between the two processing modes (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999). 
The two dominant dual-process models to emerge from the social cognition literature 
are the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b) and the heuristic-systematic 
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model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). The ELM is based on a continuum of 
elaboration, which refers to the extent a person will think about issue-relevant arguments. At 
one end of the continuum, the individual will elaborate extensively and generate a lot of issue-
relevant thoughts. At the other end of the continuum, an individual will rely on peripheral 
cues to make their judgement, and will not elaborate on issue-relevant ideas. The ELM 
contains two processing routes: the central route (elaboration) and the peripheral route 
(minimal elaboration). The central route requires time, effort, and ability, as recipients try to 
integrate the message arguments with their existing knowledge. Conversely, the peripheral 
route is utilised when motivation is low, or there are constraints on time and ability. The 
peripheral route involves forming attitudes based upon peripheral cues such as the source of 
an argument, the number of arguments, or the length of an argument. In a test of the ELM, 
Petty and Cacioppo (1984) manipulated argument strength and the number of arguments that 
were presented, as well as participant involvement. They observed a three-way interaction, 
with low involvement participants forming more extreme attitudes following a greater 
number of arguments, regardless of the strength of the arguments, whereas the high 
involvement participants showed more extreme attitudes for the large number of strong 
arguments, but crucially, not for the large number of weak arguments.  
Around the time that the ELM was gaining attention, Chaiken and colleagues 
published theoretical and empirical papers in support of another dual-process model, the 
heuristic-systematic model (HSM). This model contained one processing route that was 
essentially identical to the central route of the ELM. Within the HSM, this was called 
systematic processing. The second processing route was termed heuristic processing, and 
differed slightly from the peripheral route of the ELM in that people were perceived to use 
heuristics, simple rules of thumb, in order to assess the validity of messages. Examples of such 
heuristics include ‘experts can be trusted’, and ‘length [of arguments] implies strength’.   
The ELM and the HSM have similarities: (1) both include a process requiring 
motivation and capacity, and a process that can occur when there are low levels of motivation 
and/or capacity, (2) both incorporate a ‘least-effort’ assumption, and (3) both acknowledge 
that motivational (e.g., task importance) and cognitive (e.g., existing knowledge) factors can 
influence processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The predominant difference between the ELM 
and the HSM is the way in which the two processing routes are hypothesised to relate to one 
another. In the ELM, the central and peripheral routes are deemed mutually exclusive. In the 
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HSM, systematic and heuristic processing can co-occur simultaneously, meaning that they can 
interact with one another, have additive effects, and bias one another. Furthermore, the HSM 
allows for multiple motives within its multiple-motive framework, whereas the ELM accounts 
solely for accuracy-motivated individuals (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). When considering how 
dual-process models of information processing may apply to the worry context, it is 
preferable to consider multiple motives. This is because worriers can hold a number of 
different goals for their worrying. To illustrate, it has been suggested that individuals engage 
in worry to (1) avoid emotionally-aversive stimuli (Borkovec & Inz, 1990), (2) detect danger 
(Mathews, 1990), (3) feel prepared for negative outcomes (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995), (4) 
cope with problems (Davey, et al., 1992), and (5) to do as much as possible about what is 
worrying them (Davey, et al., 2005). While Bohner, Erb and Siebler (2008) argue that the ELM 
provides a more complete account of the low-intensity processing mode, this thesis focuses on 
the role of the high-intensity processing mode in perseverative worrying. Given that the HSM 
allows multiple-motives, the HSM provides a dual-process account3 of information processing 
that is better suited to explain how information is processed by worriers, and thus the HSM 
has been chosen as the dual-process model of focus.  
2.3 The Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing 
Judgements, such as making a decision or forming an attitude, are integral to human 
cognition. Social cognition models, such as the HSM, acknowledge that individuals are not 
passive recipients of information, but rather they can process information with varying 
degrees of cognitive effort. As reported above, the HSM incorporates two processing styles: 
systematic processing and heuristic processing. Systematic processing involves detailed 
analysis of information relevant to an individual’s judgement. Chaiken et al. (1989) define 
systematic processing as “a comprehensive, analytic orientation in which perceivers access 
and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and importance to their judgement 
task, and integrate all useful information in forming their judgements” (p.212). Individuals 
who systematically process pay attention to all relevant information (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), 
although which information is considered to be relevant will vary, and is affected by an 
individual’s motivation and goals. Chaiken et al. (1989) conceptualize systematic processing 
                                                     
3
 Some authors, e.g., Kruglanski, Thompson and Spiegel (1999), champion single-process models, arguing 
that forming judgements on the basis of heuristic or systematic processing reflects the same underlying 
process, an ‘if-then’ process. Chen and Chaiken (1999) disagree, arguing that systematic processing is not 
solely ‘if-then’ processing, and that it involves integrating many, possibly contradictory, ‘if-then’ 
associations.  
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as the high-end of the data processing continuum, and, as such, they state that it requires a 
fair amount of cognitive capacity and effort.  
 In different situations, people may focus on a subset of available information which 
enables use of simple decision rules or cognitive heuristics to formulate their judgements and 
decisions. This is heuristic processing, and has been contrasted with systematic processing as 
“a more limited processing mode that demands much less cognitive effort and capacity” 
(Chaiken et al., 1989, p.213). Heuristic processing is only feasible when heuristic cues are 
available to the individual. Heuristic cues are defined by Chaiken et al. (1989) as “any variable 
whose judgemental impact is hypothesised to be mediated by a simple decision rule” (p.216). 
Chen and Chaiken (1999) describe heuristics as knowledge structures, which are learned and 
stored in memory. Examples include stereotypes, schemas, and the opinions of others 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, if someone is trying to assess the frequency of 
‘event A’ occurring, they may use the number of instances that they can remember of ‘event A’ 
happening, i.e. the availability heuristic (Chaiken, 1980). The use of heuristic processing is 
constrained by the availability, accessibility, and applicability of heuristic cues (Chaiken, et al., 
1989). 
2.3.1 Processing style summary 
To summarise, systematic processing is reliant on factual information, leads to 
judgements formed on the basis of careful examination of arguments, and includes the 
integration of all useful evidence with information already held by the individual. In contrast, 
heuristic processing is less effortful, and involves the assimilation of knowledge into existing 
knowledge structures, such as scripts and schemas. Apart from their distinctively different 
modes of operation, psychophysiological studies also suggest that systematic and heuristic 
processing may be supported by functionally distinct brain processes, with systematic and 
heuristic processing associated with activation of the left and right frontal lobes respectively 
(Leynes & Phillips, 2008; Leynes, 2002; Nolde, Johnson, & Raye, 1998). The processing styles 
are similar in that neither is assumed to be wholly objective, and both can enable an 
individual to achieve their processing goals. 
2.4 Sufficient and motivated information processing 
Systematic processing requires cognitive effort and consequently will only occur when 
an individual is motivated to expend cognitive resources on processing information. As such, 
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an individual’s level of motivation is an important determinant of whether systematic is 
deployed. What is more, the goals that an individual has for processing information (e.g., 
arriving at a correct judgement, making a popular judgement, or finding information 
consistent with their current viewpoint), will influence the point at which an individual feels 
they have processed the information thoroughly enough. The next section focuses on 
motivation and the sufficiency threshold as determinants of whether systematic processing 
deployed.  
2.4.1 The sufficiency threshold 
A central feature of the HSM is the sufficiency threshold principle, which recognizes 
the trade-off between cognitive efficiency and task goals. While efficiency is important, 
individuals exert whatever level of effort is required to attain a sufficient degree of confidence 
that they have satisfactorily accomplished their processing goals (Chaiken et al., 1989). The 
least effort principle is an essential component of understanding which information 
processing style individuals will use, and is the basis for the HSM’s sufficiency threshold 
principle. Psychologists such as Allport (1954) argued that individuals constrain their 
processing in order to preserve cognitive resources and make their way through an 
information-laden world. Related to the principle of least effort, some theorists argue that 
humans are cognitive misers, constrained by limited cognitive capacity, and forced to take 
shortcuts where possible to maintain efficiency (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). However, use of 
the cognitive miser concept to explain why systematic processing requires high levels of 
motivation has been criticised for failing to account for how systematic processing can also 
occur in low-motivation settings (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).   
The HSM provides a fuller account of the role of motivation in determining processing 
style by employing the concept of a sufficiency threshold. The sufficiency threshold principle 
extends the work of Simon (1957) who introduced the idea of ‘satisficing’. Individuals choose 
the first option that addresses most of their needs, rather than selecting the optimal solution – 
“finding a course of action that is ‘good enough’” (Simon, 1957, p. 205). Individuals must 
balance the need to minimize processing demands (maintain cognitive efficiency) with the 
desire to maximize confidence that they have achieved their task goals. While an individual 
will rarely be able to achieve complete confidence that they have achieved their goals for 
processing information, they can strive for a subjectively desired level of confidence. Within 
the HSM, this desired amount of confidence is termed the sufficiency threshold, and it is 
28 
 
conceptualised as falling along a continuum. Chaiken et al. (1989) state that the exact 
positioning of the sufficiency threshold (i.e. amount of confidence required) will vary 
depending on the individual and the situation. Likewise, an individual’s actual level of 
confidence will vary as a function of individual and situational factors, and may change as new 
information is encountered and processed. The discrepancy between actual confidence and 
desired confidence is critical when determining which type of processing will be used: 
“according to the sufficiency principle, motivation for systematic processing is a positive 
function of the negative discrepancy that exists between actual confidence and the sufficiency 
threshold” (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991, p. 14). Once an individual reaches a level of 
confidence that matches (or exceeds) their sufficiency threshold, cognitive effort should cease. 
However, while an individual’s actual confidence is below the sufficiency threshold, cognitive 
effort should be expended in an attempt to reduce the discrepancy between desired- and 
actual confidence levels.  
Chen and Chaiken (1999) highlight predictions that can be drawn from the sufficiency 
threshold principle. Firstly, systematic processing is more probable as the discrepancy 
between actual and desired confidence increases. Consequently, situations where this gap is 
widened, such as when an individual’s sufficiency threshold is increased, or actual confidence 
levels are decreased, should result in greater deployment of systematic processing. Factors 
that are understood to increase the deployment of systematic processing, such as feeling 
accountable for one’s decisions (see Section 2.7.3), can be understood to operate by raising an 
individual’s sufficiency threshold and increasing the amount of confidence that the individual 
feels is necessary. The sufficiency principle suggests that individuals will engage in greater 
amounts of systematic processing when heuristic processing (or small amounts of systematic 
processing) does not confer the desired level of confidence. This is because systematic 
processing is generally thought to provide greater confidence in judgements (Bohner, 
Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995; Chaiken, et al., 1989; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; Chen, 
Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996). However, on some occasions, this self-efficacy assumption (that 
greater confidence can be obtained through careful consideration of the information) will not 
be met, and a discrepancy between actual and desired confidence may not result in systematic 
processing. Nonetheless, evidence shows that an increased discrepancy between actual and 
desired confidence tends to lead to the deployment of systematic processing. Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley and Eyre (2007) demonstrated that when an individual experiences 
difficulty processing a message (e.g., the font is degraded or they are instructed to form a 
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furrowed brow implying that they are processing a complex message), they show reduced 
reliance on heuristic cues. The authors argue that metacognitive experiences of difficulty act 
as an alarm bell that activates more analytic forms of processing, i.e. systematic processing. 
Additionally, attitudes based on direct experience (which is more similar to systematic 
processing than use of heuristic cues) are held with more confidence, persist for a longer 
period of time, and show greater attitude-behaviour consistency (Fazio & Zanna, 1981, cited 
in Chaiken et al., 1989). This suggests that individuals place greater confidence in judgements 
made when they have more involvement in the issues, which lends support to the notion that 
individuals will use systematic processing when they require greater confidence in their 
judgements.  
One strength of the sufficiency threshold principle is that it can account for why 
systematic processing occurs in low-motivation settings, when desire for a high level of 
confidence is typically low. The sufficiency threshold principle posits that whenever actual 
confidence is lower than desired confidence (even if the desired level is quite low) 
participants will be motivated to deploy systematic processing in an attempt to reach their 
desired level of confidence. Consequently, Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) argue that it 
should be possible to encourage an individual with low motivation to use systematic 
processing if confidence in heuristic-based judgements is undermined. Indeed, Chaiken et al. 
(1989) wrote that “the sufficiency principle implies that if a less effortful mode of processing 
does not afford a sufficiently confident judgment a more effortful mode will be invoked” 
(p.221). Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) presented participants with information indicating 
that a group of consumers either liked or disliked a product. Participants were then provided 
with a message that described the product in either positive or negative terms. The two pieces 
of information were presented in a 2 × 2 design so that they could either be congruent 
(positive consumer review and positive product description; negative consumer review and 
negative product description) or incongruent (positive consumer review and negative 
product description; negative consumer review and positive product description). 
Participants were also either allocated to a high task importance condition, where they were 
informed that their opinions would strongly influence the company’s decision about whether 
to distribute the product in the area where the participants lived, or to a low task importance 
condition, where participants were informed that their opinions were relatively unimportant 
as they would be merged with the opinions of others. The participants’ responses to the 
message were recorded during a three minute thought-listing task. These thoughts were 
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subsequently coded as attribute-related (reflecting systematic processing) or consensus-
related (reflecting heuristic processing). Participants in the high task importance condition 
demonstrated increased systematic processing (as indexed by more attribute-related 
thoughts) regardless of whether the product details and the consumer reviews were 
congruent or incongruent. Conversely, participants in the low task importance condition only 
demonstrated systematic processing when the product details and the consumer reviews 
were incongruent. An increase in attribute-related thoughts suggests that individuals are 
paying more attention to the details about the product (utilising systematic processing), and 
relying less on the heuristic cues of what other people think (i.e. they are less willing to use 
the heuristic information). Furthermore, participants reported lower levels of actual 
confidence (but there was no difference in desired level of confidence) when the message and 
consumer information were incongruent. Thus the increase in attribute-related thoughts is 
associated with a greater negative discrepancy between actual and desired confidence, a 
factor that should promote systematic processing. Therefore, it seems that participants are 
capable of systematic processing when motivation is low, and that this can be driven by low 
confidence in heuristic cues, which widens the gap between desired and actual confidence 
levels.  
2.4.2 Forms of motivation 
Individuals are economy-minded, and as long as valid heuristic cues are present in the 
environment, systematic processing will only occur when the individual is sufficiently 
motivated to justify the extra cognitive expenditure. A number of motivational factors have 
been identified and were incorporated into the multiple-motive framework of the HSM 
(Chaiken, et al., 1989). These are typically linked to the goals that an individual has for 
processing the information. It should be acknowledged that the HSM assumes both systematic 
and heuristic processing can enable an individual to satisfy their motivational goals (Chaiken 
et al., 1989). Individuals are likely to hold more than one motive, and the descriptions below 
should be considered to refer to a primary motivation, rather than a sole motivating force 
(Chen & Chaiken, 1999). 
Accuracy motivation. 
Chaiken et al. (1989) originally formulated the HSM around the goal of assessing 
validity of persuasive messages. They describe accuracy motivation as the “desire to form or 
to hold valid, accurate attitudes” (p.214).  Focusing solely on validity-seeking goals allows a 
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more precise definition of systematic processing to be presented, which is aimed at assessing 
message validity: “people judge the validity of a message’s advocated position by scrutinizing 
all relevant information (especially persuasive argumentation) and by thinking about this 
information in relation to other knowledge they may possess about the object or issue 
discussed in the message” (Chaiken et al., 1989, p.215).  
In terms of heuristic processing, an individual who is validity-seeking will use minimal 
information alongside heuristic rules that are associated with determining whether the 
message has a high probability of advocating a position that is valid. For example, when 
judging the accuracy/validity of a persuasive message, an individual may use heuristic 
decision rules such as “Experts’ statements can be trusted” (heuristic cue: source expertise), 
“Consensus implies correctness” (heuristic cue: consensus information), and “Length implies 
strength” (heuristic cue: message length). The use of such rules may lead individuals who are 
heuristically processing, with the aim of reaching a valid judgement, to agree more readily 
with experts and with messages that the majority of other people appear to agree with, 
without processing the semantics of the persuasive message in detail.  
Numerous studies have supported the idea that accuracy motivation can be obtained 
through more or less effortful information processing (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). 
However, the conception of human motivation as solely striving to form an accurate appraisal 
of a message is far too narrow, as highlighted by Fiske and Taylor (1991): “cognition serves 
many masters, and efficient or accurate understanding is only one of them” (p. 555). Chaiken 
et al. (1989) suggested that the HSM could be applied beyond the persuasion setting and 
extended to include situations when individuals generate their own ideas. Two other 
important motivational factors were identified by Chaiken et al. (1989): defence motivation 
and impression motivation.   
Defence motivation. 
Individuals can be motivated by a “desire to form or to defend particular attitudinal 
positions” (p. 234, Chaiken et al., 1989). This is known as defence motivation. Individuals who 
are motivated to defend particular attitudinal positions have the goal of confirming the 
validity of these particular attitudinal positions and disconfirming the validity of any other 
attitudinal positions. Chaiken et al. (1989) claim that defence-motivated individuals use the 
same heuristics as those motivated by accuracy, they just use them selectively. For example, 
the defence-motivated individual will use the expertise heuristic as long as the message is 
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delivered by an expert who advocates the position that they also support, or a non-expert who 
supports an alternative attitudinal position. Individuals who are defence-motivated but utilise 
systematic processing will also do so selectively. Defence-motivated systematic processing 
involves focusing on attitude-relevant information that backs the attitudinal position that the 
individual wishes to preserve. Alternatively, it may include focusing on information that 
opposes the unsupported attitudinal position, and lead to less favourable interpretations of 
information that opposes the favoured position or supports alternative positions. Giner-
Sorolla and Chaiken (1997) found that students relied on heuristic cues when their 
viewpoints were supported by such cues, but used systematic processing when hostile 
heuristic cues were presented. The use of systematic and heuristic processing in individuals 
who are defence-motivated (e.g., Chaiken, et al., 1996) supports the inclusion of defence 
motivation in the HSM framework. Chen and Chaiken (1999) state that the extent of  defence-
motivated processing is dependent upon (1) how central the threatened attitude is to the 
individual’s sense of self, (2) the presence (or absence) of heuristic cues that relate to defence 
goals, and (3) individual factors, such as the knowledge that an individual has about a given 
domain.  
Impression motivation. 
 The third processing goal identified in Chaiken et al.’s (1989) multiple-motive 
framework is impression motivation. Impression-motivated individuals have a “desire to 
express attitudes that will be socially acceptable to potential evaluators, both real and 
imagined” (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 234). Thus when individuals are impression-motivated 
their processing goal is to assess whether a particular attitudinal position is more socially-
acceptable than alternatives. What is considered socially-acceptable will vary from situation 
to situation. The desire to hold a socially-acceptable attitude is typically heightened when an 
individual believes that they may have to share it with others or justify it to others. 
Furthermore, Chaiken et al. (1989) suggest that impression motivation is more likely when 
individuals are made aware of interpersonal relationships, or when the identities or group 
membership of significant others are emphasised. Chaiken et al. (1989) suggest that high 
levels of impression-motivation can manifest in both systematic and heuristic processing. If an 
individual’s attitudinal position is known, an individual can use a simple agreement heuristic, 
such as ‘agreement facilitates liking’. But similarly, they may apply systematic processing to 
ensure that their ideas are socially acceptable.  
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 Impression-motivated attitudes are strategic, and although they can become 
internalised, they more frequently reflect concessions to situational pressures and usually 
revert to original positions when the situational pressures are removed. In terms of heuristic 
processing, impression-motivated individuals are likely to use simple rules to select socially-
acceptable attitudes, such as ‘moderate positions minimise disagreement’, ‘people generally 
agree with people they like’, and ‘agreement facilitates liking’ (Chaiken et al., 1989). When 
processing systematically to achieve the goal of assessing whether an attitudinal position is 
socially acceptable, the individual gives more extensive consideration to the detail of the 
attitudinal messages, and whether they are socially-acceptable. Chen, Shechter and Chaiken 
(1996) found that when participants were instructed to have a pleasant interaction with 
another individual, impression-motivated individuals expressed attitudes that were similar to 
those of their partner, reflecting the use of the ‘go along to get along’ heuristic. It was also 
found that use of this heuristic biased subsequent systematic processing in impression-
motivated participants.  
2.5 The relationship between systematic and heuristic 
processing 
 Systematic and heuristic processing are both susceptible to constraints that prevent 
their operation, for example a lack of motivation, or a lack of heuristic cues in the 
environment, respectively. Alternatively, there are some situations where both types of 
processing style are applicable, and the necessary requirements are met. The HSM considers 
two ways in which systematic and heuristic processing impact on one another: (1) 
interdependent, or interactive, effects, and (2) independent, or additive, effects (for a recent 
review, see Bohner & Dickel, 2011).  
2.5.1 Interdependent co-occurrence 
 The interdependent relationship between systematic and heuristic processing 
suggests that there are conditions under which each processing style will influence the impact 
of the other processing style. Chaiken et al. (1989) highlight three main interdependent 
effects: (1) the attenuation hypothesis, (2) the bias hypothesis, and (3) the ability of each 
processing style to meet the sufficiency threshold.  
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The attenuation hypothesis. 
 The attenuation hypothesis captures the idea that the impact of heuristic cues can be 
weakened, or overridden, by systematic processing. Heuristic cues are more persuasive when 
motivation or ability to use systematic processing is low (Chaiken et al., 1989). Conversely, 
the impact of heuristic cues is much weaker when motivation and ability to systematically 
process is high (i.e. attenuation effects occur in these conditions). The attenuation effect may 
occur because systematic processing highlights information that questions the validity of 
heuristic processing. For example, an individual may have cues present regarding the length 
of the arguments presented. Based on the use of the simple decision rule ‘length implies 
strength’, longer arguments should be more persuasive. However, systematic processing of 
the content of the message may reveal that one long message contains many weak arguments, 
whereas a different, shorter message contains a small number of strong arguments. In such 
situations, the individual is less likely to use heuristic processing to form their judgement. 
Examples of heuristic cues’ impact being attenuated by systematic processing typically arise 
when the heuristic cue provides an interpretation that is incongruent with the interpretation 
derived from systematic processing (e.g., Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).  
The bias hypothesis. 
 The bias hypothesis concerns the way in which heuristic cues can influence systematic 
processing. Such effects are most likely to occur when the message being processed is 
ambiguous, allowing for different interpretations to be made (Chaiken et al., 1989). Heuristic 
cues can disambiguate ambiguous sources, and Chaiken et al. (1989) suggest that the 
mechanism for this is through heuristic cues establishing expectancies about how valid the 
message is. In these instances, heuristic cues act to bias systematic processing. Chaiken and 
Maheswaran (1994) demonstrated that source credibility can bias subsequent systematic 
processing by shaping the appraisal of the message content (i.e. a message is systematically 
processed more favourably if it is from a credible source). They demonstrated this through 
the larger number of positive attributes recorded by individuals who had received a message 
from a credible source, compared to individuals who had not received a message from a 
credible source. 
Meeting the sufficiency threshold. 
 As highlighted above (Section 2.5.1), the type of information processing style that is 
deployed is affected by each style’s ability to meet the sufficiency threshold. In instances 
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where heuristic processing does not instil adequate confidence, the individual is more likely 
to systematically process the information. Similarly, if systematic processing does not provide 
enough confidence (e.g., the individual lacks ability to successfully systematically process the 
information), the individual can increase their search for heuristic cues that may help in the 
attainment of the sufficiency threshold.  
2.5.2 Independent co-occurrence 
 The HSM also assumes that there are conditions under which heuristic and systematic 
processing can proceed concurrently and relatively independent of one another. Chaiken et al. 
(1989) describe a situation in which support for the additive effects of heuristic and 
systematic processing could be obtained. They suggest that if a researcher manipulated a 
heuristic cue (e.g., source expertise) and an aspect of the message content (e.g., argument 
quality), and subsequently found main effects of both source expertise and argument quality 
on the individuals’ attitudes, a regression analysis could be conducted to confirm whether the 
impact of source expertise was mediated by the expertise heuristic and the impact of 
argument quality was mediated by the valence of thoughts about the message. Chaiken et al. 
(1989) argue that the reason that there is little empirical support for the additive hypothesis 
is that in conditions where the 2 × 2 design noted above is used, there are conflicts in 
conditions where there are strong arguments/non-experts and weak arguments/experts. If an 
individual is motivated to process systematically, then the heuristics will be invalidated in 
these two cells. Consequently, the likelihood of demonstrating a main effect of expertise is 
greatly reduced. The authors recommend comparing heuristic and systematic conditions to 
conditions where no heuristic cue is present, i.e. observing whether there is a greater effect of 
source expertise and strong arguments on positive post-message attitudes than strong 
arguments in the absence of the source expertise cue. Such experiments have yet to be 
conducted.  
2.6 Factors determining information processing style 
2.6.1 Personal relevance and task importance 
 Situational factors, such as how relevant a message is, and how important the task is, 
influence the desired level of confidence and subsequent processing style. Petty, Cacioppo and 
Goldman (1981) demonstrated that when participants were presented with a personally 
relevant message (considering policy changes that would be implemented during their time at 
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university) compared to a message low in personal relevance (considering policy changes that 
would be implemented in ten years when they would no longer be at university), they 
processed a message more carefully and were not as influenced by heuristic cues. The same 
findings were obtained when Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) manipulated task importance. 
Participants were either told that their opinions would weigh very heavily in the 
manufacturer’s decision to distribute a product that the participants were asked to evaluate, 
or that their opinions were not very important as they would be averaged with the opinions of 
others. Those participants who were told that their viewpoints would be instrumental in the 
company’s distribution policy demonstrated significantly more systematic processing than 
participants in the low task importance condition.  In this instance, systematic processing was 
indexed by the number of attribute-related thoughts an individual reported during a thought-
listing task, and by the number of persuasive arguments that were recalled. 
2.6.2 Negative mood 
Cognition and affect are intimately linked; Zajonc (1980) argued that “feeling is not 
free of thought, nor is thought free of feeling” (p. 154). This section will review the evidence 
that affective states influence the style of information processing that is deployed. First, the 
effect of induced and naturally occurring mood states on processing styles will be reviewed, 
before the exploration of studies examining specific mood states.  
Numerous studies have demonstrated that negative mood states are associated with 
extended cognitive processing (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). Bohner, Bless, Schwarz and Strack (1988) informed participants that they had 
either performed well or poorly on a test. Alongside this, participants were also provided with 
information about how likely they were to perform well/poorly based on the (fictional) 
percentages scores experienced by previous participants. Bohner et al. (1988) demonstrated 
that, after receiving negative information about performance on a test, participants generated 
more causal reasons for the performance than individuals who received positive feedback. 
This effect occurred regardless of how probable the outcome was. Bohner et al. (1988) argue 
that this study provides clarity on previously confounded studies containing negative events 
that were less probable, and they suggest that increased causal reasoning when in a negative 
mood is not the result of a need to explain unexpected events. Thus, Bohner et al. (1988) 
suggested that the findings may be due to a general systematic approach to information 
processing when in a negative mood state and they hypothesised three possible reasons for 
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why a negative mood state results in greater causal reasoning. Firstly, enhanced causal 
reasoning may serve a protective function; searching for causal reasons makes it more likely 
that the individual will identify external and self-irrelevant causes. Secondly, it may enable 
individuals to avoid similar states in the future. This bears remarkable similarity to the 
deployment of worrying as a coping strategy for avoiding negative outcomes (Borkovec, 
1994). Lastly, Bohner et al. (1988) suggest that causal thinking reduces the intensity of 
emotions, and can function as a mood control strategy. 
Bohner, Crow and Erb (1992) constructed a set-up in which the participants found a coin 
(positive mood induction) or an onion (neutral mood induction) in a phone booth. A 
confederate (unaware of the participant’s mood state) asked to use the phone before the 
participant. The confederate either provided a strong argument (their boss would only be in 
the office for a few more minutes) or gave no reason in the weak argument condition. 
Participants in the neutral group showed differential processing by indicating greater 
willingness to let the confederate use the phone first when a strong argument was presented 
compared to when no reason was given. There was no difference based on argument strength 
in the willingness to let the confederate use the phone first in the positive mood condition 
(suggesting that argument quality was not processed). In a second experiment, participants 
were induced into a negative or positive mood (through false feedback on a test) and then 
interacted with a confederate who asked for donations to a charity. The request included a 
manipulation of argument strength (weak vs. strong) and consensus cue (weak - few names 
on the donation list - vs. strong - many names on the donation list). Individuals in a positive 
mood were more likely to donate money, and this was not affected by the strength of the 
arguments or the consensus cue. Conversely, in the negative mood condition, donations were 
greatly reduced when a weak argument was presented in combination with a weak consensus 
cue, as compared to the conditions with either a strong argument or a strong cue. The authors 
argue that this supports the HSM principle that individuals will process and integrate “all 
useful information in forming their judgements” (Chaiken et al., 1989, p.212, italics added by 
Bohner et al., 1992).  
Batra and Stayman (1990) also investigated the effects of positive (vs. neutral) mood on 
cognitive elaboration and subsequent attitudes. Following a mood induction procedure 
participants were asked to read an advert for a bank that contained either three strong or 
three weak arguments. Batra and Stayman (1990) found that the positive mood group 
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reported less cognitive elaboration (consisting of support arguments and counter-arguments) 
during a thought listing task than the neutral mood group. It seems that positive mood 
decreases cognitive elaboration. The positive mood group evaluated the message arguments 
more favourably than the neutral group (as indicated by the lower counter-arguments: total 
elaboration ratio). This indicates that a positive mood reduces the number of counter-
arguments generated as a function of total elaboration. 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer (1994) investigated the impact of specific negative 
moods on processing styles. They used recall of personal memories to induce anger and 
sadness. Participants underwent a task in which they were asked to take the role of a member 
of a judicial board. Stereotyped information about the defendants was provided for half of the 
participants. Ratings were taken of the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt. Stereotype 
activation did not affect the guilt ratings in the sad and neutral mood conditions, but 
stereotyped individuals were rated as more guilty in the anger mood condition. Bodenhausen 
et al.’s (1994) study suggests individuals in an angry mood are more likely to use stereotypes, 
and that individuals in a sad and neutral mood are less likely to rely on stereotyped 
information. In a second experiment, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that participants in an 
angry mood were more likely to agree with an expert source in a persuasion setting than 
individuals in a sad or neutral mood. The third experiment indicated a non-significant trend 
towards individuals in an angry mood agreeing more with trustworthy sources compared to 
individuals in a sad or neutral mood. Consequently, in all three of Bodenhausen et al.’s 
experiments, angry negative mood states were found to be more associated with a willingness 
to use heuristics than sad negative mood states. This fits with the work of Tiedens and Linton 
(2001) who suggest that it is the amount of certainty associated with an emotion that dictates 
whether heuristic or systematic processing are deployed, rather than the valence per se. 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) argue that emotions associated with certainty (happiness, anger) 
generate heuristic processing, while emotions associated with uncertainty (fear, anxiety, 
sadness) lead to systematic processing.  
The exact mechanisms through which negative moods result in more deliberative 
processing are unclear. Some argue that it is because negative moods provide information 
about existing threats that require further consideration (e.g., Scott & Cervone, 2002). If an 
individual interprets that there is a threat in their environment, it is probable that they will 
also experience heightened accountability, responsibility, need for cognition, and desire for 
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control. Consequently one possibility is that negative moods exert their effect on systematic 
processing by impacting on a whole host of cognitive variables that raise an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold.   
2.6.3 Accountability 
Accountability is defined as the pressure to justify one’s opinions to others. It 
promotes effortful information processing in an attempt to avoid judgements that could cause 
embarrassment (e.g., Livingston & Sinclair, 2008). Experimental manipulations of 
accountability involve informing the high accountability group that they will need to justify 
their ideas to others (e.g. Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2007). Tetlock (1983) 
recognised that the impact of accountability on processing is not consistent; it is dependent in 
part on whether the participant is aware of the views of the person that they are accountable 
to. This places the motivating factor of accountability closely in the realm of impression 
motivation, an idea supported by Chen et al. (1996). Tetlock (1983) argued that if the 
participant is aware, then they can adopt a heuristic-style approach and simply select the 
socially acceptable viewpoint. However, if the participant is unaware of the views of the 
person they are accountable to then they may wish to engage in more effortful processing so 
that they can successfully justify their views. According to this hypothesis, effortful processing 
should occur in the group of individuals who are justifying their views to an individual whose 
views are unknown, but not when they are justifying their ideas to an individual described as 
liberal or conservative. In the latter groups, Tetlock predicted that a tactical attitudinal shift 
would occur, with the participant moving the attitudes that they have to justify closer to that 
of the liberal or conservative person. The pattern of results obtained by Tetlock (1983) 
supported these hypotheses, and suggests that accountability only motivates more effortful 
information processing when the heuristic of agreeing with the other person’s views is not 
available.  
2.6.4 Responsibility 
 Responsibility also promotes systematic processing. Bohner et al., (1995) have 
suggested that responsibility increases systematic processing by increasing task importance 
and raising sufficiency thresholds. Some authors have linked responsibility to Tetlock’s 
(1983) conception of accountability. For example, individuals may engage in “responsible” 
processing when they are consciously concerned about their reputation as a thinker (1989). 
Uleman suggests that systematic processing can form part of responsible processing, in which 
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individuals are motivated to scrutinise information with greater intentional control to ensure 
it meets accountability standards (for others and themselves). Interestingly, perceptions of 
responsibility are affected by mood states; individuals induced into a negative mood reported 
feeling more responsible than participants induced into a neutral mood (Tiedens & Linton, 
2001). Chaiken et al. (1989) report that participants given sole responsibility versus shared 
responsibility for evaluating messages were more motivated to engage in systematic 
processing.  
2.6.5 Need for cognition 
Need for cognition (NFC) is defined as “a need to structure relevant situations in 
meaningful, integrated ways” (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955, p. 291), and individuals who 
possess high levels of NFC are likely to find systematic processing less aversive in terms of its 
cognitive expenditure. The ways in which an individual wishes to structure information to 
make it ‘meaningful’ and ‘integrated’ vary as a function of individual and situational factors 
(Cohen et al., 1955). Batra and Stayman (1990) found that high NFC individuals demonstrated 
greater elaboration of ideas relating to a message. Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris (1983) 
provided individuals with messages varying in argument quality. Participants who were high 
NFC showed a greater impact of argument quality on their post-message attitudes, indicating 
that they had deployed systematic processing to a greater extent than their low NFC 
counterparts. Cohen et al. (1955) suggest that situations in which an individual is unable to 
achieve the amount of cognition that they desire, such as situations that are ambiguous, create 
frustration. What is more, Cohen et al. (1955) demonstrated that individuals who are 
high/medium NFC more readily identify situations as being ambiguous than low-NFC 
individuals. This raised perception of ambiguity is likely to increase an individual’s desire to 
systematically process information.  
2.6.6 Desire for control 
Desire for control is the motive to control events in one’s life. Systematic processing 
may be deployed in an attempt to maximize control (Burger & Cooper, 1979). Maheswaran 
and Chaiken (1991) report that situational factors, such as control deprivation, and 
dispositional factors, like desire for control, increase the extensiveness of message processing. 
They postulate that this is due to raised sufficiency thresholds, with the consequence that 
more systematic processing is required in order to meet the sufficiency threshold.  Kofta and 
Sedek (1998) suggest that a loss of control motivates an individual to deploy cognitive 
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resources in an attempt to try to regain control, and that a loss of control may in fact free up 
cognitive resources for deployment.  
Each of the factors described in Section 2.6 (negative mood, accountability, 
responsibility, NFC, and desire for control) can be considered systematic processing 
facilitators, in that they can all act to raise an individual’s sufficiency threshold (Cacioppo, et 
al., 1983; Chaiken, et al., 1989; 1998; Lee, Herr, Kardes, & Kim, 1999; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 
1991), as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Schematic diagram of variables that increase the likelihood systematic 
processing will be deployed. 
2.7 Application of the HSM 
The HSM was originally derived as a model of persuasion (Chaiken, et al., 1989), but 
has since been applied to risk perception (Trumbo, 1999) and decision making, including in 
clinical health contexts (Steginga & Occhipinti, 2004). Although a full review of the application 
of the HSM to contexts beyond persuasion is beyond the scope of this literature review 
chapter, some examples are provided to demonstrate that the key principles of the HSM apply 
beyond the persuasion setting. 
 The sufficiency threshold principle has been extended to health/risk settings. Kahlor, 
Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth, and Giese (2003) demonstrated that the notion that a negative 
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discrepancy between actual and desired confidence will promote systematic processing 
extends to health risk perception. They found that the wider the gap between an individual’s 
understanding of risk and the level of understanding that the individual felt was needed to 
make a decision about health risks, the more likely it was that systematic processing would be 
deployed. Trumbo (2002) applied the HSM to risk perception (see Figure 2.2), and found that 
the model had good predictive power for an individual’s risk perception.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Reproduced from Trumbo (2002); the heuristic-systematic model applied to 
predicting risk perception. 
2.8 The HSM and perseverative worry 
 The application of the HSM to contexts beyond the persuasion setting raises the 
possibility that applying the HSM to understanding worry perseveration may also be fruitful. 
Indeed, systematic processing has already been invoked in explanations of the role of negative 
mood in worry (Davey, 2006b), and AMA stop rule deployment (Startup & Davey, 2001), but 
until now the role that systematic processing may play in worry has not been explored. This 
section reviews features of chronic worriers that increase the likelihood that they will deploy 
systematic processing in relation to their worries, and consequently show extended bouts of 
worry as they spend longer processing thought content in more detail. The following sections 
will argue that the characteristics of worriers not only raise sufficiency thresholds, but also 
decrease actual confidence, making the deployment of systematic processing highly probable 
in an attempt to resolve this discrepancy.  
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2.8.1 Similarities between worry and systematic processing 
There are many similarities between systematic processing as an effortful form of 
information processing and chronic worrying. For example as outlined above, systematic 
processing is associated with raised sufficiency thresholds. An individual will exert increasing 
levels of analytical effort to attain a degree of confidence that they have achieved their 
processing goals, and appraisals relevant to responsibility and accountability contribute to 
raising this ‘sufficiency threshold’. Similar processes appear to underlie perseverative worry. 
First, chronic worriers possess personality characteristics that will raise the threshold for 
feeling confident that goals associated with judgements and decisions have been successfully 
met (e.g., perfectionism, IU, inflated concerns over mistakes) (Dugas, et al., 1997; Frost, 
Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck, 1997; Stöber & Joormann, 
2001a). Worriers also exhibit cognitive appraisal processes known to facilitate systematic 
processing, such as feelings of responsibility and accountability for outcomes (Wells & Carter, 
2001; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998).  
Secondly, metacognitive approaches to understanding pathological worry argue that 
chronic worriers possess metacognitive beliefs that worrying is a necessary process to engage 
in to successfully avoid future threats (Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999; Davey, Tallis, 
et al., 1996; Wells, 1995), and such beliefs will inevitably raise sufficiency thresholds to 
ensure whatever level of effort is required is deployed to successfully engage with the worry 
and achieve the necessary levels of confidence that the worry has been dealt with. In addition 
to these processing similarities, systematic processing and worrying appear to share similar 
functional brain characteristics. Systematic processing appears to be supported by a 
functionally distinct brain process located in the left frontal lobes (Leynes & Phillips, 2008; 
Leynes, 2002; Nolde, et al., 1998), and studies have reported evidence that increases in 
worrying are associated with increased left hemisphere frontal activation (Borkovec, et al., 
1998). Furthermore, successful treatment for worry-related diagnoses such as Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) lead to significant reductions in left hemisphere activation (Hoehn-
Saric, Schlund, & Wong, 2004). This is consistent with systematic processing and worrisome 
thought both being predominantly left hemisphere activities (Carter, Johnson, & Borkovec, 
1986) involved in the systematic, verbal processing of information. 
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2.8.2 Raised sufficiency thresholds 
Systematic processing is more readily deployed when a discrepancy exists between an 
individual’s actual level of confidence and their desired level of confidence. There are a 
number of reasons why worriers may possess lower levels of confidence that they have met 
the goals for their worrying than the level of confidence that they desire. Firstly, worriers 
exhibit low PSC (Belzer, et al., 2002; Davey, 1994b; Davey, et al., 1992; Davey & Levy, 1998a), 
and this increases the likelihood that their judgements will be deemed insufficient. 
Additionally, worriers frequently couch their worries in terms of personal inadequacy (Davey 
& Levy, 1998a, 1998b), which is likely to give rise to the belief that they have not acquired a 
sufficient judgement. Furthermore, worriers have been identified as having a negative 
problem-orientation (Dugas, et al., 1997; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005). A negative problem-
orientation will reduced an individual’s actual confidence given that this orientation towards 
problems is associated with a “perceived threat of problems to well-being, self-inefficacy or 
doubt over one's problem-solving ability, the tendency to be pessimistic about the outcome, 
and low frustration tolerance” (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005, p. 391). 
Individuals who experience high levels of worry exhibit dispositional tendencies that 
make it more likely that they will have high sufficiency thresholds. One such dispositional 
tendency is perfectionism. In the past decade, Shafran and colleagues have propelled 
understanding of perfectionism in psychopathology through their work on ‘clinical 
perfectionism’. This is defined as “the overdependence of self-evaluation on the determined 
pursuit of personally demanding self-imposed standards in at least one highly salient domain, 
despite adverse consequences” (Shafran, Cooper, & Fairburn, 2002, p.778). Clinical 
perfectionism has been identified as a transdiagnostic construct (Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 
2011), and while studies have not been conducted in patients with GAD, it seems likely that 
they will possess elevated levels of clinical perfectionism as has been demonstrated in 
patients with social anxiety and OCD. Clinical perfectionism occurs in domains that are highly 
personally relevant to the individual (Shafran, et al., 2002), a factor that is known to raise an 
individual’s sufficiency threshold (e.g. Petty, et al., 1981).  
Furthermore, worriers possess raised levels of IU (Ladouceur, et al., 1997), which is 
associated with seeking more information before being confident when making decisions 
(Tallis, et al., 1991). Searching for more information has used been used as an indicator of 
systematic processing in a number of studies (e.g. Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, & Neuwirth, 
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2006). The fact that individuals with high IU feel the need to consult more information in 
order to be confident in the decisions that they make suggests that they have raised 
sufficiency thresholds. Linked to this, worriers also have elevated evidence requirements 
(Tallis, et al., 1991).  
Earlier in this chapter, variables that promote systematic processing were covered 
(negative mood, accountability, responsibility, NFC, and desire for control). These 
motivational variables have also been explored in clinical contexts. As reported in Chapter 1, 
pathological worriers experience negative mood more frequently (e.g. Meyer, et al., 1990), 
which is likely to trigger systematic processing. There are a number of outcomes of 
experiencing persistent negative moods that make it more likely that worriers will be 
motivated to use systematic processing. Firstly negative mood states are associated with 
increased performance standards (Cervone, et al., 1994; Scott & Cervone, 2002). Negative 
moods are also associated with an increased desire on the part of the individual experiencing 
the negative mood to try to understand and repair their mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Furthermore, the negative moods experienced by worriers, sadness and anxiety, are related to 
uncertainty, and this can result in systematic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
Responsibility consistently emerges in factor analyses of worry content, appraisals 
and beliefs (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000; Sugiura, 
2007), and experimentally increasing responsibility increases worrying (Startup & Davey, 
2003). What is more, worriers report feeling responsible for negative outcomes (Davey, et al., 
1992). In addition, feelings of accountability predict worry levels of women undergoing 
cancer screening (Brain, et al., 2008). Desire for control is also related to worry as clinical 
descriptions highlight worriers’ desire to control unwanted thoughts (e.g. Roemer & 
Borkovec, 1993; Wells, 1995). Evidently, factors that have been identified as facilitators of 
systematic processing are relevant to worrying. As such, it is possible that systematic 
processing may underpin worry perseveration. 
2.8.3 Motivated information processing 
Characteristics of worriers also increase the likelihood that they are motivated to 
ensure that their appraisal/judgement of a situation is accurate (i.e. high levels of accuracy 
motivation). For example, worriers believe that worrying is a necessary process to engage in 
to avoid future threats and problems (e.g. Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996). Furthermore, worriers 
believe it is important to think about the issues as much as possible when worrying, as 
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evidenced by their endorsement of use of the AMA stop rule for worry. Worriers endorse 
specifying that the task must be completed fully and properly (Davey, et al., 2005), again 
supporting the notion that they will be motivated to attain accurate judgements of whether an 
issue has been fully resolved, or is still amenable to worrying.  
Defence motivation could come into play when worriers seek to defend the beliefs that 
they hold about worrying. Worry is an unpleasant experience, and chronic worriers 
experience increasing distress as a worry bout progresses (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). 
Cognitive dissonance theory would predict that worriers would hold some positive beliefs 
about why they worry in order to integrate the negative experience of worry with the 
compulsion to worry, and thus maintain a sense of internal consistency (Festinger, 1957). 
Indeed, a number of authors have identified that chronic worriers hold positive beliefs about 
deploying worry as a coping strategy, including beliefs such as ‘worrying keeps me in control’, 
‘in order to get something done I have to worry about it’, ‘worrying gives me the opportunity 
to analyse situations and work out the pros and cons’, and ‘by worrying, I reorganise and plan 
my time better’ (e.g. Borkovec, et al., 1999; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Davey, Tallis, et 
al., 1996; Wells & Carter, 1999). Thus, worriers may process information about their worries 
in a way that allows them to continue to hold these positive beliefs about the utility of worry. 
Additionally, worriers hold a number of strong beliefs about the negative consequences of 
worry, such as ‘worrying increases my anxiety and so decreases my performance’, ‘worrying 
makes me irrational’, and ‘worrying distorts the problem I have and so I am unable to solve it’ 
(Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996). Altering the beliefs that worriers hold about worrying forms a 
central tenet of metacognitive therapy for GAD (e.g. Wells, 1999). Thus worriers may process 
information about their worries in a way that allows them to maintain both positive and 
negative beliefs about worrying. 
 Impression motivation also appears to be a feature of chronic worriers. The Anxious 
Thoughts Inventory (Wells, 1994), which was designed as a multidimensional measure of 
worry, includes a social worry subscale. The social worry subscale consists of items such as ‘I 
worry about saying or doing the wrong thing among strangers’ and ‘I worry that people don’t 
like me’. Individuals with GAD were found to be comparable to individuals with social anxiety 
on the social worry subscale, highlighting the importance of social worries in GAD (Wells & 
Carter, 2001). Furthermore, Purdon and Harrington (2006) highlight the role of worry-type 
processes in social anxiety, which they claim has anticipatory anxiety as a hallmark feature.  
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2.8.4 Is worry a form of systematic processing? 
 While systematic processing and worrying share may factors in common, they are not 
the same thing. Both represent forms of effortful, analytic thought, but systematic processing 
is deployed in a broad range of judgement tasks having both personal and social significance. 
For example, systematic processing can be deployed in decision making, such as treatment 
decisions in prostate cancer (Steginga & Occhipinti, 2004), and when forming attitudes 
(Martin & Hewstone, 2003). To this extent, systematic processing might be viewed as a form 
of analytic thought that many individuals might call worrying, but more properly represents 
constructive problem-solving in which activities such as logical analysis, problem-solving, 
information-seeking, and active behavioural coping all play a central role (Davey, 1994b). It is 
only when this adaptive, analytical process is ‘thwarted’ that the characteristics of 
pathological worrying begin to emerge (e.g., increasing emotional discomfort, catastrophising, 
perceived lack of control over the worry process). If systematic processing is the effortful, 
analytic, verbally-based thought that many researchers have also used to define worrying 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996), then pathological worrying is 
additionally defined by those processes that ‘thwart’ the effectiveness of systematic 
processing. Such processes may involve low PSC (Davey, 1994b; Davey, Jubb, et al., 1996), 
metacognitions about the negative consequences of worrying (Wells, 1995), feelings of 
personal inadequacy (Davey & Levy, 1998b), IU (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004) and an 
avoidance coping style (see Berenbaum, 2010, for some further examples of processes that 
may ‘thwart’ closure of the worry process).  
2.8.5 Advantages of a systematic processing approach to 
understanding worry 
Exploring systematic processing as a mechanism of perseverative worry has the 
potential to bridge the gap between theories of worry at the level of clinical constructs, such 
as IU, and explanations of proximal mechanisms that underlie worry perseveration. Indeed, 
because of its theoretical purity as a functionally-distinct effortful form of analytical thought, 
systematic processing may be a truly transdiagnostic process that is involved in a range of 
perseverative, pathological thought processes, including rumination, worrying, brooding, 
doubting, and hyper-vigilant scanning to name but a few. A better understanding of the 
proximal mechanisms involved in worry perseveration offers the promise of effective, 
theoretically-informed and targeted interventions for worry-based mental health problems.  
48 
 
2.9 Summary and concluding remarks 
The HSM provides a theoretical basis for understanding how individuals process 
information. This model has been successfully applied to persuasion, risk perception and 
decision-making, but has not yet been applied to clinical psychopathology. As reviewed in this 
chapter, three key dispositional factors exhibited by worriers - negative mood, IU, and low 
PSC - are all likely to widen the gap between an individual’s actual level of confidence and 
their desired level of confidence (the sufficiency threshold). The HSM suggests that in order to 
meet their sufficiency thresholds, worriers will deploy systematic processing. This thesis will 
examine this notion, and explore whether negative mood, IU and low PSC operate through a 
mechanism of systematic processing.  
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3 Examining worry and systematic processing: 
Manipulations and measurements 
3.1  Introduction 
This thesis examines the role of systematic processing as a mechanism for the impact 
of negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), poor problem-solving confidence (PSC) on 
perseverative worry. However, the ability to answer questions regarding the role of this 
information processing style in worry is dependent upon the ability to measure both worry 
and systematic processing, and also the ability to manipulate variables thought to have a 
causal effect. This chapter reviews existing methods for manipulating and measuring the 
variables central to this thesis, and accounts for the methodological decisions made in this 
body of work.  
3.2 Measuring worry 
Worry is defined as a chain of negative thoughts that feel uncontrollable (Borkovec, et 
al., 1983). These negative thoughts are often aimed at anticipating threats (Mathews, 1990) 
and solving problems (Davey, 1994b). Worry thoughts can be catastrophic in nature (Davey & 
Levy, 1998a), and include themes of personal inadequacy (Davey & Levy, 1998b). Worry is 
different from trait anxiety (Davey, 1993b), and thus worry requires separate measures to 
those typically used to assess trait anxiety, such as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, 1983). Methods for measuring worry include interviews (e.g. Davey, 2006a), 
asking participants to report their thoughts (e.g. Borkovec, et al., 1983), and worry diaries 
(e.g. Szabó & Lovibond, 2006), but questionnaires are the most common method of 
assessment (e.g. Meyer, et al., 1990).  
3.2.1 Worry Questionnaires 
Davey (1993b) reports that early attempts had been made to measure worry in 
specific populations, such as the elderly (Wisocki, Handen, & Morse, 1986), and there were 
some items in anxiety questionnaires that measured worrying, such as the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule (Di Nardo, et al., 1985). Once the need for more specific worry 
questionnaires was established, the development of worry questionnaires followed two 
approaches: content measures and frequency/intensity measures.  
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 A number of questionnaires were developed to measure the content of individuals’ 
worries. The items for content-analysis questionnaires were often generated by asking 
participants to write down things that they worried about (Davey, et al., 1992; Di Nardo, et al., 
1985). While this method of item-generation is good in that it is open-ended and enables 
participants to report worries that the experimenters may not have personally 
experienced/considered, it does pose the risk that individuals are not defining worry in the 
same way. For instance, some individuals may feel that their worries include problem-solving 
processes; others may not. There is also the risk that participants may not appreciate the 
academic differences between worry and related cognitions, such as obsessions and 
ruminative thoughts. Consequently, items generated by participants may not solely measure 
‘worry’. The Student Worry Scale (SWS; Davey, et al., 1992) contains 10 items measuring 
frequently reported areas of concern for students: financial concerns, academic demands, 
accommodation, health worries, job prospects, world affairs, personal relationships, religious 
matters, environmental matters, and evaluation of themselves by others. Additionally, Tallis, 
et al. (1992) developed a measure not limited to the student population, the Worry Domains 
Questionnaire (WDQ).  The WDQ was derived using cluster analysis of 100 common worries 
and concerns. It is a 30-item questionnaire with five subscales: relationships, lack of 
confidence, aimless future, work incompetence and finances. Clearly there is overlap in the 
content of worries reported by students in the SWS and the participants involved in the 
development of the WDQ.  
 However, in terms of assessing individuals who have chronic worry levels, and who 
may meet diagnostic criteria for GAD, it is perhaps more useful to focus on the nature of the 
worry thoughts (uncontrollability and excessiveness) rather than the topic of the worries. 
This is because uncontrollability and excessiveness are key diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and these features reliably differentiate non-
pathological and pathological worry (Brown, 1997). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990) is undoubtedly the most widely used questionnaire in the worry 
literature. The PSWQ does not examine the content of an individual’s worry, but instead 
measures features of the worry process, such as frequency and intensity. It consists of 16-
items (e.g., ‘Many situations make me worry’), which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from (1) ‘not at all typical of me’ to (5) ‘very typical of me’. The PSWQ has good test-
retest reliability (r = .74-.93) (Molina & Borkovec, 1994), internal consistency (α = .90) 
(Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992), and discriminant validity (Meyer, et al., 1990). In terms of 
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convergent validity, the PSWQ correlates with related constructs: trait anxiety (Davey, 1993b) 
and depression (Meyer, et al., 1990). Also, providing strong evidence that the PSWQ does 
indeed measure worry, it has been demonstrated that the PSWQ correlates with other 
measures of worry, including the Worry Domains Questionnaire (Davey, 1993b), the Anxious 
Thoughts Inventory (Wells, 1997), the Why Worry? (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994), and the Consequences of Worry Scale (Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996).  
In their review of the PSWQ, Startup and Erikson (2006) considered relative scores 
among different groups. As expected, non-anxious individuals score lowest on the PSWQ. 
Analogue GAD participants score higher than non-anxious groups, but not quite as high as 
diagnosed GAD patients. Individuals with other forms of psychopathology, such as depression 
and other anxiety disorders, also score very highly on the PSWQ.  It appears that the cut-off 
required to sensitively and specifically distinguish individuals with GAD from individuals 
without GAD depends upon the sample. Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig and Borkovec (2003) found 
that a PSWQ score of 45 was a successful cut-off to distinguish treatment-seeking individuals 
with GAD from non-anxious individuals, but that a higher cut-off of 62 was required when 
differentiating individuals with GAD in a large student sample. 
The PSWQ has been used as an outcome measure to assess changes in worrying after a 
variety of interventions (e.g., Goldman, Dugas, Sexton, & Gervais, 2007; Borkovec & Costello, 
1993; Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011). Stöber and Bittencourt 
(1998) adapted the PSWQ to enable weekly assessment of worry, creating the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire-Past Week (PSWQ-PW). The PSWQ-PW has excellent internal 
consistency (α = .91) and convergent validity (Stöber & Bittencourt, 1998). However, the 
psychometric rigour of the PSWQ-PW was assessed while individuals were undergoing a 
worry intervention, and as such, they may have had prior expectations that their worry levels 
would decrease during the course of the assessment period. Furthermore, the PSWQ-PW is 
not widely used, making comparative data sparse.  
Nonetheless, as is always an issue with questionnaire measures, it is nigh impossible 
to determine whether two individuals both endorsing ‘5’, for example, for a particular 
question have the same experience of worry. Furthermore, a recent study highlighted that an 
individual’s perception of their own symptoms of depression and anxiety are rank-based 
according to their perception of the symptoms of their friends around them (Melrose, Brown, 
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& Wood, 2012). An alternative approach is to try and gauge ‘in the moment’ worry tendencies, 
which is attempted in the catastrophising interview (CI). 
3.2.2 Worry interviews and sampling 
Interviews are commonly used for diagnosing GAD (Turk & Wolanin, 2006). The 
clinician elicits responses about clients’ presenting problems and symptoms through asking 
the client questions aloud. Two widely-used clinical interviews are the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997) and the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule (Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). Whilst these interviews are 
useful for obtaining information relating to whether the client has a diagnosis of GAD or not, 
they do not provide an assessment of the proximal features of the individual’s worry. Nor do 
these clinical interviews measure the whole spectrum of worry behaviour, omitting areas 
such as adaptive, problem-focused worrying. An alternative interview, the CI, has been used in 
the context of research examining mechanisms of worry. The CI technique provides an 
objective measure of the “what if...?” questioning style characteristic of high worriers. 
Originally derived from the de-catastrophising procedure, a therapeutic tool from cognitive 
clinical psychology (Kendall & Ingram, 1987), the CI procedure has been developed to 
measure the length and content of a worry bout (Davey, 2006b; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). In 
its original form, Vasey and Borkovec (1992) first asked participants to list their current 
worries and rate them for significance and the amount of time spent worrying about them. 
They then chose the highest rated worry (for time and significance) and audio taped the 
following interview, which began by asking the participant ‘what is it about X that worries 
you?’ (where X is the participant’s highest rated worry). This was followed up with the 
question ‘What about Y would you find fearful or bad if it did happen?’ (where Y is the 
participant’s answer to the preceding question). This catastrophising procedure was repeated 
until the participant (a) refused to continue, (b) was unable to think of any more responses, or 
(c) repeated the same answer on three consecutive occasions.  
This procedure was adapted by researchers at the University of Sussex and has been 
used in several experiments investigating catastrophic worry (e.g. Davey & Levy, 1998b; 
Johnston & Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001). Significant changes from the Vasey and 
Borkovec (1992) procedure include asking participants to write their answers down rather 
than audio taping the interview, and just using the first part of the question ‘what is it that 
worries you about X?’. Asking participants to write down their responses encourages 
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participants to give one answer at a time, rather than a string of ideas that worry them. This 
modification allows more reliable coding of how many catastrophic steps have been 
generated. Participants are told there is no right or wrong time to end the interview, and they 
should end the interview when they choose to. The number of steps generated is taken as a 
measure of perseveration at the worry task. While the CI is excellent for assessing the 
catastrophic nature of worry thoughts, it does not lend itself to assessing problem-solving. 
Thus it is questionable whether the CI captures the entire worry experience. However, the CI 
is well-suited to assessing the impact of short-term laboratory manipulations on worry 
behaviour, and has possible applications as both an assessment tool and a clinical tool (Davey, 
2006a), which cannot be said of traditional worry questionnaires. Furthermore, the CI has 
validity as a measure of problematic worry, with high worriers (as identified by the PSWQ) 
generating more steps on the CI than low worriers (Startup & Davey, 2001).  
In an attempt to gather information on naturally occurring worry episodes, diary 
approaches have also been used (Szabó & Lovibond, 2002; 2006). In one study, participants 
were asked to record all worries that occurred over seven days, or until they reached 10 
worries, whichever happened first (Szabó & Lovibond, 2002). These diaries were then scored 
for frequency and excessiveness (self-reported) of worries experienced during the 7-day 
period. Despite their advantage in terms of valid real-world worry data, worry diaries are 
labour intensive, both for the participant and the research team. The use of diaries is also not 
appropriate for measuring the impact of short-term laboratory manipulations, which are 
likely to have short-term effects on worry. Other researchers, in an attempt to tap into 
naturally occurring worry intrusions, have used a thought-sampling technique, where 
participants were asked at numerous (pseudo-random) time points during a breathing task 
whether, at the time they were asked, they were focusing on their breathing, distracted by 
negative thoughts, distracted by positive thoughts, or some other thought (Borkovec, et al., 
1983). However, reporting negative thoughts does not in itself indicate that the individual is 
experiencing a worry thought, specifically. What is more, single snapshots of thoughts do not 
appear to fit the examination of worry defined as a ‘chain’ of negative thoughts as well as the 
CI does.  
3.2.3 Summary: worry measures 
Measures of worry take many forms, and using multiple measures of worry enables 
research teams to explore different aspects of worry (e.g., state/trait, excessiveness, 
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negativity, catastrophising, and problem-solving). Questionnaires have been used to assess 
the content of worries, but worry content has little predictive power in establishing who will 
experience worry-related psychopathology. Questionnaires have also been developed that 
focus on the thoughts worriers have about the worry process, and the beliefs that individuals 
hold about their worrying. Despite the range of worry questionnaires available, the PSWQ is 
undoubtedly the most widely-used measure of worry. The PSWQ does focus largely on the 
maladaptive end of the worry spectrum, at the expense of measuring more adaptive aspects of 
worrying. Nonetheless, the PSWQ was used in this thesis because it is well-validated, has 
established norms for different populations, and has been used to assess changes in worry 
over time.  
While questionnaires can provide a good indication of trait worry levels, they are less 
appropriate when estimating state worry. Alternative measures to questionnaires include 
diagnostic interviews, but these are similar to the PSWQ in that they focus on the extreme end 
of the worry spectrum. Diary measures have also been used but they are time consuming, rely 
upon the participant to remember to complete the diary, and are not suited for assessing the 
impact of short-term laboratory manipulations on worrying. The CI was used in this thesis 
because it is the best method for examining the impact of variables on a measure of 
catastrophic worry in a laboratory setting, allowing a closer exploration of the proximal 
factors involved in worry perseveration. The CI probably doesn’t assess all aspects of the 
worry process, but using both the PSWQ and the CI provides a more thorough overview of the 
way in which the independent variables examined in this thesis affect worry.  
3.3 Measuring systematic processing 
A detailed discussion of the definitions of systematic and heuristic processing was 
provided in Chapter 2. Broadly speaking, systematic processing is described as “a 
comprehensive, analytic orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinize all 
informational input for its relevance and importance to their judgement task, and integrate all 
useful information in forming their judgements” (Chaiken, et al., 1989, p. 212). Heuristic 
processing, in contrast, is “a more limited processing mode that demands much less cognitive 
effort and capacity than systematic processing” (p. 213). The way in which systematic 
processing is measured, or perhaps more accurately, inferred, varies and a lack of direct 
measures creates issues when assessing variables that affect systematic processing. However, 
some techniques are frequently used in the literature to infer whether systematic or heuristic 
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processing is in use. These techniques include recording the number of thoughts that are 
listed, examining message recall, thought-listing tasks (with attention on whether 
attribute/message or consensus/opinion thoughts are reported), looking at differential 
agreement between weak and strong arguments, correlating message-related thoughts and 
message-related attitudes, and questionnaires. These methods have been employed in social 
psychology studies, typically investigating attitude persuasion, and their validity to worry 
situations should be considered. 
3.3.1 Thought-listing 
One of the most widely used methods of measuring information processing style is 
thought-listing. Thought-lists have been coded and analysed in different ways, including (1) 
the number of thoughts listed (Greenwald, 1968), (2) assessing content of thoughts for 
attribute versus consensus related thoughts (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991), and (3) 
examining how closely message-related thoughts correlate with attitudes toward the message 
conclusion (Chaiken, 1980). Martin, Hewstone and Martin (2007) employed thought-listing in 
their study of the impact of message relevance and levels of orientation on attitudes and 
message processing. Participants were given a counter-attitudinal message, and then asked to 
list the thoughts they had while reading the message. Martin et al. (2007) suggest that the 
higher the ratio of message-congruent thoughts compared to the number of total message-
thoughts is an indication of the amount of thought elaboration. Similarly, Maheswaran and 
Chaiken (1991) analysed thoughts that participants had about a product message and coded 
them as attribute-related (i.e. features of the product, which they suggest represents 
systematic processing) and consensus-related (going along with public opinion about the 
product, which they suggest represents heuristic processing). Thought-listing allows some 
interpretation of the information processing style that individuals use, but it requires 
researchers to infer which thought processes led the individual to produce these thoughts. 
Furthermore, individuals may not write down all their thoughts, and some aspects of 
processing may not reach conscious awareness, particularly when using heuristics (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). Additionally, given that Chaiken et al. (1989) highlight that both systematic 
and heuristic processing can result in the same judgments being made, it is unclear how much 
certainty can be obtained about the type of information processing simply by looking at the 
thoughts listed by an individual.  
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 Related to thought-listing, some research teams have analysed verbal communication 
for evidence of systematic and heuristic processing. Steginga and Occhipinti (2004) 
categorized participants’ responses as reflecting heuristic processing if they involved agreeing 
with expert opinions, and reflecting systematic processing if they demonstrated that the 
individual considered treatment information (e.g., side effects). However, Hamm (2004) 
questions whether (1) deferring to an expert counts as a ‘heuristic’ strategy; (2) it is possible 
to ascertain if an individual has used heuristic processing simply by assessing whether such 
ideas have occurred in the patient’s self-report account of the decision making process; and 
(3) patients’ decisions were actually consistent with the heuristics identified in their accounts 
(Steginga & Occhipinti didn’t report this).   
 Other authors have examined indicators of the amount of effort devoted to message 
processing such as the amount of message recalled successfully (Eagly & Chaiken, 1984; Smith 
& Shaffer, 1991), and the amount of time spent reading a message (Chaiken, 1980). This can 
be justified by the argument that systematic processing requires greater cognitive capacity 
than heuristic processing, and that this extra cognitive capacity requires greater time. 
3.3.2 Information processing questionnaires 
Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese and Dunwoody (2002) developed a 9-item questionnaire 
designed to measure systematic and heuristic information processing. Participants indicated 
their agreement or disagreement with statements, which they were told represented different 
ways that people deal with information they receive from the media and other sources about 
risk. A 5-point Likert-type scale response format was used. Heuristic processing was 
measured by four items, including ‘When I encounter information about this topic, I focus on 
only a few key points’. Systematic processing was measured by five items, including ‘After I 
encounter information about this topic, I am likely to stop and think about it’. Factor analysis 
supported the two factor solution of a heuristic processing factor and a systematic processing 
factor. While this questionnaire shows promise for measuring general tendencies towards 
systematic and heuristic processing, it might not map well onto measuring the processing of 
worry thoughts, which are typically internally generated risk appraisals, rather than risk 
information from an external source. The questionnaire has moderate reliability (Griffin, et al., 
2002), but the authors did not report examinations of the questionnaire’s validity. A 
questionnaire measure of information processing styles raises some of the same issues that 
were discussed in relation to using thought-listing, see above. Most importantly, it requires 
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participants to be aware of the processing styles that they are using, and this may not always 
be the case. However, it provides an efficient way of assessing the approaches individuals take 
to the information that they are presented with.   
3.3.3 Approximating the sufficiency threshold 
 An alternative approach to measuring systematic processing deployment is to assess 
the extent of an individual’s sufficiency threshold. Chaiken et al. (1989) account for why a 
higher sufficiency threshold should result in greater amounts of systematic processing, as 
outlined in Chapter 2. Consequently, when comparing two groups, those with higher 
sufficiency thresholds are more likely to engage in systematic processing. This seems a more 
promising way of examining the role of systematic processing in worry as alternative 
methods, such as thought-listing, are difficult to code in relation to worry thoughts. Numerous 
papers manipulate task importance, personal relevance, responsibility, accountability, need 
for control, or desire for cognition in order to induce systematic processing (Batra & Stayman, 
1990; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Petty, et al., 1981; 
Tetlock, 1983). As such, measuring these variables can provide an indication of an individual’s 
propensity to deploy systematic, as opposed to heuristic, processing.  
3.3.4 Summary: Measuring systematic processing 
 Systematic processing has typically been assessed through thought-listing tasks and 
the attitude position adopted by the participant. Thought-listing tasks are limited by their 
reliance on participants to report all their thoughts. Furthermore, interpreting the style of 
information processing used from the attitudes that individuals settle upon may be ill-advised 
given that Chaiken et al. (1989) report both systematic and heuristic processing can result in 
the same outcome. Furthermore, despite Chaiken et al.’s (1989) assertion that the heuristic-
systematic model (HSM) is applicable beyond the persuasion setting, the majority of 
experiments that have examined systematic processing have been conducted around 
persuasion and attitude formation. Consequently, it can be difficult to map these techniques 
onto other areas of human judgment, such as risk perception and, in the case of this thesis, 
personally-generated thoughts. More recently a questionnaire measure has been developed in 
the risk perception literature (Griffin, et al., 2002). This provides an efficient way of assessing 
the way in which an individual thinks that they have processed information, without the 
experimenter having to make inferences in the same way that is required in the coding of 
thoughts generated in a thought-listing procedure. An adaptation of the Heuristic-Systematic 
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Processing Questionnaire was used in this thesis. However, individuals need to be aware of 
what processing styles they have used. Consequently, the experimental studies utilised a 
novel measure informed by the sufficiency threshold principle of the HSM. Participants 
reported how much they endorsed cognitive appraisals that are known to raise sufficiency 
thresholds and promote systematic processing. While this method is fairly indirect, in that no 
actual measure of information processing is obtained, it is beneficial in that it does not require 
participants to have conscious awareness of how they processed information (although they 
do need to report how they feel in regard to the cognitive appraisals) and it does not require 
the experimenter to code the participants’ responses and infer which processing style was 
used, reducing the subjectivity of measuring systematic processing.  
3.4 Manipulating causal variables 
3.4.1 Manipulating negative mood 
 Many techniques have been developed since the mid 1960s for inducing mood states 
in participants. The earliest of these was the Velten mood induction procedure (e.g. Kenealy, 
1986; Velten Jr, 1968), which involves participants reading aloud sixty self-referent 
statements that progress from neutral to negative. Music (e.g. Pignatiello, Camp, & Rasar, 
1986; Västfjäll, 2002), film (Schotte, Cools, & McNally, 1990; Weisenberg, Raz, & Hener, 1998), 
and vignettes (Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995) have also all been utilized successfully to 
induce mood states. Across mood induction procedures, it appears that the effects are 
stronger for inducing negative mood states compared to positive mood states (Westermann, 
Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), although film/story mood inductions, and those involving 
receiving a gift, appear to induce elation (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994). In a review of 
mood induction techniques, Gilet (2008) highlights the existence of simple procedures, which 
involve one mood induction technique, and combined procedures, involving the use of two or 
more mood induction techniques. Seemingly, mood induction procedures have an additive 
effect, with combined mood induction procedures resulting in larger effects than simple 
procedures.  
There are two dominant methodological issues in inducing mood states. The first issue 
concerns whether mood states induced in the laboratory are representative of naturally 
occurring moods. Martin (1990) highlights that mood inductions can operate through three 
different components: cognition (via thought processes), somatic processes (via bodily 
sensations), and emotion (via the participant’s intention to feel a particular emotion). Some 
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mood induction procedures operate primarily through cognitive (e.g., threat of public 
speaking to induce anxiety), somatic (asking participants to pose particular facial 
expressions), or emotion (e.g., autobiographical recall tasks) channels, while some (e.g., self-
statement and music) are argued to engage all three processes, which is likely to be more 
reflective of naturally occurring moods (Martin, 1990). Despite the difficulties in ascertaining 
whether mood induction procedures induce emotions of a similar quality to those that 
naturally occur, the alternatives to exploring the role of mood on thoughts and behaviours are 
also not fully satisfactory. These alternatives include examining individuals who have 
emotion-based disorders, such as studying depressive individuals as an approximation of 
negative mood, or testing individuals who are in naturally occurring mood states. The 
difficulty with both of these alternative approaches is that there are numerous confounds that 
can account for naturally occurring mood (e.g., medication, temperamental/state differences), 
which may also impact upon the dependent variables in question. Thus, despite the questions 
surrounding the representativeness of induced mood states, they allow a better control of 
extraneous variables and individual differences. The second issue relates to demand 
characteristics induced through mood induction procedures. Westermann et al. (1996) report 
that effect sizes for mood inductions measured by self-report are larger than those obtained 
through behavioural measurements, a fact that they argue demonstrates that there is an 
element of demand characteristics in the process of inducing moods. Nonetheless, given that 
the effects are still above zero in the behavioural measurement conditions, mood induction 
procedures do not solely operate through demand characteristics (Westermann, et al., 1996).  
It is important that researchers using mood induction procedures attempt to minimize 
demand characteristics, while also being mindful that stimuli such as films and music can 
evoke very different emotional reactions in different people; some participants may find a 
sketch from Mr Bean hilarious, while others may find it annoying. A promising approach has 
been developed by Scott and Cervone (2002). They presented participants with vignettes, 
either about imagining their best friend becoming terminally unwell (sadness mood induction 
procedure), or imagining their bedroom furniture (neutral control). Participants listened to 
these vignettes, which lasted around five minutes, through headphones. Given that listening to 
a sad story in the context of a lab experiment could have alerted some participants to the 
purpose of the task, Scott and Cervone (2002) added a convincing cover story; participants 
were told that the experiment was about imagery, and that participants needed to engage 
with the imagery task before completing a mental imagery questionnaire, which the 
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participants were told would assess the content and quality of any mental images evoked by 
the scenario. The benefit of inducing negative mood states in this way is that it allows for a 
condition that controls for the impact of priming on the dependent variables. Scott and 
Cervone (2002) told participants in the priming condition that the task was about sentence 
completion. They then asked participants to complete a sentence rating task while listening to 
the same information as the individuals in the negative mood group, except the information 
was presented in the third person rather than first person. Given that priming is one possible 
explanation for how negative mood leads to increased worry perseveration, the vignette 
methodology used by Scott and Cervone (2002) was used in the experimental work 
undertaken in this thesis, to allow an exploration of whether priming is a valid explanation.   
3.4.2 Manipulating Intolerance of uncertainty 
A detailed discussion of IU and its perceived role in worry was provided in Chapter 1, but 
IU can be summarized as “the way in which an individual perceives information in uncertain 
situations and responds to this information with a set of cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
reactions” (Ladouceur, et al., 1998, p. 141). Ladouceur et al., (2000) conducted the first 
examination of whether IU could be manipulated in the lab, and what impact this had on 
worrying. Participants took part in a computerized roulette game. Each participant was 
required to bet on 15 consecutive trials, with a bet set at $2. All participants received $20 at 
the start of the roulette task, and the task was fixed so that all participants finished with a 
total of $14. Bets could be placed in one of three columns of 12 numbers that were either 
black or red. The experimenter explained the probabilities associated with each bet (1 in 2 for 
odd vs. even, 1 in 3 for bets placed on a column, and 1 in 36 for a single number). After 
explaining the rules, participants were told that in this task, they had to place their bets on 
columns (i.e. a 1 in 3 chance of winning the bet). In order to motivate the participants, they 
were told that $100 would be donated to charity if they finished with at least $20 at the end of 
the 15 trials. In the condition designed to increase IU, participants were told that their 
chances of winning were unacceptable, that previously people had been allowed to bet on 
colours (so the participants now had worse odds,  1 in 3, versus 1 in 2), and the experimenter 
commented that they were noticing that the odds of winning were much worse. In contrast, 
participants in the condition designed to decrease IU were told that previously participants 
had to place their bets on single numbers (so the participants now had better odds of 1 in 3 
versus 1 in 36). The experimenter also emphasized that it was only a game, and that someone 
at some point would win, so the charity would receive the money eventually. Ladouceur et al. 
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(2000) report that this manipulation successfully created differences between the two 
conditions on measures of IU, with the group in the condition designed to raise IU having 
higher IU scores than the group in the condition designed to reduce IU. While this 
methodology shows it is possible to generate differences in IU using short laboratory 
manipulations, this study has been criticized for only measuring worry about the gambling 
task, and thus it is not clear if the manipulation would have an impact on issues outside the 
task (Deschenes, et al., 2010). 
In an attempt to manipulate participants’ beliefs about uncertainty, Deschenes et al. 
(2010) presented participants with a PowerPoint lecture on problem-solving and either 
provided positive information about the benefits of uncertainty on problem-solving (designed 
to decrease IU beliefs), or negative information about the interference of uncertainty on 
problem-solving (designed to increase IU beliefs). Although Deschenes et al. (2010) did 
observe difference in IU post-manipulation, this procedure risks confounding problem-solving 
with IU. This is problematic given the role that PSC plays in worry (see Chapter 1). 
A different methodology, which is free of the problems of specificity and confounds 
with problem-solving comes from Kelly (2009). The manipulation used four sets of two short 
stories. In one set, the character has high IU. In the other set, the character has low IU. For 
both sets, there is a male version and a female version. The scenarios are gender-congruent to 
ensure the participants can relate as fully as possible to the character and their gender-typical 
attitudes. In each of the scenarios, the character encounters an uncertain situation that has a 
potentially negative outcome. Participants were given ten minutes to read the stories and try 
to understand the motivations of the central character, paying attention to how the character 
responded to his/her challenge. Afterwards, participants were asked to “think of a situation in 
your own life where you aren’t sure whether the outcome will be good or bad” and to briefly 
describe the situation. After spending five minutes describing their own uncertain life event, 
participants received the following instructions “We want you to imagine that you are Sean 
[or Sarah] from the stories you have just read, and that you keep a journal about your 
thoughts and feelings about key issues and events in your life. Please take fifteen minutes to 
write a journal entry describing how you would feel if you were Sean [or Sarah] and were 
experiencing the situation you have just described above. Try to be as detailed as possible in 
describing how you (Sean [or Sarah]) would feel about the dilemma”. After the fifteen minutes 
had passed, participants were given five minutes to read the diary entry they had written with 
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an emphasis placed on understanding the feelings of the central character. Kelly (2009) found 
that this generated differences in IU levels between the two groups, with the group reading 
about the character with high IU demonstrating higher IU scores than the group who had read 
about the character with low IU tendencies. This method of IU manipulation was selected for 
the experimental work conducted in this thesis. Firstly, this method is superior to other 
methods used in the literature as it is less affected by specificity to a particular task, such as 
the gambling scenario used by Ladouceur et al. (1997). Rather, this task is applicable to any 
scenario of the participants’ choosing. Secondly, it is not confounded with problem-solving, 
which was a drawback of the Deschenes et al. (2010) information manipulation, which framed 
IU as helpful or unhelpful when solving problems.  
3.4.3 Manipulating problem-solving confidence 
There is a dearth of research involving changing an individual’s PSC. Heppner (1988) 
defines PSC as “self-assurance while engaging in problem-solving activities” (p. 1). Davey et al. 
(1996) is the only study (to the author’s awareness) to emerge from the worry literature that 
includes a manipulation of PSC, and as such, this method was employed in experiments 
conducted for this thesis. Davey et al. (1996) manipulated PSC by providing false feedback to 
participants about their performance on a series of problem-solving tasks. The tasks were 
taken from the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Test (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). The MEPS 
involves presenting participants with the beginning and end of a story and asking them to 
coherently solve how the protagonist in the scenario could get from the beginning to the end 
(i.e. complete the middle of the story). After each scenario was completed, the experimenter 
took the script away to be ‘marked’. Participants were presented with a short results 
paragraph, describing how problem-solving ability was assessed, the mean score for each 
subscale, and the participant’s score for that scenario. Participants who were in the condition 
designed to increase PSC were consistently told that they had scored higher than the mean 
score for their age and gender, whereas participants in the condition designed to decrease 
PSC were consistently told that they had scored lower than the mean score for their age and 
gender. Davey et al. (1996) found that this procedure resulted in a significant difference 
between the two conditions on a visual analogue scale measuring how confident the 
participants felt when they tackled some of the important problems in their lives. The 
manipulation did not affect feelings of control over the problem, or how readily individuals 
endorsed approaching problems. It is difficult to examine the reliability and validity of 
manipulating PSC, given that this is the only manipulation experiment. Even so, Davey et al. 
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(1996) demonstrate that it is possible to alter an individual’s self-reported confidence in their 
problem-solving ability through providing false feedback.  
3.5 Ethical considerations 
 Worrying can be a distressing experience. Researching worrying in the laboratory 
requires special consideration of the ethical issues involved in this endeavour. The British 
Psychological Society has clear guidance on conducting research in an ethical manner, and its 
principles were adhered to in the work conducted for this thesis. Each experiment was 
approved by the University of Sussex Life Sciences and Psychology Cluster based Research 
Ethics Committee (see Appendices A-E for approval certificates). All participants were 
provided with an information sheet at the start of the experiment. This detailed the nature of 
the tasks involved in the experiment, such as disclosing personal information (in the CI). 
Participants were reassured that they could leave the experiment at any time, and without 
providing a reason for doing so. All participants were fully debriefed about the tasks, the aims 
of the experiment, and invited to ask questions. Participants were reimbursed for their time in 
either course credits or money, but the sums were approved by the Ethics Committees, and 
were not thought to provide a large incentive to engage in a task that the participants would 
not have wanted to do had the reimbursement not been offered. 
The two areas that required the most thought in terms of ensuring that the procedures 
were ethical were the manipulations and the CI. The manipulations were designed to be 
short-term and had all been used in previous research. Participants who underwent a 
negative mood induction were offered a positive mood induction. Those who read the high IU 
information were given the low IU stories to read. All participants in the PSC were informed 
that the feedback on the tasks was fictional, and all participants were offered a positive mood 
induction (it can be just as distressing to discover that the high score you thought you 
received was false as it can be to be told that you have performed poorly on a task). For the CI, 
participants were asked to pick a topic that was currently worrying them. In each case, the 
participant was asked whether they were comfortable discussing it, or whether they would 
like to pick a different topic. Furthermore, a distress recognition protocol was followed; 
participants were monitored for signs of distress (such as avoiding eye contact, excessive 
fidgeting, crying, etc). If any of these signs were identified, the participant was offered the 
chance to stop the task, and to end the experiment. Finally, while the work conducted for this 
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thesis was not anticipated to cause any harm to the participants, all participants were 
provided with the University of Sussex counselling details during the debriefing.  
3.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
 Examining mechanisms of worry requires valid and reliable techniques to manipulate 
causal variables and to measure the phenomena of interest. This chapter has reviewed the 
methods used to measure worry and systematic processing, and the procedures used to 
manipulate negative mood, IU and PSC in an ethical manner. In the experiments reported in 
this thesis, worry was examined using the PSWQ and the CI. Using these methods together 
allowed for an examination of trait and state worry. The PSWQ is the most-widely used 
method of assessing worry and its norms have been more extensively determined than other 
worry questionnaires. Furthermore, while other state measures exist, such as worry diaries 
and asking participants to report worry thoughts at pseudo-random intervals, they are less 
suited to laboratory manipulations. The diary and thought-reporting techniques rely upon the 
individual experiencing a worry thought, which they might not in the course of the 
experiment. In contrast, the CI guides the participant to think about a worry thought. As such, 
it is possible to examine the effect of short-term laboratory manipulations on worrying. In 
terms of assessing processing styles, participants were asked to report how strongly they 
endorsed a number of cognitive appraisals that represent their sufficiency threshold for 
information processing. Higher sufficiency thresholds are associated with greater amounts of 
systematic processing. This method is preferable to thought-listing as it does not require the 
experimenter to infer what kind of processing led the individual to write down a particular 
thought, which is a subjective, difficult process. A questionnaire measure was also used. While 
the use of questionnaires to measure information processing may be affected by individuals’ 
awareness of their processing styles, this method enables efficient assessment of the way that 
individuals approach processing information.  
Negative mood, IU and low PSC are the independent variables in this thesis. Each of 
these constructs was manipulated to investigate whether these variables increase sufficiency 
thresholds. One of the greatest difficulties in inducing moods is ensuring that participants are 
not aware that it is a mood induction procedure. Tasks that utilize music and videos are often 
transparent mood inductions, which may increase the participants’ demand characteristics. In 
this thesis, a vignette mood induction procedure was used, with a priming condition to control 
for any influence that hearing negative words may have. The vignette procedure allowed a 
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convincing cover story to be presented, namely that the experiment was examining mental 
imagery processes. There have been few experiments that have tried to manipulate either IU 
or PSC. The experiments involved the only procedure for inducing PSC that has been 
published in peer review journals; participants received false-feedback about their 
performance on a problem-solving task. The IU manipulation utilized vignettes in which a 
character either exhibited negative views about uncertainty, or positive views. This method 
relies in part on the participants’ identification with the character, as those who can identify 
with the character are more likely to take on some of their attitudes towards uncertainty. This 
method of inducing IU improves upon past methods because it does not refer to a single 
scenario, rather individuals read about a character in two scenarios, and then apply their 
attitudes to another uncertain situation. Given that worrying is a cognitive process, and many 
of the factors that affect worrying are also cognitive, measuring these processes with accuracy 
is a challenge. Nonetheless, using multiple methods of measurement allows a broad 
assessment of whether systematic processing is a mechanism involved in perseverative 
worry.  
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4 Negative mood and appraisals that facilitate 
systematic information processing 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is designed to explore the mechanism accounting for the association 
between negative mood and worry. Negative mood is defined as “a dimension of subjective 
distress and unpleasurable engagement” (Watson, et al., 1988, p.1063). Chronic worriers 
experience endemic negative mood (Davey, et al., 1992; Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Meyer, et al., 1990; Tallis, et al., 1991; Wisocki, et al., 1986). As outlined in 
Chapter 1, this association may emerge from the negative cognitive processes associated with 
chronic worrying such as negative outcome anticipation (Szabó & Lovibond, 2002), 
processing negative thoughts (Borkovec, et al., 1998), catastrophising (Davey, 2006a), and 
thoughts about personal inadequacy (Davey & Levy, 1998b). However, a number of studies 
support the view that, rather than simply being a consequence of worrying, negative mood is 
a causal contributor. Johnston and Davey (1997) found that inducing negative mood resulted 
in significantly more catastrophising steps being generated during a CI than positive or 
neutral moods. This and similar studies (e.g. Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003) demonstrate that 
negative mood has a causal effect on worry perseveration, and is not simply an outcome of 
worrying.  
 One possible mechanism accounting for the association between negative mood and 
increased worrying is that negative mood influences the style of information processing that 
individuals employ. A significant body of literature suggests that when in a negative mood, an 
individual is more likely to use an analytic processing style (e.g. Ambady & Gray, 2002; 
Tiedens & Linton, 2001). As described in Chapter 2, within the Heuristic-Systematic Model 
(HSM) this effortful processing is called systematic processing, which is described as an 
“analytic orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinize all informational input for its 
relevance and importance… and integrate all useful information in forming their judgments” 
(Chaiken, et al., 1989, p.212). The above description of systematic processing has similarities 
with the persistent, detailed processing of information that characterizes perseverative 
worrying, and negative mood may exert its causal influence by activating systematic 
processing. Crucially, while systematic processing is perceived as cognitively demanding, its 
deployment does not rely on conscious strategies (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), and consequently 
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the need to scrutinize and integrate potentially relevant information (i.e. systematically 
process) may seem uncontrollable in the way that worriers perceive of their worrying as 
uncontrollable (Borkovec, et al., 1983). 
 An important feature of the HSM relevant to pathological worry is the sufficiency 
threshold principle, which recognizes the trade-off between cognitive efficiency and task 
goals. Numerous information processing theories suggest that humans are economy-minded, 
and wish to satisfy goal-related needs in the most efficient way (Chaiken, et al., 1989; Mischel, 
1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). While efficiency is important, individuals exert whatever level of 
effort is required to attain a sufficient degree of confidence that they have satisfactorily 
accomplished their processing goals (Chaiken, et al., 1989). People cannot be certain that their 
judgements are correct, but they can achieve a level of confidence that they perceive as 
reasonable/sufficient. The sufficiency principle is a construct designed to describe the balance 
individuals strike between minimising their cognitive expenditure and maximising their 
confidence in their judgements. According to Chaiken et al. (1989), the sufficiency principle 
“asserts that people will exert whatever level of effort is required to attain a sufficient degree 
of confidence that they have satisfactorily accomplished their processing goals” (p.221). 
Variations in the sufficiency threshold occur due to individual differences (some people may 
require more evidence before making a decision) and situational factors (the task 
importance). Pathological worriers possess characteristics that would raise their sufficiency 
threshold including (1) beliefs that worrying is a necessary process to engage in to avoid 
future threats and problems (Borkovec, et al., 1999; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Breitholtz, et 
al., 1998; Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996; Wells, 1995), (2) use of the ‘as many as can’ (AMA) stop 
rule for worry, specifying that the task must be completed fully and properly (Davey, et al., 
2005), (3) elevated evidence requirements (Tallis, et al., 1991), and (4) dispositional 
characteristics such as perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), responsibility for 
negative outcomes, and inflated concerns over mistakes (Dugas, et al., 1997; Frost, et al., 1990; 
Pratt, et al., 1997; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). A raised sufficiency threshold increases the 
likelihood that systematic processing will be deployed (Chaiken, et al., 1989). 
 Negative mood is also associated with cognitive appraisals that raise sufficiency 
thresholds (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) and this may 
represent the mechanism by which negative mood facilitates perseverative worrying. These 
appraisals include accountability, responsibility, desire for control and need for cognition. 
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Accountability promotes effortful information processing in order to avoid judgements that 
could cause embarrassment or lower self-esteem (Chen, et al., 1996; Livingston & Sinclair, 
2008; Tetlock, 1983). Responsibility is also associated with systematic processing, and 
Bohner et al. (1995) suggested a mechanism through increased task importance and raised 
sufficiency thresholds. Desire for control is the motive to control events in one’s life and 
systematic processing may be deployed in an attempt to maximise control (Burger & Cooper, 
1979). Finally, need for cognition (NFC) is defined as “a need to structure relevant situations 
in meaningful, integrated ways”  (Cohen et al., 1955, p.291). Those high in NFC may find 
systematic processing less aversive in terms of cognitive expenditure. Together, 
responsibility, accountability, NFC and desire for control, give an indication of an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold. 
The experiment presented in this chapter is designed to explore whether systematic 
processing is a mechanism mediating negative mood and worry. This exploration was 
achieved by exposing participants to a negative (versus neutral) mood induction and 
assessing the impact of the individual’s mood state on a measure of their sufficiency 
threshold. The sufficiency threshold measure comprises of four cognitive appraisals 
(accountability, responsibility, NFC, and desire for control), which were chosen because they 
were identified through a detailed literature search as variables that have been linked with 
raised sufficiency thresholds. Each variable has been associated with increased systematic 
processing: accountability (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989), responsibility (Harkins & Petty, 1982), 
NFC (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), and desire for control (Pittman & D'Agostino, 
1989).   
These cognitive appraisals have also been explored in clinical contexts. Responsibility 
consistently emerges in factor analyses of worry content, appraisals and beliefs (Cartwright-
Hatton & Wells, 1997; Langlois, et al., 2000; Sugiura, 2007), and experimentally manipulating 
responsibility increases worrying (Startup & Davey, 2003). Furthermore, feelings of 
accountability predict worry levels of women undergoing cancer screening (Brain, et al., 
2008). Additionally, clinical descriptions highlight worriers’ desire to control unwanted 
thoughts (e.g. Roemer & Borkovec, 1993; Wells, 1995).  
If systematic processing is a mechanism between negative mood and worry, then it 
would be expected that negative mood would facilitate (1) the endorsement of cognitive 
appraisals associated with systematic processing. This experiment is the first to examine the 
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effect of mood states on cognitive appraisals associated with effortful information processing 
and psychopathology. Specifically, given that negative mood signals a situation has not been 
successfully dealt with (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Hsee & Abelson, 1991), it was predicted that 
negative mood would increase reports of accountability, responsibility, NFC, and desire for 
control, and the composite measure of these variables (the processing sufficiency threshold). 
Given previous work (e.g. Johnston & Davey, 1997) it was also predicted that negative mood 
would increase (2) self-report and behavioural measures of worrying, and (3) endorsement of 
‘as many as can’ (AMA) stop rule use. Furthermore, based on the theoretical hypothesis that 
systematic processing may mediate the relationship between negative mood states and 
perseverative worry, it was hypothesised that (4) the causal positive relationship between 
negative mood and worry would be mediated by the endorsement of cognitive appraisals that 
increase sufficiency thresholds and promote systematic processing.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-six (79 females) University of Sussex undergraduate psychology students 
participated, aged 18-40 years (M = 19.70, SD = 3.00). Participants were volunteers and were 
remunerated with course credits. 
4.2.2 Materials 
Mood manipulation check.  
Participants completed two 100-point visual analogue scales (VASs) assessing their 
mood:  ‘Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate’ (i) ‘how sad you feel at the present 
moment’, and (ii) ‘how happy you feel at the present moment’.  
Systematic processing facilitator scale. 
The composite systematic processing facilitator measure was produced by compiling 
the four VASs assessing accountability, responsibility, desire for control, and NFC. As 
described above, these cognitive appraisals were chosen as they are linked with increased 
systematic processing, and emerge in the literature as dominant characteristics of individuals 
who systematically process (e.g. Cacioppo, et al., 1986; Harkins & Petty, 1982; Pittman & 
D'Agostino, 1989; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). An individual’s processing sufficiency threshold 
is dictated by a number of factors, of which responsibility, accountability, NFC, and desire for 
control are four dominant examples in the literature (e.g. Chaiken, et al., 1989). As such, this 
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composite score is theoretically meaningful, as the co-occurrence of moderately high scores 
across these four systematic processing facilitators could increase an individual’s sufficiency 
threshold to the extent that they would persevere with their worrying. See Section 4.3.2 for 
statistical support for the unitary structure of the systematic processing facilitator measure. A 
higher score on the systematic processing facilitator measure represents an increased 
tendency to deploy systematic processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). The VAS questions were 
developed by considering the definitions used in the literature, existing measures, and 
experimental manipulations of the constructs.  
Tetlock (1983) defined accountability as “pressures to define one’s opinions to others” 
(p.74). Indeed, experimental manipulations involve informing the high accountability group 
that they will need to justify their ideas to others (e.g. Livingston & Sinclair, 2008). The VAS 
question measuring accountability was ‘Please indicate on the scale below the extent to which 
you feel that you may have to justify your worries to others’. 
The VAS question measuring responsibility was ‘Please mark a cross along the scale to 
indicate how strongly you hold the belief that if you fail to anticipate (foresee) a potential 
negative outcome, because you did not worry sufficiently, then you are responsible for the 
negative outcome’. This was based upon the Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis, et al., 
2000), the most widely used scale of clinically-relevant responsibility beliefs, containing items 
such as ‘If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences if it 
happens’. 
NFC is the tendency to engage in effortful cognitive endeavours (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984; Cohen, et al., 1955). The question developed was ‘If you were to start worrying 
about something right now, to what extent would you want to think over the issue for a long 
time?’, and derived from its definition as a desire to generate thoughts about an issue, which is 
the basis of items in the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, et al., 1984). 
The desire for control VAS was ‘Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how 
strongly you hold the belief that it is important to have control over things you worry about’, 
and was based upon Burger and Cooper’s (1979) Desirability of Control Scale. 
The cognitive appraisals can occur in the absence of worry, and consequently it is 
important to assess their relevance to a worry context. Accordingly, the VASs were couched in 
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terms of a hypothetical worry. Participants assessed their reactions to a hypothetical worry, 
rather than engaging in a worry bout.  
Other measures. 
Participants completed a VAS measuring deployment of the AMA stop rule (Davey, 
2006b) (‘Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how strongly you hold the belief that 
you will stop worrying when you have worried as much as possible’), as this is likely to be a 
proximal mechanism through which systematic processing is operationalised during the 
worry process. Participants completed the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, et 
al., 1990, see Chapter 3 for more details), which is the most widely used valid measure of 
worry. As outlined in Chapter 3, the PSWQ has been used as an outcome measure to assess 
changes in worrying after a variety of interventions (e.g. Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Goldman, 
Dugas, Sexton, & Gervais, 2007; Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 
2011). Similarly, the PSWQ was used in the present study as an outcome measure across the 
mood induction groups.  The PSWQ consists of 16-items (e.g., ‘Many situations make me 
worry’), and has good test-retest reliability (Meyer, et al., 1990) and internal consistency (α = 
.90; Brown, et al., 1992). 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Stage 1. 
After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: negative mood (n = 30), neutral mood (n = 30) and cognitive priming (CP; n = 26). 
Initially, the mood groups were split into high (n = 15) and low (n = 15) saliency. Mood 
induction saliency was manipulated as individuals may ignore the informational properties of 
mood if they attribute it to a source unrelated to the task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). To 
limit demand characteristics, participants were informed that the study was about mental 
imagery. 
Stage 2 (mood manipulation). 
For a review of mood induction procedures, see Chapter 3. This experiment utilized 
vignettes to induce mood because they allowed for the construction of a convincing cover 
story that the experiment was investigating imagery, and also enabled the inclusion of a 
cognitive priming control condition. Vignettes (based on Scott & Cervone, 2002) were played 
through headphones. The negative mood vignette lasted for 5 min 25 s. Participants in the 
negative mood group were asked to imagine memories they shared with their best friend, and 
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their friend becoming terminally ill. The CP group listened to a modified version of the 
negative vignette, which was slightly shorter at 3 min 42 s because it did not include a few 
sentences which emphasized that the participant should imagine that the following sentences 
were happening to them. In the CP vignette, all first person pronouns were substituted by two 
hypothetical characters, Bill and Joe. So, for example, in the negative mood condition, 
participants heard the sentence ‘Now think about your best friend’, while the CP group heard 
‘Bill and Joe have been good friends’. When the negative mood group heard ‘Now imagine that 
your friend has become progressively ill over the past few months’, the CP group heard ‘Joe 
has been feeling progressively ill over the past few months’. Additionally, the CP group rated 
on a five-point Likert scale the extent that 15 target words were similar to sentences in the 
vignette. So, for example, the participants were required to rate how similar the sentence ‘Bill 
and Joe have been good friends’ is to the word ‘comrade’, and how closely the sentence ‘Joe 
has been feeling progressively ill over the past few months’ is to the word ‘sickly’. Participants 
in the CP group made their ratings in this similarity task on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Not at 
all similar; 5 = ‘very similar’). These ratings were not analysed. Consequently, the CP group 
heard the same negative words as the negative mood group, but did not experience it in a 
personally relevant manner. Thus, individuals in the CP group were not expected to show the 
same level of negative mood or subsequent worry perseveration, forming a control for 
priming effects. Participants in the neutral mood group were guided to imagine various pieces 
of their bedroom furniture, for example ‘Visualise where your desk is – look at all the objects 
that are on your desk’. The neutral mood vignette was 3 min 47 s.  
Stage 3 (saliency manipulation).  
After the vignette, the high saliency groups were told “It can sometimes change your 
mood listening to vignettes like that”. The low saliency and the CP groups were not told 
anything about the possibility of the vignette affecting their mood. A manipulation of the 
saliency of the mood induction was included as some research suggests that individuals 
ignore the informational properties of mood if they attribute it to a transient external source 
of little relevance to the task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The saliency manipulation was 
designed to ensure that mood awareness was not a determining factor and that participants 
were not simply responding to demand characteristics. 
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Stage 4 (VAS questionnaire).  
Participants completed the 100-point VASs described in section 4.2.2 measuring mood 
(sadness, happiness), systematic processing facilitators (responsibility, accountability, desire 
for control, NFC), and AMA deployment.  
Stage 5 (worry measures). 
Participants took part in the CI to provide a behavioural measure of perseverative 
worry (Davey, 2006a; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), see Chapter 3 for details. Use of the CI 
alongside the PSWQ allows for both behavioural and self-reported worry, respectively, to be 
examined. The experimenter begins by asking “what is it that worries you about X?” where X 
is the participant’s current main worry. The experimenter repeats the question, substituting X 
with the participant’s answer to the first question, and so on. Participants are told there is no 
right or wrong time to end the interview, and they should end the interview when they choose 
to. The number of steps generated is taken as a measure of perseveration at the worry task. 
Afterwards, participants completed the PSWQ. 
Stage 6 (debrief). 
During the debrief participants were asked what they thought the purpose of the 
vignette was (saliency manipulation check). Participants were debriefed about the 
experiment’s aims and provided with the university’s Counselling Service details. 
4.2.4 Statistical Analyses 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) script for conducting mediation with multiple mediators 
was used. In assessing mediation, it is possible to calculate the direct effect of an independent 
variable (IV) on a dependent variable (DV) (weight c'), and the indirect effect (weight a × b; 
where a is the effect of the IV on the mediator, and b is the effect of the mediator on the DV) of 
the IV on the DV through the proposed mediator, which together make up the total effect. 
When multiple mediators are hypothesized, one multiple mediator model can be used to 
estimate total indirect effects (i.e. sum of a × b weights for all mediators) and specific indirect 
effects (i.e. a × b effect for each mediator). 
To estimate indirect effects, bootstrapping was used with n = 5000 resamples. 
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling technique that takes n samples from the full 
data and calculates the indirect effects in the resamples; it is preferable to the Sobel test due 
to its greater power (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). For a further discussion of bootstrapping, see 
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Preacher and Hayes (2008). Percentile confidence intervals (95%) were constructed as they 
had the best overall performance on Monte Carlo simulations in terms of controlling Type 1 
error rates, and exhibiting reasonable power (Biesanz, Falk, & Savalei, 2010). Indirect effects 
were considered significant in the case that zero was not contained in the confidence intervals 
(e.g. Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2008). 
4.3 Results 
See Table 4.1 for all descriptive statistics. 
4.3.1 Manipulation Checks 
Mood 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests revealed a significant difference between 
the groups on sadness, F(2, 83) = 23.98, p < .001, and happiness, F(2, 83) = 13.18, p < .001. 
Planned comparisons were conducted to follow-up significant ANOVAs (Field, 2009). In the 
first contrast, the negative mood group [+2] was compared to the neutral mood [-1] and CP [-
1] groups. The negative mood group scored significantly higher on sadness, t(83) = 6.60, p < 
.001, r = .34, and significantly lower on happiness, t(83) = 7.27, p < .001, r = .39, than the 
neutral mood and CP groups, with medium effect sizes (Cohen, 1992). In the second planned 
contrast, the neutral mood group [+1] was compared to the CP group [-1]; there was no 
difference in sadness, t(83) = -1.83, p > .05, r = .04, or happiness, t(83) = 1.13, p > .05, r = .02.  
Saliency 
A chi-square test indicated that the saliency manipulation did not result in a 
significant difference in self-reported awareness of the mood changing potential of vignettes 
across the high and low saliency groups, χ² (1) = 1.09, p = .22. Consequently, saliency groups 
were collapsed by valence. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the mood and systematic processing facilitator measures 
post mood induction procedure. 
 Negative Neutral Cognitive 
Priming 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Sadness*** 61.63 17.88 22.00 24.93 33.19 25.16 
Happiness*** 35.47 18.12 61.20 20.05 55.08 22.53 
Accountability** 66.69 18.70 44.83 26.71 54.96 23.66 
Responsibility 38.52 25.19 37.10 33.78 22.60 20.22 
Desire for control 72.28 15.93 66.43 22.33 72.68 13.75 
Need for cognition 63.59 20.62 52.13 25.09 56.20 18.47 
Composite systematic processing 
facilitator measure1* 
241.07 46.29 200.50 80.73 206.44 35.26 
‘As many as can’ ** 45.97 23.78 22.63 26.12 27.08 20.33 
*p <.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 1Note: Four 100-point VASs combined; score is out of 400, not 100. 
 
4.3.2 Experimental Outcomes 
Systematic processing facilitators. 
Two participants were identified as outliers on boxplots of the distribution of the 
composite measure of systematic processing facilitators and were removed (one low-scoring 
negative mood group participant and one high-scoring CP participant) (see Field, 2009). After 
excluding outliers: negative group n = 29; neutral group, n = 30; CP group n = 25.  
To examine whether the composite measure of systematic processing facilitators is a 
unidimensional composite measure representing how much processing an individual felt was 
required to meet their task goals (i.e. their sufficiency threshold), a principal components 
analysis was conducted. A one-factor solution best reflected the scores on the cognitive 
appraisal items, as shown in the scree plot in Figure 4.3. This single factor (representing the 
sufficiency threshold) accounted for 43% of the variance in scores. The loadings of the items 
on the single factor are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.3 Scree plot of eigenvalues for each component in the 
composite systematic processing facilitator measure scores 
 
Table 4.2 Factor loadings for the composite 
 systematic processing facilitator items 
Item Factor loading 
Accountability 0.65 
Responsibility 0.61 
Desire for control 0.66 
Need for cognition 0.70 
 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference on the composite systematic 
processing facilitator measure, Welch: F(2, 52.33) = 5.58, p = .01. Planned comparisons 
showed that the negative group [-2] scored significantly higher on the composite systematic 
processing facilitator measure than the neutral [+1] and CP [+1] groups, t(65.24) = 3.17, p < 
.01, r = .37, with a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992). The neutral [+1] and CP [-1] groups were 
not significantly different, t(41.19) = -0.36, p > .05, r = .06. 
Individual systematic processing facilitators. 
To assess the effect of the mood inductions on the separate cognitive appraisals, one-
way ANOVAs were conducted with a Bonferroni correction; significant differences were 
accepted when p < .013. All significant one-way ANOVAs were followed up with planned 
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contrasts. The mood induction had a significant effect on accountability, Welch: F(2, 51.83) = 
6.89, p < .01. The negative group reported significantly higher accountability than the neutral 
and CP group, t(72.17) = 3.46, p = .001, r = .38, representing a medium effect size (Cohen, 
1992). The neutral and CP groups were not significantly different, t(52.78) = 1.49, p > .05, r = . 
04. When the corrected p-value of p < .013 is adhered to, there was no significant effect of the 
mood induction on responsibility, desire for control, or NFC, Fs ≤ 3.89, ps ≥ .026. 
To examine whether accountability or the composite systematic processing facilitator 
measure best predicted PSWQ scores, all four cognitive appraisals and the composite 
systematic processing facilitator measure were entered into a stepwise regression, with 
PSWQ as the outcome variable. This procedure was utilised to establish whether the effect of 
negative mood on the composite systematic processing facilitator measure (and subsequent 
worry) was purely accounted for by the accountability measure, or whether more variance in 
PSWQ scores was explained by taking into account individuals’ scores on all four VAS 
measures. A hierarchical method was used, with mood induction condition entered into block 
1 using forced entry, and the single VAS items and composite score entered into block 2 using 
stepwise elimination. In the final model, only the composite systematic processing facilitator 
was a significant predictor, t(79) = 5.93, p < .001, b = 0.11, SE = 0.02, β = .55, accounting for 
36% of PSWQ variance. Mood induction condition did not significantly predict PSWQ scores, 
t(79) = 1.63, p = .11, b = 2.30, SE = 1.42, β = .15. All other VAS variables were excluded from 
the final model, ts ≤ 0.76, ps ≥ .45. Therefore, there is merit in the composite systematic 
processing facilitator measure, and this was included in the subsequent mediation analyses 
(Section 4.3.4), rather than the single accountability measure. 
Worry and stop rule measures.  
The PSWQ showed good internal consistency (α = .92). There was a significant effect 
of mood on PSWQ scores, F(2, 79) = 4.49, p = .01, and planned contrasts showed that the 
negative mood group had significantly higher PSWQ scores than the neutral mood and CP 
groups, t(79) = 3.00, p < .01, r = 0.32 (medium effect size, Cohen, 1992), see Figure 4.4. The 
neutral and CP groups did not significantly differ, t(79) = 0.05, p > .05, r = .01.  
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Figure 4.4 Error bar graph showing mean Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire scores by mood induction conditions 
 
As predicted, the negative mood group generated more catastrophising steps (M = 
10.45, SD = 6.25) than the neutral mood (M = 8.20, SD = 4.29) and CP (M = 7.92, SD = 3.46) 
groups, but these differences did not reach statistical significance, F(2, 81) = 2.29, p = .11.  
The mood induction condition significantly affected AMA stop rule endorsement, F(2, 
81) = 7.91, p = .001; planned contrasts indicated the negative mood group scored significantly 
higher than the neutral mood and CP conditions, t(81) = 3.87, p < .001, r =.40 (medium effect 
size, Cohen, 1992), and the neutral mood and CP groups did not significantly differ, t(81) = -
0.69, p > .05, r = .08. 
4.3.3  Correlational analyses 
Given that the standard deviations are quite large for the mood measures taken post-
mood induction, and the confidence intervals indicate that there is overlap in the scores for 
the cognitive appraisals across the mood induction groups, correlation analyses were 
conducted to examine whether negative mood (sadness VAS) predicted an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold, AMA deployment, and measures of worry. The results are shown in 
Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Correlations between negative mood, systematic processing  
facilitators, and worry  
 NEG ST ACC RESP NFC DFC AMA CI PSWQ 
NEG 1 .38*** .36** .20 .25* .19 .45*** .30* .41*** 
ST  1 .68*** .69*** .65*** .58*** .50*** .11 .58*** 
ACC   1 .26* .26* .18 .34** .03 .39*** 
RESP    1 .18 .21 .44*** .15 .37** 
NFC     1 .32** .25* .02 .43*** 
DFC      1 .24* .08 .37** 
AMA       1 .001 .58*** 
CI         1 -.03 
PSWQ         1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. NEG = negative mood; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP =  
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; AMA = ‘as  
many as can’ stop rule; CI = catastrophising interview steps; PSWQ = Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire 
 
 It was hypothesised that negative mood would increase cognitive appraisals 
(prediction 1). While correlations cannot clarify the direction of relationships, they show that 
increased negative mood is associated with higher scores on the composite cognitive 
appraisal measure (representing an individual’s sufficiency threshold), r = .38, p < .001. 
Furthermore, negative mood significantly positively correlated with accountability, r = .36, p < 
.01, and with NFC, r = .25, p < .05. Negative mood did not significantly correlate with 
responsibility, r = .20, p > .05, or with desire for control, r = .19, p > .05. Similarly, it was 
predicted that negative mood would increase PSWQ scores and CI steps (prediction 2). The 
correlations indicate that the more an individual endorsed being in a negative mood, the 
greater the number of steps that they generated on the CI, r = .30, p < .05, and the higher their 
scores were on the PSWQ, r = .41, p < .001. Finally, prediction 3 stated that negative mood 
would result in greater endorsement of AMA stop rule deployment. Negative mood 
significantly positively correlated with AMA deployment, r = .45, p < .001.  
4.3.4 Mediation analyses 
It was hypothesised that the composite systematic processing facilitator measure and 
AMA stop rule endorsement may mediate negative mood and PSWQ scores. This was tested 
using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) macro. Mood induction condition was entered as the 
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independent variable, and for ease of interpretation, only data from the participants in the 
negative and neutral mood inductions were entered (Preacher and Hayes' (2008) macro is 
suitable for dichotomous predictor variables, Hayes & Preacher, 2011). Participating in a 
negative mood induction was coded as 1, while the neutral mood induction was coded as 0. 
The mediation results are shown in Table 4.4. Unstandardised coefficients are reported as 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008). However, to aid interpretation, standardised 
coefficients are presented in Table 4.5. The indirect effects for all three mediation models 
have confidence intervals that do not include zero, and as such, can be considered significant 
point estimates (p < .05). This indicates that the a x b pathways account for a significant 
amount of variance in the relationship between the IV and the DV; in all cases the specified 
mediating variable mediates the relationship between the specified IV and DV. 
Negative mood was significantly positively related to worry (c weight), and to the two 
mediators (the composite systematic processing facilitator measure and endorsing AMA stop 
rule use, a weights). The mediators were significantly positively associated with worry when 
partialling out negative mood (b weights). When the composite systematic processing 
facilitator measure and the AMA stop rule were analysed simultaneously, both were 
significant positive mediators of negative mood and worry (all a × b confidence intervals 
excluded zero, see Table 4.4). The pathway between negative mood and worry was no longer 
significant when the mediators were included, indicating full mediation.  
The AMA stop rule significantly correlated with the composite systematic processing 
facilitator measure, r(84) = .50, p < .001. To examine whether multicollinearity was affecting 
the results, regression analyses were run, with the composite systematic processing facilitator 
measure and AMA deployment entered as predictors, and worry entered as the outcome. The 
variance inflation factors (VIF) were 1.00, indicating that multicollinearity did not influence 
the results (Field, 2009).  
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Table 4.4 Summary of unstandardised mediation results  
 Independent 
variable  
(IV) 
Mediating 
variable  
(M) 
Dependent 
variable  
(DV) 
Effect of 
IV on M 
(a) 
Effect of 
M on DV 
(b) 
Direct 
effects 
(c') 
Indirect 
effects 
(a × b) 
Total 
effects  
(c) 
1 Negative 
mood 
Systematic 
processing  
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
40.14* 0.08*** 2.20 3.13a 8.21* 
AMA 21.01** 0.14* - 2.88a - 
2 Negative 
mood 
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
Systematic 
processing  
8.21 3.39*** 12.31 27.82a 40.14 
3 Negative 
mood 
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
AMA 8.21* 1.06*** 12.34 8.68a 21.01** 
*p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. a Confidence intervals do not include zero, significant point 
estimate (p < .05). 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of standardized mediation results 
 Independent 
variable  
(IV) 
Mediating 
variable  
(M) 
Dependent 
variable  
(DV) 
Effect of 
IV on M 
(a) 
Effect of 
M on DV 
(b) 
Direct 
effects 
(c') 
Indirect 
effects 
(a × b) 
Total 
effects  
(c) 
1 Negative 
mood 
Systematic 
processing  
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
0.31* 0.44*** 0.18 0.26a 0.66* 
AMA 0.77** 0.31* - 0.23a - 
2 Negative 
mood 
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
Systematic 
processing  
0.67 0.61*** 0.18 0.18 a 0.58 
3 Negative 
mood 
Worry 
(PSWQ) 
AMA 0.67* 0.47*** 0.45 0.32 a 0.77** 
*p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. a Confidence intervals do not include zero, significant point 
estimate (p < .05). 
    
Alternative mediation models. 
Post-hoc alternative models are also conceivable, with worry (PSWQ) potentially 
mediating negative mood and the composite systematic processing facilitator measure, and 
negative mood and AMA endorsement. Two mediation analyses were performed with mood 
induction as the predictor, worry as the mediator, and (separately) the composite systematic 
processing facilitator measure and the AMA stop rule as outcome variables. The results are 
shown in Table 4.4 (standardized coefficients in Table 4.5). The systematic processing 
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facilitator model did not fit a mediation model, with non-significant a and c pathways. For the 
AMA model, negative mood was significantly positively related to worry (a weight) and the 
AMA stop rule, (c weight). Worry was significantly positively associated with AMA stop rule 
use when partialling out negative mood (b weight); a × b confidence intervals excluded zero 
(see Table 4.4). The pathway between negative mood and AMA stop rule use was marginally 
significant (p = .05) suggesting partial mediation. The partial mediation status, alongside 
existing empirical evidence, provides stronger support for the initial mediation model, and 
this is addressed in the discussion. 
4.4 Discussion 
This experiment tested a potential mechanism mediating negative mood and 
increased worrying (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Johnston & Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001). 
Experimentally-induced negative mood significantly increased scores on a composite 
systematic processing facilitator measure, and the endorsement of accountability. However, 
negative mood did not affect responsibility, desire for control or NFC, although the composite 
systematic processing facilitator measure (encompassing all four cognitive appraisals) better 
predicted worry levels than the individual cognitive appraisal ratings. Negative mood 
positively correlated with NFC, despite no between-group differences being identified. 
Additionally, negative mood increased (1) the endorsement of deploying AMA stop rules for 
worrying, and (2) scores on a validated measure of worrying (PSWQ). The CI scores showed a 
trend that was consistent with the prediction that negative mood would facilitate behavioural 
worry measures, and negative mood significantly positively correlated with the number of 
catastrophising steps that an individual generated. The experiment utilized a control 
condition for priming which indicated that the negative mood effects could not be accounted 
for simply by priming. Meditational analyses confirmed that the composite systematic 
processing facilitator measure and AMA stop rule deployment fully mediate negative mood 
and increased worrying.  
These findings confirm the prediction that negative mood facilitates the endorsement 
of cognitive appraisals that increase sufficiency thresholds and trigger the systematic 
processing of information, and this analysis suggests a mechanism by which negative mood 
causes increases in worrying. Many negative moods are known to facilitate the use of an 
analytic processing style (Ambady & Gray, 2002), especially those associated with 
uncertainty, not understanding what is happening, and feeling unsure about what will happen 
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next (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). In this experiment, the negative mood vignette significantly 
increased sadness (associated with uncertainty) and decreased happiness (associated with 
certainty), circumstances which facilitate systematic processing (Bodenhausen, et al., 1994). 
This provides an empirical rationale for predicting that negative mood influences worrying 
through its effect on systematic processing. 
It is interesting to note that in terms of the individual cognitive appraisals only the 
accountability measure was significantly different between the mood groups. Examination of 
what these appraisals measure suggests that the need to justify one’s worries (accountability) 
may be much more heavily implicated in appraising worry, as is seen in the psychopathology-
relevant Type 2 worry (see Wells, 1995). This provides further support to the notion that 
negative mood states can increase perseverative pathological worrying. As reported in the 
literature on heuristic and systematic processing literature (Chen, et al., 1996; Erb, et al., 
2007; Livingston & Sinclair, 2008; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) when individuals 
feel high levels of accountability, they feel a greater need to process their thoughts in great 
detail, possess higher sufficiency thresholds, and are more likely to deploy systematic 
processing. Thus, the accountability measure may reflect appraisals associated with Type 2 
worry; the other VAS measures may better reflect Type 1 worry appraisals. While a greater 
endorsement of a negative mood was associated with significantly higher self-reported NFC, 
there were no significant between-group differences. This may reflect that NFC is typically 
considered a dispositional characteristic (e.g. Cacioppo, et al., 1986), and may be less affected 
by short-term experimental manipulations.  
The relationship between negative mood and PSWQ scores was also mediated by 
intention to use AMA stop rules. This was independent of the mediating effect of systematic 
processing appraisals as both represented independent sources of PSWQ variance. This may 
reflect a separate effect of negative mood inducing higher performance standards (Scott & 
Cervone, 2002), causing individuals to become relatively dissatisfied with any given level of 
performance (Cervone, et al., 1994). This may lead to deployment of AMA stop rules (‘I must 
continue with the task till I am sure I have met all my specific goals for the task’) rather than 
‘feel like continuing’ (FLC) stop rules (‘I will continue with the task until I no longer feel like 
doing it any more’). One interpretation is that the sufficiency threshold measure indicates the 
extent that appraisals are triggering systematic processing through a raised processing 
threshold, whereas AMA deployment represents a more generic measure of an individual’s 
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goals for their worrying (e.g., ‘I must worry until I have resolved this problem/feel less 
anxious’). To some extent these two factors are inter-related, in that systematic processing 
may be necessary to achieve stringently-defined goals for worrying, but systematic processing 
is a means to an end and not an end in itself, so the deployment of stop rules will inevitably be 
affected by a wider range of variables than those that trigger systematic processing. 
However, as shown by the alternative mediation models, this is not the only model 
consistent with the data obtained. Worry also mediated the relationship between negative 
mood and the AMA stop rule. Worrying may lead to the deployment of the AMA rule, as the 
task is rationalized to be problematic, and therefore a large amount of cognitive expenditure 
is warranted. However, mediation models cannot test causation, and therefore the statistical 
significance of the indirect effects of these alternative models is not evidence in itself that the 
directional relationship exists (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The alternative models need to be 
examined in future experiments that involve experimental manipulations. However, while 
evidence exists demonstrating a causal effect of AMA stop rules on worrying (Davey, 2006b; 
Davey, et al., 2005; Startup & Davey, 2001), there is no evidence indicative of a causal effect of 
worrying on AMA stop rule deployment. Indeed, evidence indicates the opposite effect: as 
worry persists, worriers turn to deploying FLC rather than AMA stop rules (Davey, Eldridge, 
Drost, & MacDonald, 2007), supporting the first mediation model over the second, and guiding 
the predictions of future studies. Furthermore, the experimental procedure involved 
measuring AMA deployment and the sufficiency threshold, before measuring worry levels, 
and as such these proposed mediators were activated prior to measuring worry. Additionally, 
the alternative mediation model, with worry as the mediator and AMA stop rule use as the 
outcome variable, only indicated partial mediation, compared with full mediation when AMA 
stop rule use and the composite systematic processing facilitator measure were included as 
mediators between negative mood and worry. 
One potential limitation is that no direct measure of systematic processing was used in 
the present experiment, and there was a reliance on self-report measures. This is perhaps not 
surprising because – to the authors’ knowledge – there is currently no validated measure of 
systematic processing as such (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of measures of systematic 
processing). This issue is addressed in the General Discussion (see Chapter 9).  
Although two worry measures were utilized, only the questionnaire measure (PSWQ) 
exhibited a significant between-group mood effect. The PSWQ is typically considered a trait 
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measure but is used frequently in clinical research contexts to demonstrate changes in self-
perceived levels of worry (Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Goldman, et al., 2007; Treanor, et al., 
2011). These results, somewhat surprisingly, indicate that short-term laboratory 
manipulations, such as mood inductions, can affect participants’ responses to supposedly trait 
measures. Metacognitive theory proposes that appraising worry levels as problematic is a key 
component of GAD (Type 2 worry, Wells, 1995), and this memory and appraisal bias for worry 
frequency may act as a mechanism for the onset of Type 2 worry/meta-worry. The 
behavioural measure (CI steps) showed trends in the predicted directions, with a significant 
positive correlation obtained between negative mood and CI steps. But differences in the 
number of CI steps across mood induction groups failed to reach statistical significance. This 
is probably due to the temporal distance between the mood induction and the CI, which was 
greater than in previous studies (e.g. Johnston & Davey, 1997). This result does not dispute 
that negative mood facilitates worrying, which has now been reported in a series of studies 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Johnston & Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001), but emphasizes the 
importance of utilizing a range of worry measures in future studies to allow a more thorough 
analysis of the factors mediating causal variables and subsequent worrying. 
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5 Intolerance of uncertainty and appraisals that 
facilitate systematic information processing 
5.1 The role of intolerance of uncertainty in perseverative worry 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is defined as “the way in which an individual perceives 
information in uncertain situations and responds to this information with a set of cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural reactions” (Ladouceur, et al., 1998, p. 141). The relationship 
between IU and perseverative worry was reviewed in Chapter 1. Despite its conceptualization 
as a dispositional characteristic, experiments have demonstrated that IU can be successfully 
manipulated in laboratory settings (e.g., Ladouceur, et al., 2000). In these experiments, 
increasing IU increased worry, implicating a causal role for IU in perseverative worry.  
The IU mechanism resulting in increased worry is unclear. It has been suggested that 
IU is the driving force behind the ‘what if…?’ questioning style that is characteristic of anxious 
anticipation (Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998). In individuals with a diagnosis of GAD, ‘what if..?’ 
questioning leads to catastrophising, whereby progressively worse outcomes of the worry 
topic are perceived. Understandably, this leads to increased subjective discomfort and it is 
also associated with the belief that such thoughts are more likely to materialise (Vasey & 
Borkovec, 1992). A related proposal is that individuals with IU possess processing biases that 
lead to ambiguous events being perceived as threatening and intolerable (Butler & Mathews, 
1983, 1987). These biases lead individuals with IU to search for more information, using the 
‘what if…?’ question formulation, to explore the likelihood of negative consequences of 
uncertainty. It is well established that high IU individuals require more information before 
feeling confident in their decision making (e.g., Carleton, et al., 2007).  
Rosen and Knäuper (2009) explored the impact of IU and situational uncertainty (SU) 
on information-seeking and worry. They contrast IU and SU as representing trait and state 
individual differences in response to uncertainty, respectively, and suggest that IU is 
associated with activation of coping strategies, such as information-seeking, whereas SU is 
associated with approach/avoidance tendencies surrounding uncertain situations. Rosen and 
Knäuper (2009) manipulated IU using a false feedback procedure and SU through modifying 
information that participants were given to read about a fictional illness. They found an 
interaction between IU and SU; those in the high IU/high SU condition sought the most 
information and worried the most, while those in the low IU/low SU group sought the least 
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information and worried the least. Uncertainty-oriented individuals can actually experience 
an increase in anxiety after information-seeking as uncertainties cannot always be resolved 
through more information (Rosen, et al., 2009).  
‘Searching for more information’ has been used as an indicator of systematic 
processing in a number of studies (e.g. Griffin, et al., 2008). Chaiken et al. (1989) state that 
seeking out and integrating all relevant information is characteristic of systematic processing, 
and as reviewed above, information-seeking is characteristic of high IU individuals. Therefore, 
the experiments outlined in this chapter explore whether IU might impact on worry through 
increased systematic processing.  
5.2 Intolerance of uncertainty and the sufficiency threshold 
 As outlined in Chapter 2, the sufficiency threshold is key in determining the amount of 
systematic processing an individual engages in. It represents the amount of processing that an 
individual feels is necessary in order to minimize any discrepancy between the level of 
confidence that they have in a decision/judgement and their desired level of confidence 
(Chaiken, et al., 1989). Given that high IU individuals require more information than their low 
IU counterparts in order to be confident in their decision making (Carleton, et al., 2007; 
Ladouceur, et al., 1997; Tallis, et al., 1991), high IU individuals may have high sufficiency 
thresholds (i.e. lower confidence levels than they desire). As sufficiency thresholds increase, it 
is less likely that heuristic processing will confer sufficient confidence, and as such individuals 
are increasingly likely to deploy systematic processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). One strategy, 
outlined above, that individuals may activate in an attempt to minimise this discrepancy is to 
seek more information, which may result in the use of ‘what if?’ thinking in an attempt to 
consider all possible negative outcomes of a given ambiguous situation.  
5.3 Intolerance of uncertainty in relation to systematic 
processing facilitators 
 High IU may raise sufficiency thresholds by affecting systematic processing facilitators 
(see Chapter 2). There has been little, if any, investigation on how finding uncertainty 
unpleasant affects the appraisals of personal relevance or task importance. Nor has the 
relationship been explored between IU and feeling accountable, or having higher need for 
cognition (NFC). Inflated responsibility and IU are both implicated in anxiety. For example, a 
validated measure of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), the Obsessive Beliefs 
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Questionnaire, has three subscales, two of which tap inflated responsibility and IU (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005). But 
studies have not previously examined the relationship between these variables, and of 
particular relevance to the current experiments, studies have not assessed whether raising 
feelings of IU also affects responsibility.  
In contrast, there is evidence suggesting a link between IU and the systematic 
processing facilitator, desire for control, in the context of psychopathology. Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas and Ladouceur (1994) emphasise the role of control processes in 
their description of the manifestation of IU as “behavioural attempts to control the future and 
avoid uncertainty” (p.799). This is reflected in the dominant measure of IU, the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, et al., 1994), which includes items that assess attempts to control 
future events. Again, considering IU in OCD, rather than worry, Sookman and Pinard (2002) 
demonstrated an association between IU and a need for control. Moulding and Kyrios (2007) 
found that IU could be predicted by an individual’s control cognitions, and that desire for 
control was correlated with the obsessive-compulsive sub-domain of IU and perfectionism. 
Evidence of an association between IU and a strong desire for control has also been found in 
the context of anorexia nervosa (Sternheim, Konstantellou, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011). It has 
been suggested that the association between a desire for control and IU might arise because of 
a form of IU described as a ‘need to know what will happen’ (Niceli & Castelfranchi, 2001), 
and Mushtaq, Bland and Schafer (2011) suggest that “the perception and estimation of 
uncertainty might play a key role in monitoring processes and the evaluation of the “need for 
control”” (p.249). Thus, there is a theoretical rationale for predicting that IU will raise 
sufficiency thresholds due to its effects on desire for control, and subsequently result in more 
systematic processing.  
5.4 Experiment 2 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 Experiment 1 (Chapter 4) demonstrated that part of the impact of negative mood on 
increased worry scores was through a mechanism of a raised sufficiency threshold for 
processing information. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether another variable 
implicated in perseverative worry, IU, also operated through a mechanism of increased 
information processing thresholds. It was hypothesised that individuals who feel intolerant of 
uncertainty will strive to minimise uncertainties and gain control through detailed 
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examination of the issues at hand. Such an approach would raise sufficiency thresholds for 
processing information, and should result in systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).  
 The methodology used in Experiment 1 is refined in Experiment 2. Firstly, in 
Experiment 1, the questions measuring factors that promote systematic processing were 
couched in terms of a worry, e.g., ‘If you were to start worrying about something right now, to 
what extent would you want to think over the issue for a long time?’ Consequently, differences 
in responses to these questions across the negative mood and neutral mood groups in 
Experiment 1 could be due to the effect negative mood has on appraising worry, rather than 
the systematic processing facilitators. To avoid this potential confound, in Experiment 2, 
participants were provided with a worry vignette and asked how they felt in relation to the 
vignette without using the word worry, e.g., ‘To what extent would you need to think about 
the issues if you were in [character’s name] position?’. Secondly, to improve the construct 
validity of the VAS questions measuring factors that promote systematic processing, three 
items were used to measure each factor, rather than the single-item VAS measures used in 
Experiment 1. Lastly, given that personal relevance and task importance are deemed 
important factors in determining an individual’s sufficiency threshold (Chaiken et al., 1989), 
VAS measures of these variables were included in Experiment 2.  
 It was predicted that if systematic processing is a mechanism mediating the 
relationship between IU and worry, then high levels of IU would facilitate: (1) the 
endorsement of cognitive appraisals associated with systematic processing and (2) self-report 
and behavioural measures of worrying. Furthermore, (3) the causal relationship between IU 
and worry would be mediated by the endorsement of cognitive appraisals that increase 
sufficiency thresholds and promote systematic processing. 
5.4.2 Method 
Participants. 
Fifty-eight (43 females, 15 males) undergraduate and postgraduate students took part in 
the experiment, of which 33 students were studying Psychology, and the remaining 25 students 
were studying a variety of courses at the University of Sussex. The age range was 18-28 (M = 
20.34, SD = 2.24). Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and were remunerated with 
course credits or compensated for their time at the rate of £5 per hour (the experiment typically 
lasted 75 minutes and participants were paid £6.25). 
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Materials. 
Manipulation checks. 
Participants completed a short questionnaire comprising 100-point VASs. There were 
three VAS questions measuring IU, which acted as manipulation checks. The first and second 
items examine negative beliefs about uncertainty, in relation to a specific uncertain situation 
that the participant had just described, and also to feelings of uncertainty more generally. The 
third question examines state uncertainty. These items are shown in Table 5.6 and measure 
the cardinal feature of the IU construct, namely ‘negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 
implications’ (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). To examine both the impact of the manipulation on 
feelings related to the uncertain situation that the participant described specifically, and 
extended beyond the situation to more global feelings, items 1 and 2 measure concern about 
uncertainty in relation to the situation and general feelings of uncertainty, respectively. It is 
possible that uncertainty when there is the potential for a negative outcome always generates 
negative appraisals. As such, the third item measures current feelings of uncertainty, rather 
than the appraisals of such uncertainty, to allow an examination of whether it is uncertainty 
per se, or the appraisals of uncertainty that are affected by the manipulation.  
Also included were three questions measuring PSC and mood (see Table 5.6) as these 
are the other two key independent variables under examination in this thesis. Mood and PSC 
have been shown to affect worry scores (see Chapter 1), and as such, data was collected to 
allow these variables to be controlled for. The PSC items are based on the problem-solving 
subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner & Petersen, 1982). The mood 
items measured four mood states (sadness, anxiety, arousal and happiness), and were the 
same as those used in Experiment 1 (see Chapter 4) to allow comparison of the outcomes of 
IU induction, relative to the mood inductions of Experiment 1. 
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Table 5.6 Items measuring intolerance of uncertainty, problem-solving confidence, and mood  
Construct Item 
NB. All items began with ‘Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate...’ 
IU items 
IU-Q1 how concerned you are about the uncertainty of the situation you have described above 
IU-Q2 at this moment in time, how much feelings of uncertainty concern you 
IU-Q3 how uncertain you feel at this moment in time 
PSC items 
PSC-Q1 the extent to which you would like to tackle problems at this moment in time 
PSC-Q2 how confident you feel about your ability to solve problems at this moment in time 
PSC-Q3 how confident you feel about solving problems related to the situation you described 
above 
Mood 
Sadness how sad you feel at the present moment 
Happiness how happy you feel at the present moment 
Anxiety how anxious you feel at the present moment 
Arousal how aroused (i.e. awake, alert or stimulated) you feel at the present moment 
 
Worry vignette and systematic processing facilitators questionnaire. 
In order to assess whether IU resulted in changes in personal relevance appraisals, it 
was necessary to design a scenario that participants could judge for personal relevance. 
Participants read two worry vignettes consisting of a short paragraph that described the 
worries of a character. There were both male and female protagonist versions, and 
participants were given the version to match their own gender so that the potential for 
personal identification with the characters was equal across genders. The worry vignettes 
were based on real responses to a CI (see Davey, 2006). The vignette topics were ‘degree 
work’ and ‘finances’ based on the observation that these were the two most commonly 
reported worry topics in the CIs in Experiment 1. The order of the vignettes was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
After reading each worry vignette, participants were asked how much they endorsed 
VAS items, measuring systematic processing facilitators (personal relevance, task importance, 
responsibility, accountability, desire for control, and NFC); the items are shown in Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.7 Items measuring systematic processing facilitators 
Factor Item 
Personal relevance 1 To what extent is the passage above personally relevant? 
Personal relevance 2 To what extent do you feel that the passage above relates to your life? 
Personal relevance 3 To what extent do you see yourself sharing the same thoughts as [name of 
character]? 
Task importance 1 To what extent do you feel the passage above involves an important issue? 
Task importance 2 If you were in [name of character] situation, to what extent would the issues 
described in the passage be a priority for you? 
Task importance 3 How significant would these issues be if you were in [name of character] 
situation? 
Responsibility 1 To what extent would you feel responsible if you were in [character’s name] 
position? 
Responsibility 2 If you were in [character’s name] position to what extent would you believe 
you should try and prevent the outcomes predicted by [character’s name]? 
Responsibility 3 To what extent would you think it was your job to think through the 
consequences of the issues, if you were in [character’s name] situation? 
Accountability 1 To what extent would you feel accountable if you were in [character’s name] 
position? 
Accountability 2 To what extent do you feel that you would have to share your thoughts with 
others at some point if you were in [character’s name] situation? 
Accountability 3 Imagine you are in [character’s name] position and have to share your 
thoughts with others. To what extent would you want to make sure you could 
justify your thoughts to others?  
Need for cognition 1 To what extent would you need to think about the issues if you were in 
[character’s name] position? 
Need for cognition 2 To what extent do you think the issues described above need deliberating? 
Need for cognition 3 If you were in [character’s name] situation, to what extent would you spend 
time thinking about these issues? 
Desire for control 1 To what extent would you want someone else to tell you what to do if you 
were in [character’s name] situation?  
Desire for control 2 To what extent would you want to have control over the situation? 
Desire for control 3 Imagine you were in [character’s name] situation, to what extent would you 
want to do something about it, rather than letting it continue? 
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The accountability VASs were formed by considering the definition of accountability  
(i.e. that one will have to justify one’s ideas). Consideration was given to how accountability 
has been manipulated in experiments. A group of participants believe they will have to justify 
their responses (high accountability) and another group believe their views will remain 
anonymous (low accountability) (e.g., Tetlock, 1983). The VASs measuring responsibility were 
based on items from the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS: Salkovskis, et al., 2000), a 26-item 
questionnaire which includes items such as ‘I must always think through the consequences of 
even the smallest actions’. The NFC VASs were based on generating thoughts about an issue, 
as represented in the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984), which includes 
items such as ‘I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to 
think in depth about something’. The VASs measuring desire for control were based upon 
Burger and Cooper’s (1979) Desirability of Control scale, which contains items like ‘I enjoy 
having control over my own destiny’. The questionnaire also included one VAS measure of 
worry: ‘How worried would you be if you were in [character’s name] position?’ 
Validated questionnaire measures. 
Participants completed the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) (Freeston, Rheaume, 
Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), the PSC subscale of the Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner 
& Petersen, 1982), and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer et al., 1990). A full 
discussion of these measures and their psychometric properties is given in Chapter 3; only brief 
details are presented here. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
The IUS (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27-item scale 
assessing “emotional, cognitive and behavioral reactions to ambiguous situations, implications of 
being uncertain, and attempts to control the future” (Freeston et al., 1994, p. 791). It consists of 
items such as ‘Uncertainty makes life intolerable’ and ‘My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know 
what will happen tomorrow’.  
Problem-solving confidence subscale. 
 The PSC subscale is taken from Heppner and Petersen’s (1982) Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory. It consists of 11-items (e.g., ‘Many problems I face are too complex for me to solve’ 
(reverse-scored), ‘I trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems’).  
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Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
Participants completed the PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990), see Chapter 3. The PSWQ 
consists of 16-items (e.g., ‘Many situations make me worry’). 
Procedure 
Stage 1 (informed consent). 
Participants read an information sheet about the nature of the tasks and provided 
informed consent. 
Stage 2 (intolerance of uncertainty manipulation). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: high IU or low IU. 
Participants then underwent the IU manipulation, which was based on a procedure used by 
Kelly (2009) and is designed to manipulate the participants’ IU. For a review of this particular 
IU manipulation compared to manipulations employed in other research on IU, refer to 
Chapter 3.  
This manipulation uses four sets of two short stories (Appendices F-I). In one set, the 
character has high IU. There is a male version (Appendix F) and a female version (Appendix 
G). In the other set, the character has low IU. Again, there is a male version (Appendix H) and a 
female version (Appendix I). The scenarios are gender-congruent to ensure the participants 
can relate as fully as possible to the character and their gender-typical attitudes. In each of the 
scenarios, the character encounters an uncertain situation that has a potentially negative 
outcome. 
Participants were given ten minutes to read the stories and try to understand the 
motivations of the central character. Afterwards, participants were asked to “think of a 
situation in your own life where you aren’t sure whether the outcome will be good or bad” 
and to briefly describe the situation. After spending five minutes describing their own 
potentially negative life event, participants received the following instructions “We want you 
to imagine that you are Sean [or Sarah] from the stories you have just read, and that you keep 
a journal about your thoughts and feelings about key issues and events in your life. Please 
take fifteen minutes to write a journal entry describing how you would feel if you were Sean 
[or Sarah] and were experiencing the situation you have just described above. Try to be as 
detailed as possible in describing how you (Sean [or Sarah]) would feel about the dilemma”. 
After the fifteen minutes had passed, participants were given five minutes to read the diary 
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entry they had written with an emphasis placed on understanding the feelings of the central 
character. 
Stage 3 (manipulation checks). 
Participants completed the manipulation check VASs. 
Stage 4 (vignettes and systematic processing facilitators questionnaire). 
Participants were presented with two worry vignettes and a set of questions measuring 
systematic processing facilitators (these questions were answered twice – i.e. they were 
completed after reading each worry vignette). 
Stage 5 (catastrophising interview). 
Participants took part in a worry CI about a current main worry (See chapters 3 for details 
about the CI). 
Stage 6 (validated questionnaires). 
Participants completed the IUS (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) the PSI (Heppner & Petersen, 1982), 
and the PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990). 
Stage 7 (demographics and debrief). 
Participants provided demographic information (age, gender, year of study). Participants 
were debriefed about the true aims of the experiment, participants in the high IU condition were 
given the low IU stories to read, and participants were reimbursed for their time. 
5.4.3 Results 
Prior to analysis, composite scores were calculated for the IU and PSC manipulation 
checks, and each of the systematic processing facilitators (personal relevance, task 
importance, responsibility, accountability, desire for control, and NFC). The composite 
measures were calculated by adding together the specific VAS questions designed to measure 
each of the constructs.  
5.4.3.1 Demographics 
 Chi-square tests revealed no significant difference across the high and low IU groups 
in terms of the participants’ gender, χ²(1) = 0.02, p = .89, subject of study, χ²(22) = 22.32, p = 
.44, or year of study, χ²(4) = 3.93, p = .42.  
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5.4.3.2 Manipulation Checks 
Prior to analysis, composite scores were calculated for the IU and PSC manipulation 
check items, where three items had been used to measure each construct. 
Intolerance of uncertainty. 
Descriptive statistics for the IU manipulation check items are shown in Table 5.8. An 
independent t-test indicated a significant difference between the high IU group (M = 164.67, 
SD = 64.87) and the low IU group (M = 113.57, SD = 68.17) on the composite of the IUS VAS 
items, t(56) = 2.93, p = .005, r = .13. Further examination of the individual VAS items using 
independent t-tests (Bonferroni corrected; criterion value of p < .02) demonstrated that the 
high IU and the low IU group differed significantly on two out of the three items. The high IU 
group scored significantly higher than the low IU group on the items ‘the extent at the present 
time that feelings of uncertainty concern you’, t(56) = 3.01, p = .004, r = .14, and ‘how 
uncertain you feel at this moment in time’ , t(56) = 2.73, p = .008, r = .12. The VAS item ‘the 
extent of concerns about the uncertainty of the situation’ was endorsed more strongly by the 
high IU group than the low IU group, but this difference did not reach statistical significance, 
t(56) = 1.77, p = .082, r = .05.  
 
Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics for the intolerance of uncertainty manipulation check items 
by intolerance of uncertainty condition. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 High IU Low IU 
IU composite* 164.67 (64.87) 113.57 (68.17) 
‘The extent at the present time that feelings of uncertainty 
concern you’* 
58.37 (26.60) 38.11 (24.44) 
‘How uncertain you feel at this moment in time’* 50.20 (24.20) 32.14 (26.12) 
‘The extent of concerns about the uncertainty of the situation’ 56.10 (28.00) 43.32 (26.80) 
*p < .01 
Mood. 
Descriptive statistics for the mood manipulation check items are shown in Table 5.9. 
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine whether the IU manipulation affected mood 
states (Bonferroni-corrected p-value criterion was adjusted to p < .013). The IU manipulation 
significantly affected sadness, t(53.53) = 2.11, p = .04, with the high IU group reporting 
significantly higher levels of sadness than the low IU group. However, the difference on 
sadness is not significant when the Bonferroni-corrected p-value is adhered to. The anxiety 
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ratings were significantly different, t(56) = 2.99, p = .004, r = .14, with the high IU group 
reporting significantly higher anxiety levels than the low IU group. There was no significant 
difference between the high IU group and the low IU group on the measure of happiness, t(56) 
= 0.45, p = .65, r = .001, or arousal, t(56) = 0.54, p = .59, r = .005.  
 
Table 5.9 Descriptive statistics for the mood manipulation 
check items by intolerance of uncertainty condition. Standard 
 deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 High IU Low IU 
Sadness* 24.97 (19.07) 15.68 (14.26) 
Anxiety** 50.73 (26.53) 29.61 (27.33) 
Happiness 65.30 (18.73) 67.61 (20.15) 
Arousal 56.43 (22.99) 53.04 (24.91) 
   *p < .05, **p < .01 
Problem-solving confidence. 
Descriptive statistics for the PSC manipulation check items are shown in Table 5.10. 
The IU manipulation did not significantly affect PSC; an independent t-test indicated no 
significant difference on the composite measure of the three PSC VASs, t(56) = -0.78, p = .44, r 
= .01. Similarly, there were no significant differences when independent t-tests were 
conducted on the individual VAS items: ‘Extent you would like to tackle problems’, t(56) = -
0.57, p = .57, r = .006; ‘How confident you feel about your ability to solve problems at this 
moment in time’, t(56) = -1.20, p = .24, r = .03, and ‘How confident you feel about solving 
problems related to the situation you described above’, t(56) = -1.40, p = .89, r = .03.  
 
Table 5.10 Mean scores for the PSC manipulation check items and composite by IU condition. 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 High IU Low IU 
PSC composite 179.13 (45.79) 189.71 (57.29) 
‘Extent you would like to tackle problems’ 57.37 (24.29) 60.96 (24.06) 
‘How confident you feel about your ability to solve problems at 
this moment in time’ 
60.67 (19.01) 66.79 (19.99) 
‘How confident you feel about solving problems related to the 
situation you described above’ 
61.10 (22.27) 61.96 (24.64) 
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5.4.3.3 Experimental Outcomes 
Prior to analysis, composite scores were computed for each of the systematic processing 
facilitator variables (personal relevance, task importance, accountability, responsibility, 
desire for control, and need for cognition) by adding together the three VAS questions for 
each variable. These composites were also added together to represent an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold. There was a composite score for the coursework questions and a 
separate composite score for the financial questions. Descriptive statistics for the systematic 
processing cognitive appraisals are shown in Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics for the composite measure of the cognitive 
appraisals that facilitate systematic processing, shown by worry vignette and 
intolerance of uncertainty condition 
  High IU Low IU 
Vignette M SD M SD 
Personal relevance Coursework 165.97 84.23 128.46 82.32 
 Financial 152.70 89.96 142.71 82.31 
Task importance Coursework 226.73 59.29 224.21 53.02 
 Financial 239.47 43.20 257.93 29.40 
Accountability Coursework 202.90 62.29 219.68 37.90 
 Financial 226.97 43.77 236.43 33.55 
Responsibility Coursework 230.90 47.07 234.68 46.69 
 Financial 255.47 31.03 261.11 33.09 
Desire for control Coursework 222.30 46.17 234.04 33.78 
 Financial 241.87 39.83 244.07 33.97 
Need for cognition Coursework 212.97 54.82 209.75 40.71 
 Financial 218.30 50.24 240.32 36.31 
Sufficiency thresholda Coursework 1329.00 265.28 1293.11 216.17 
 Financial 1380.67 166.21 1447.79 142.59 
aComposite measure of the six cognitive appraisals associated with increased  
systematic processing 
 
Coursework. 
 An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high and low IU 
groups on the coursework vignette sufficiency threshold, t(56) = 0.56, p = .576, r = .006. There 
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were no significant differences between the high and low IU groups on any of the individual 
systematic processing facilitators following the coursework vignette, ts ≤ ±1.71, ps ≥ .09. An 
independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high IU group (M = 67.63, 
SD = 23.95) and the low IU group (M = 68.79, SD = 26.21), on the coursework vignette worry 
VAS, t(56) = -0.18, p = .86, r = .001. 
Financial vignette. 
An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high and low IU 
group on the financial vignette sufficiency threshold, t(56) = -1.65, p = .11, r = .05. There were 
no significant differences between the high and low IU groups on any of the systematic 
processing facilitators following the financial vignette, ts ≤ ±1.90, ps ≥ .06. An independent t-
test indicated a significant difference between the high IU group (M = 77.23, SD = 19.42) and 
the low IU group (M = 87.00, SD = 10.93), on the financial vignette worry VAS, t(46.31) = -2.38, 
p = .02, r = .11. This was against the predicted direction, with the group who received the low 
IU manipulation reporting that they would feel more worried about the financial scenario 
than participants in the group who received the high IU manipulation.  
Catastrophising interview 
 An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high IU group 
(M =7.57, SD = 3.28) and low IU groups (M = 7.57, SD = 4.18) in terms of the number of 
catastrophising steps that they generated, t(56) = -0.005, p = .996. The mean number of 
catastrophising steps is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5 Error bar graph showing mean number of catastrophising 
steps by intolerance of uncertainty condition. Error bars represent one 
standard deviation. 
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Validated questionnaire measures. 
 Independent t-tests indicated no significant difference between the high and low IU 
groups on the validated questionnaires, the IUS, t(56) = 1.60, p = .116, r = .04, the PSWQ, 
t(544) = 1.48, p = .116, r = .04, and the PSI PSC subscale, t(555) = 0.86, p = .393, r = .02. 
Examination of the means (see Table 5.12) suggests that the high IU manipulation increased 
IU and PSWQ scores, and decreased PSC scores in the predicted direction relative to the low 
IU manipulation, but that these differences did not reach statistical significance.  
 
Table 5.12 The descriptive statistics for the validated 
questionnaires shown by IU condition. 
Questionnaire High IU Low IU 
 M SD M SD 
IUS 64.36 22.20 55.79 18.33 
PSWQ 53.72 13.72 48.67 11.65 
PSC 47.28 7.07 49.57 9.80 
 
5.4.3.4 Correlational analyses 
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine whether composite IU predicted an 
individual’s sufficiency threshold, ‘as many as can’ deployment, and measures of worry. This 
was because the confidence intervals are quite large for the composite IU measure and the 
confidence intervals for the sufficiency thresholds for the coursework and financial vignettes 
indicate that there is overlap across the IU groups. The results are shown separately for the 
coursework and financial vignettes in Tables 5.13 and 5.14, respectively. 
For the coursework vignette, as predicted, IU significantly positively correlated with 
the sufficiency threshold, r = .36, p < .01, personal relevance, r = .41, p < .01, task importance, r 
= .30, p < .01, and need for cognition, r = .26, p < .05. In relation to the coursework vignette, IU 
did not correlate with accountability, r = .14, p > .05, responsibility, r = .08, p > .05, and desire 
for control, r = -.06, p > .05. The pattern of results was different for the financial vignette, with 
IU failing to correlate with the sufficiency threshold, r = -.03, personal relevance, r = .02, task 
                                                     
4
 The degrees of freedom are smaller for this test as two participants missed items on the scale and hence a 
total PSWQ score could not be compiled. 
5
 One participant did not complete all items of the PSC subscale of the PSI. 
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importance, r = .07, accountability, r = -.02, responsibility, r = -.08, need for cognition, r = .04, 
and desire for control, r = .11, all ps > .05. 
 
Table 5.13 Correlations between intolerance of uncertainty, systematic processing 
facilitators in relation to the coursework vignette, and worry 
 IU ST PR TI ACC RESP NFC DC CI PSWQ 
IU 1 .36
**
 .41
**
 .30
*
 .14 .08 .26
*
 -.06 .06 .49
***
 
ST  1 .66
***
 .88
***
 .66
***
 .78
***
 .77
***
 .41
**
 -.004 .18 
PR   1 .44
**
 .14 .26
*
 .31 -.03 .13 .47
***
 
TI    1 .53
***
 .66
***
 .74
***
 .41
**
 -.06 .13 
ACC     1 .65
***
 .45
***
 .52
***
 -.18 -.22 
RESP      1 .58
***
 .46
***
 -.08 -.15 
NFC       1 .46
***
 .01 .20 
DC        1 .01 -.16 
CI         1 -.02 
PSWQ          1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. IU = intolerance of uncertainty; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP = 
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; CI = catastrophising interview steps; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
 
Table 5.14 Correlations between intolerance of uncertainty, systematic processing 
facilitators in relation to the financial vignette, and worry 
 IU ST PR TI ACC RESP NFC DC CI PSWQ 
IU 1 -.03 .02 .07 -.02 -.08 .04 .11 .06 .49
***
 
ST  1 .51
***
 .74
***
 .47
***
 .54
***
 .65
***
 .39
**
 -.21 .10 
PR   1 .10 -.08 -.07 .04 .13 -.05 .10 
TI    1 .25 .45
***
 .57
***
 .34
***
 -.17 .10 
ACC     1 .42
***
 .25 .28* -.15 -.18 
RESP      1 .30
*
 .50
***
 -.23 -.04 
NFC       1 .33
*
 -.11 .20 
DC        1 .02 -.02 
CI         1 -.02 
PSWQ          1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. IU = intolerance of uncertainty; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP = 
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; CI = catastrophising interview steps; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
 
 It was predicted that IU would result in raised scores on self-report and behavioural 
measures of worry. Correlational analyses do not provide information about the direction of 
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causation, but the correlational analyses do indicate that IU is significantly positively 
correlated with PSWQ scores, r = .49, p < .001, but not with CI steps, r = -.06, p > .05.   
5.4.4 Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether experimentally-induced IU had an 
effect on increased worry scores through a mechanism of raised sufficiency thresholds. High 
IU individuals seek more information before being satisfied with a judgement and have a 
strong desire for control over a situation, suggesting that they might deploy systematic 
processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). Experiment 2 utilised a manipulation of IU that involved 
reading about a character who displayed reactions to uncertainty that were either 
representative of a high IU individual (i.e. who found uncertainty intolerable), or a low IU 
individual (i.e. who found uncertainty acceptable). Participants then applied this style of 
appraisal of uncertainty to a personal uncertain situation. The results of Experiment 2 
indicate that this manipulation, based on Kelly (2009), was successful at generating 
significantly different amounts of IU. Participants who read the stories about the high IU 
characters reported significantly higher levels of IU post-manipulation than participants who 
read the stories about the low IU characters. However, the high and low IU groups did not 
differ in their endorsement of appraisals known to facilitate systematic processing (personal 
relevance, task importance, accountability, responsibility, need for cognition, and desire for 
control). This finding challenges the hypothesis that individuals with high levels of IU have 
raised sufficiency thresholds. However, Experiment 2 utilised a slightly different methodology 
to Experiment 1, which examined systematic processing facilitators in relation to negative 
mood. In Experiment 2, participants read a vignette about a character before rating how they 
would feel if they were in that situation in terms of personal relevance, task importance, 
accountability, responsibility, NFC, and desire for control. Experiment 1 did not use vignettes, 
and participants were asked about the appraisals in relation to an imaginary worry bout. 
Thus, Experiment 1 used questions that were self-referent, while Experiment 2 was more 
indirect, asking how the participant would feel if they were in character X’s position. It is 
plausible that because the worry vignettes were not presented in the first-person in 
Experiment 2, the participants appraised the situations differently, despite being asked to 
imagine that they were in that situation. 
 IU correlated with the sufficiency threshold measure and the cognitive appraisals 
personal relevance, task importance, and need for cognition. This provides some support for 
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the notion that IU is related to systematic processing, but the correlational analyses do not 
allow the idea that systematic processing may cause IU to be dismissed; the direction of 
causation cannot be established. It may be that when individuals are investing cognitive 
expenditure into systematic processing, they become less willing to accept uncertainty. This is 
particularly likely given that individuals usually deploy systematic processing when tasks are 
perceived as important, and uncertainty is less likely to be tolerated. This pattern was not 
replicated for the financial vignette. One possibility for the discrepancy is that individuals may 
have felt that they had more control over worries about their coursework, but less control 
over worries relating to financial difficulties, which are practically synonymous with being a 
student. Therefore individuals may have perceived that there was less that they could do 
about the financial worries, and consequently may have been less willing to deploy cognitively 
demanding systematic processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). 
Furthermore, the IU groups did not differ on the measures of worry (the PSWQ and 
the CI). This suggests that the correlation found between IU and PSWQ scores in this study, 
and others e.g., Buhr and Dugas (2006), either (a) is not in the direction examined in this 
study (i.e. worry actually causes IU, rather than IU causing worry) and/or (b) experimentally-
induced IU is not ‘strong enough’ to cause changes in self-reported worry. However, the lack 
of an association with CI steps is consistent with the work of Deschenes et al. (2010) who did 
not find an effect of IU manipulation on the number of catastrophising steps generated. One 
possible explanation for this finding comes from de Bruin et al. (2007), who noted that IU was 
a good predictor of trait worry but was a poor predictor of idiosyncratic worry bouts. The CI 
can be considered an idiosyncratic worry, and this may be why the IU manipulation did not 
result in a change in the number of worry steps generated. What is more, the association 
between IU and worry reported by Buhr and Dugas (2006) involved correlating trait IU (IUS) 
with trait worry (PSWQ) and as such, it is difficult to disentangle causation. While IU may 
result in worry perseveration, it is equally unlikely that individuals who frequently worry 
learn to find uncertainty aversive and unacceptable given that it so frequently co-occurs with 
worrying. The findings suggest that short-term laboratory manipulations of IU do not mimic 
the properties of trait IU. Alternatively, reading the vignettes and completing more systematic 
processing facilitator measures than in Experiment 1 may have resulted in dilution of the 
effects of IU manipulation by the time the participants completed the PSWQ. 
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5.5 Experiment 3 
5.5.1 Introduction 
 Experiment 3 was designed to explore whether the different findings obtained 
between negative mood and IU on systematic processing facilitators in Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively, are due to the presentation of a third-person vignette and asking participants to 
imagine being in that situation (Experiment 2), compared to asking participants to imagine 
that they are worrying (Experiment 1). To explore this possibility, participants were exposed 
to a manipulation of IU before completing the systematic processing facilitator VAS measures 
that were used in Experiment 1. Thus, Experiment 3 was an amalgamation of Experiments 1 
and 2 in that participants underwent the same manipulation of IU as in Experiment 2, but the 
sufficiency threshold measure was the same as in Experiment 1. It was predicted that if 
systematic processing is a mechanism mediating the relationship between IU and worry in a 
personally-relevant context, then high levels of IU would facilitate endorsement of cognitive 
appraisals associated with systematic processing. 
5.5.2 Method 
Participants. 
There were 60 participants (49 females and 11 males) recruited via advertisement 
posters in the School of Psychology and Brighton and Sussex Medical School, recruitment 
emails to the University of Sussex International Summer School, and the University of Sussex 
online participant recruitment system, SONA. The majority of participants were students at 
the University of Sussex (n = 59; 17 studied Psychology, 42 studied another course at the 
University of Sussex), while 1 participant reported being employed by the University of 
Sussex. The age range was 16-29 yr (M = 20.63, SD = 2.30). Participants were recruited on a 
voluntary basis and were compensated for their time with £3. 
Materials. 
 Most materials in the current experiment were used in the experiments previously 
described in this thesis; for the manipulation checks and the sufficiency threshold scale see 
Chapter 4; for the PSWQ see Chapter 3. 
The pre-manipulation questionnaire (baseline measures). 
A pre-manipulation questionnaire consisting of 100-point visual analogue scales 
(VASs; 0 = ‘Not at all’, 100 = ‘Extremely’) assessed baseline levels of sadness (‘You feel sad’), 
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PSC (‘You trust your ability to solve new and difficult problems’), and IU (‘You feel concerned 
by uncertainty’). These single-items were based on the cardinal feature of each construct and 
were embedded amongst seven distracter questions, all ostensibly about general life well-
being, e.g., ‘you feel that your income limits the choice of where you can live’ and ‘you feel 
comfortable showing affection to your friends’. The sadness VAS item was based upon the 
item ‘ Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how sad you feel at the present moment.’, 
which has been used in numerous published studies to demonstrate participants’ current 
level of sadness (e.g. Davey, et al., 2007; Startup & Davey, 2001). The PSC item is taken from 
the PSC subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory  (Heppner & Petersen, 1982). The 
IU item was worded to capture an individual’s unease about uncertainty, reflecting items in 
the IU Scale (Freeston, et al., 1994), such as ‘Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or 
stressed’, ‘Unforeseen events upset me greatly’, and ‘I always want to know what the future 
has in store for me’. Single items were used to avoid alerting participants to the aims of the 
experiment. 
Procedure. 
 The procedure was very similar to that used in Experiment 1, see Chapter 4. However, 
rather than undergoing a mood induction, after providing informed consent, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a high IU condition or low IU condition. Additionally, at the 
start of the experiment, prior to undergoing the IU manipulation, participants completed the 
baseline questionnaire (see the Materials section directly above). The IU manipulation was 
identical to that used in Experiment 2 (see above, this chapter) and is based on a procedure by 
Kelly (2009). Participants read a vignette about a character who either viewed uncertainty 
negatively (upward manipulation of IU, the high IU group) or who viewed uncertainty 
positively (downward manipulation of IU, the low IU group). Participants then described a 
situation in their own life where they were unsure whether the outcome would be good or 
bad. The last part of the IU manipulation involved participants writing a diary about their 
uncertain situation from the perspective of the character that they had read about in the 
vignette. Following the IU manipulation, participants completed manipulation check 
questions, which examined how the IU manipulation had altered self-reported IU, as well as 
mood and PSC – the other two key independent variables examined in this thesis. Participants 
were then presented with the four VAS questions used in Experiment 1 (Chapter 4) to 
measure cognitive appraisals that influence an individual’s sufficiency threshold: 
accountability - ‘Please indicate on the scale below the extent to which you feel that you may 
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have to justify your worries to others’; responsibility - ‘If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, 
then I am to blame for any consequences if it happens’; need for cognition - ‘If you were to 
start worrying about something right now, to what extent would you want to think over the 
issue for a long time?’; and desire for control - ‘Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate 
how strongly you hold the belief that it is important to have control over things you worry 
about’. After completing these VAS scales, participants also completed a VAS about how much 
they felt that they would keep worrying until they had done as much as possible (‘as many as 
can’, AMA, stop rule deployment) , the PSWQ and the IUS. 
Participants did not complete a CI in Experiment 3. This was because the focus of this 
experiment was on whether IU affected sufficiency thresholds when questions examining the 
sufficiency threshold were phrased in the first-person, rather than the effect of IU on 
worrying. The manipulation of IU was the same as that used in Experiment 2, and thus no 
differences were expected in terms of CI steps or PSWQ scores between Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3. Consequently, not including the CI in Experiment 3 reduced the time that 
participants were required to attend the experiment. Additionally, given that the CI was 
deemed unnecessary, eliminating it from experiment 3 was more ethical, as it meant that 
participants did not need to engage in an (unnecessary) interview designed to make them 
worry. 
5.5.3 Results 
Demographics. 
 Chi-square tests revealed that there was no significant difference between the high 
and low IU conditions in terms of gender, χ2(10) = 8.13, p = .62,  occupation, χ2(1) = 1.02, p = 
.31, year of study, χ2(5) = 1.67, p = .89, or subject of study, χ2(3) = 2.17, p = .54. 
Baseline Measures. 
 Independent t-tests indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
high and low IU (IU) groups on the VASs measuring baseline levels of IU, t(52.14) = 0.65, p 
=.52, r = .008, PSC, t(57) = 1.22, p = .23, r = .03, or sadness, t(57) = 0.17, p = .87, r < .001. See 
Table 5.15 for descriptive statistics. 
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Table 5.15 Baseline descriptive statistics for intolerance 
 of uncertainty, problem-solving confidence, and sadness, 
by intolerance of uncertainty condition. 
 High IU Low IU 
M SD M SD 
IU 55.60 23.65 59.03 16.68 
PSC 66.72 12.51 70.97 14.15 
Sadness 22.69 18.73 23.57 20.79 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 All descriptive statistics for the manipulation check VAS items are shown in Table 
5.16.  
Intolerance of uncertainty. 
An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high and low IU 
conditions on the IU composite measure, comprised of four 100-point VASs measuring IU, 
t(58) = -1.03, p = .31, r = .02. Further examination of the single VAS items indicated that there 
was also no significant difference on the single IU items, ts ≤ -1.62, ps ≥ .11. This indicates that 
the manipulation was unsuccessful in changing levels of IU between the two experimental 
conditions. 
Problem-solving confidence. 
An independent t-test showed no significant difference between the high and low IU 
conditions on the PSC composite, comprised of the four 100-point VAS items measuring PSC, 
t(58) = 1.24, p = .22, r = .03. Closer examination of the single VAS items indicated no 
significant difference between the high and low IU groups on the item PSC 1, t(58), = 0.76, p = 
.45, r = .01, but there was a significant difference on the PSC 2 item, t(58) = 2.05, p = .045, r = 
.07,  the PSC 3 item, t(58) = 2.34, p = .023, r = .09, and the PSC 4 item (reverse-scored), t(58) = 
-2.03, p = .047, r = .07. In all cases, the high IU group reported lower confidence in their 
problem-solving ability (see Table 5.16). 
Mood. 
Independent t-tests revealed no significant difference between the high IU group and 
the low IU group on any of the items measuring mood (sadness, happiness, anxiety, arousal, 
and negativity), ts ≤±1.31, ps ≥ .20. 
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Table 5.16 Descriptive statistics for the manipulation check 
items shown by intolerance of uncertainty condition 
 High IU Low IU 
 M SD M SD 
IU-Q1 60.87 27.59 53.37 23.82 
IU-Q2 58.20 25.86 62.70 20.61 
IU-Q3 55.53 23.34 45.50 24.70 
IU-Q4 47.83 26.20 40.10 27.94 
IU composite 222.43 83.03 201.67 73.52 
PSC-Q1 70.70 2-.63 74.37 16.70 
PSC-Q2 61.17 15.95 69.97 17.22 
PSC-Q3 64.00 13.89 72.93 15.63 
PSC-Q4 33.27 16.33 24.77 16.11 
PSC composite 229.13 38.92 242.03 41.45 
Sadness 22.92 20.62 22.43 20.19 
Happiness 69.80 16.95 72.63 20.65 
Anxiety 44.97 26.07 36.53 23.88 
Arousal 57.10 20.35 53.17 18.63 
Negativity 33.43 21.78 27.87 21.42 
 
Correlation analyses. 
 Given that manipulating IU was unsuccessful, there was no rationale for comparing 
high and low IU groups on the experimental outcomes. In Experiments 1 and 2, correlations 
between the independent variable and each dependent variable were examined, in addition to 
between-group analyses.  As such, correlational analyses were conducted with the composite 
IU scores to examine whether participants’ IU score predicted an individual’s sufficiency 
threshold, ‘as many as can’ deployment, and scores on validated measures of worry, IU and 
PSC (see Table 5.17). 
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Table 5.17 Correlations between intolerance of uncertainty, systematic processing 
facilitators, and worry 
 IU ST ACC RESP NFC DC AMA PSWQ IUS 
IU 1 .41** .22 .36* .28* .34** .27* .57*** .59*** 
ST  1 .81*** .80*** .78*** .46*** .46*** .53*** .47*** 
ACC   1 .54*** .56*** .15 .39** .36** .36** 
RESP    1 .48*** .17 .26* .39** .42** 
NFC     1 .13 .46*** .51*** .28* 
DC      1 .20 .26 .28* 
AMA       1 .46*** .39** 
PSWQ        1 .62*** 
IUS         1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. IU = intolerance of uncertainty; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP = 
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; AMA ‘As many as can’ stop rule; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
 
It was predicted that high IU would result in raised sufficiency thresholds. While 
correlational analyses do not provide information on the direction of causation, they do 
illuminate relationships between variables. There was a significant positive correlation 
between IU composite scores and sufficiency threshold scores, r = .41, p = .001. As IU 
composite scores increased, sufficiency thresholds also increased (see Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6 Scatterplot showing the relationship between intolerance  
of uncertainty composite scores and the sufficiency threshold 
110 
 
 
Turning to examine the individual systematic processing facilitator variables, there 
was a significant correlation between IU and desire for control, r = .34, p = .007; higher IU 
scores were associated with a greater desire for control. There was a significant association 
between IU and responsibility appraisals, with those scoring higher IU composite scores also 
reporting feeling more responsible, r = .36, p = .004. Need for cognition was also significantly 
correlated with the IU composite score, r = .28, p = .03; those high in IU were more likely to 
express a greater need for cognition. Similarly, as IU scores increased, accountability 
appraisals also increased, but this did not reach statistical significance, r = .22, p = .09. 
 It had also been predicted that IU would lead to raised worry and AMA scores. There 
was a significant positive correlation between the IU composite scores and PSWQ scores, r = 
.55, p < .001. Higher IU composite scores were associated with higher PSWQ scores, as shown 
in Figure 5.7. The IU composite measure was significantly associated with ‘as many as can’ 
deployment, r = .27, p = .04. As IU scores increased, individuals were more likely to deploy the 
‘as many as can’ stop rule. There was also a significant correlation between IU and IUS scores, 
r = .59, p < .001, indicating that the IU composite measure was representative of the IU 
construct as measured by the IUS. However, IU composite scores did not significantly 
correlate with PSC, r = .25, p = .06.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Scatterplot showing the relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty composite scores and Penn State Worry Questionnaire scores 
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5.5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 3 examined whether manipulating IU would affect an individual’s 
appraisals of variables known to increase systematic processing (accountability, 
responsibility, need for cognition, and desire for control) in the context of an imagined worry 
bout. This was in contrast to Experiment 2, where participants, who had undergone an IU 
manipulation, read a vignette about a third-person character, and were asked to imagine how 
they thought they would feel if they were in the situation described in the vignette. 
Experiment 3 used the same IU manipulation as the manipulation used in Experiment 2, 
derived from Kelly (2009). In Experiment 3, this manipulation proved unsuccessful, and there 
was no significant difference between the individuals who had undergone the high IU 
manipulation compared to the low IU manipulation. Interestingly, the means for both the high 
and the low IU groups were considerably higher in Experiment 3. This might reflect 
population stratification as the sample for Experiment 2 consisted of students who completed 
the experiment during the spring term when students were more likely to be settled into the 
University year, whereas Experiment 3 consisted of more visiting students who were new to 
the university (attending summer school courses) and was conducted during the summer 
term. Unfortunately the lack of replication of the induction effect prevented a comparison of 
the two methods of presenting the systematic processing facilitators (imagining a worry bout 
versus a third-person vignette).  
Given that the IU manipulation did not generate differential IU scores between the two 
groups, it was not possible to conduct between-group analyses. Despite this, interesting 
findings emerged when the participants’ scores on the composite measure of IU items was 
correlated with the sufficiency threshold measure. IU significantly correlated with the 
sufficiency threshold, suggesting that as individuals become less comfortable with 
uncertainty, they are more likely to deploy systematic processing. This may be in an attempt 
to discover more information about a situation in the hope that this will enable greater 
control of a situation and the minimisation of uncertainty. However, given that the findings 
are correlational, the direction of causation cannot be inferred, and it is also possible that 
having a raised sufficiency threshold would result in individuals feeling intolerant of 
uncertainty. After all, high sufficiency thresholds occur primarily when the individual believes 
that they require great confidence in their decision. This can be in response to the situation 
being important and personally relevant (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989), and there may be negative 
outcomes associated with not meeting the sufficiency threshold (e.g., looking silly in front of 
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peers – linked to being accountable for one’s judgements, or losing control of a situation). In 
such situations, when sufficiency thresholds are high, individuals are unlikely to tolerate 
uncertainty that may mean that the judgement that they reach is less than optimal. 
In summary, IU is associated with increased sufficiency thresholds in the context of a 
personally-relevant worry experience. IU was also shown to correlate with self-reported 
worrying. While the direction of causation cannot be confirmed due to the failure to 
successfully induce different levels of IU, it can be concluded that IU and sufficiency 
thresholds are linked, and this raises the possibility that systematic processing may play a 
role in the link between IU and perseverative worry. 
5.6 General Discussion 
 Taken together, Experiments 2 and 3 highlight the difficulties of reliably manipulating 
IU, which is considered a dispositional characteristic (e.g. Koerner & Dugas, 2008). 
Experiment 2 included a successful manipulation of IU, but did not show the expected 
between-group difference in worry scores as measured by the PSWQ (c.f. Buhr & Dugas, 
2006) but IU correlated with scores on the PSWQ. This suggests that either (1) the 
manipulation was not strong enough to lead IU to cause changes in PSWQ scores, or (2) 
induced IU differs from naturally occurring IU in the population, and short-term 
manipulations do not shift an individual far from their dispositional responses to uncertainty. 
Experiment 3 used the same manipulation procedure as Experiment 2 but it was unsuccessful 
in generating differential amounts of IU between those exposed to the condition designed to 
raise IU and those exposed to the condition designed to lower IU.  
 Despite the difficulties encountered in inducing IU, Experiments 2 and 3 are 
informative about the role systematic processing may play in relation to IU and worry. In 
Experiment 2, induced high versus low IU did not change individuals’ sufficiency thresholds. 
Nonetheless, a composite IU measure significantly correlated with sufficiency threshold 
scores in both Experiments 2 and 3. The correlational nature of the analysis conducted means 
that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the direction of the relationship. 
Interestingly, it highlights that the relationship may be in the opposite direction to that 
suggested at the opening of this chapter. Rather than IU leading to greater amounts of 
systematic processing, it is plausible that possessing a high sufficiency threshold may increase 
feelings of IU. Or, it may simply reflect that IU is part of systematic processing, in which an 
individual strives to integrate all available data to reach a judgment that they are confident in. 
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Individuals who have dispositionally high sufficiency thresholds (e.g., perfectionistic 
individuals) are also more likely to find uncertainty unpleasant as it can indicate the 
sufficiency threshold has not been met. Furthermore, one of the features of systematic 
processing is seeking more information (e.g. Griffin, et al., 2008), a factor that is related to 
higher levels of worry (Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). Seeking more information cannot always 
provide adequate confidence in judgements that contain a lot of uncertainty (which future-
based worries typically do), and as such, individuals who are striving for high levels of 
confidence to meet their high sufficiency thresholds may become intolerant of such 
uncertainty. Experiments 2 and 3 were not designed to test this direction of causation but this 
could be examined in future by manipulating the amount of systematic processing an 
individual engages in.  
 In Experiment 2, differences were not found in worry levels between the high  and low 
IU groups, which contradicts dominant models of GAD (e.g. Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998). 
However, a measure more akin to trait IU (a composite score of items measuring IU which 
was not affected by the IU manipulation) correlated with PSWQ scores in both Experiments 2 
and 3. Consequently, ‘trait’ IU may be more strongly related to worry than situational IU. 
Unfortunately, due to the failure to induce differential amounts of IU in Experiment 3, it was 
not possible to examine whether the lack of IU affecting sufficiency thresholds and worry in 
Experiment 2 was due to the use of a third-person vignette. To investigate whether the 
differences between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 were due to differences in trait and state 
IU, 2 × 2 designs such as those used by Rosen and Knäuper, (2009) could be utilised. 
 In conclusion, IU is related to higher sufficiency thresholds and increased worry levels 
(Experiments 2 and 3) but does not appear to cause raised sufficiency thresholds or worry 
(Experiment 2), suggesting that systematic processing is not a mechanism through which IU 
affects perseverative worry. However, IU appears difficult to manipulate reliably, and this 
questions the value of the findings in Experiment 2 showing IU does not cause raised 
sufficiency thresholds/increased worrying. The results from Experiments 2 and 3 clearly 
indicate a relationship between IU and raised sufficiency thresholds but do not allow 
conclusions to be drawn on whether (1) IU causes raised sufficiency thresholds, or (2) raised 
sufficiency thresholds cause IU. Either way, full accounts of the role that IU plays in 
perseverative worry should incorporate the relationship between IU and systematic 
information processing.   
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6 Problem-solving confidence and appraisals that 
facilitate systematic information processing 
6.1 Introduction 
 Problem-solving is pivotal to the way in which some authors define worrying, and a 
detailed discussion of the role of problem-solving in worry is provided in Chapter 1. Davey 
(1994b) describes worrying as “a constructive and appropriate task-oriented process that 
contributes to the solving of problems and the reduction of anxiety” (p.327). Problem-solving 
has been postulated as the adaptive form of worry (Borkovec, et al., 1983; Mathews, 1990), 
and worriers endorse beliefs that worrying is a useful process for solving problems. For 
example, worriers are more likely to report believing that “worrying helps me to solve 
problems” (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) and “worrying gives me the opportunity to 
analyze situations and work out the pros and cons” (Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996), than non-
worriers. Davey, et al. (1992) suggest that worry is deployed as a coping strategy aimed at 
solving problems, They suggest that it is when this adaptive, problem-solving worry is 
disrupted that pathological worry occurs. After all, worrying cannot be a successful coping 
strategy in chronic worriers as chronic worriers experience heightened distress during a 
worry bout (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). Davey et al. (1992) suggest two ways in which the 
problem-solving process may become disrupted in chronic worriers. Firstly, they suggest that 
worriers may adopt an emotion-focused coping strategy, rather than coping strategies aimed 
at dealing with the cause of the stress. This is reflected in Robichaud and Dugas’ (2005) 
assertion that worriers have a negative problem-orientation, which they define as “a set of 
dysfunctional attitudes toward social problem-solving” (p.391). Individuals who possess 
negative problem-orientations are more likely to experience high levels of worry, and 
emotional problem-orientation has been identified as a stronger predictor of worry than 
cognitive or behavioural indicators (Dugas, et al., 1997). Secondly, Davey et al. (1992) suggest 
that worriers may have low problem-solving confidence (PSC), which prevents successful 
closure of the worry process. This second factor, low PSC, is the focal independent variable in 
this chapter. Initially, the role of PSC in perseverative worrying will be examined, before 
turning to consider whether low PSC affects the deployment of systematic information 
processing. Experiment 4, presented in this chapter, is designed to explore whether 
systematic processing is a mechanism accounting for an association between low PSC and 
perseverative worry.   
115 
 
The role of problem-solving confidence in worry 
Davey et al. (1992) examined the relationship between worry and three problem-
solving constructs: PSC, approach-avoidance of problem-solving, and perception of personal 
control over the problem. Worry correlated with lower PSC and less perception of personal 
control over the problem. The relationship between worry and PSC appears to be driven by 
high trait anxiety in the worriers. However, objectively, worriers have comparable problem-
solving skills (Davey, 1994b). Experimental manipulation of PSC through a false feedback 
procedure has suggested a causal role for PSC in worry, with those induced into a low PSC 
state generating more worry thoughts than those induced into a high PSC state (Davey et al. 
1996). As such, chronic, perseverative worry can be considered as thwarted problem-solving 
(Davey, et al., 1992) arising from a lack of confidence at the solution selection stage (Szabó & 
Lovibond, 2002).  
Problem-solving confidence and the sufficiency threshold 
Chaiken et al. (1989) emphasise that when an individual has not met their sufficiency 
threshold, they are more likely to deploy systematic information processing, as described in 
Chapter 2. The amount of confidence that an individual has in their judgement can be 
represented by a judgmental confidence continuum. At one point on this continuum is the 
amount of confidence that an individual desires in the judgment that they are making, such as 
whether they have worried as much as possible, and this is known as the sufficiency 
threshold. Another important point on this continuum is the amount of confidence that the 
individual currently has in their judgment, i.e. their actual amount of confidence. When there 
is a negative discrepancy between these two points, with actual confidence being lower than 
desired confidence, individuals are motivated to try to minimise this discrepancy. The 
sufficiency principle suggests that individuals will engage in greater amounts of systematic 
processing (i.e. detailed, integrative processing) when heuristic processing (or small amounts 
of systematic processing) does not confer the desired level of confidence (Chaiken, et al., 
1989). This is because systematic processing is generally thought to provide greater 
confidence in our judgements (Bohner, et al., 1995; Chaiken, et al., 1989; Chen, et al., 1999; 
Chen, et al., 1996) 
PSC is defined as “an individual’s self-assurance in a wide range of problem-solving 
activities, a belief and trust in one’s problem-solving abilities (general problem-solving self-
efficacy) and coping effectiveness” (Heppner & Lee, 2002, p. 347). Petty, Briñol and Tormala 
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(2002) suggest that metacognitions – an individual’s thoughts and awareness of their own 
thoughts and thought processes, such as how confident they are in their thoughts – plays an 
important role in forming judgments. They found that when an individual was confident in the 
validity of their thoughts, valenced cognitive responses were more predictive of attitudes. 
When PSC is low, individuals have greater feelings of uncertainty (Tormala, Rucher, & Seger, 
2008). This uncertainty means that individuals with low PSC are more likely to feel that they 
have not met their sufficiency threshold (i.e. their actual confidence in their judgement is 
lower than their desired confidence), meaning that low PSC should result in a greater 
deployment of systematic processing. A number of studies have indicated that when 
individuals feel uncertain, they are more likely to deploy detailed processing (e.g., Weary & 
Jacobson, 1997). This is probably because when an individual feels certain, they feel confident 
that they have sufficient knowledge, whereas when they feel uncertain, they are not confident 
that they have sufficient knowledge, and so seek more information.  
An alternative way in which PSC may affect the deployment of systematic processing 
is through lowering self-efficacy beliefs. The definition of PSC provided above by Heppner and 
Lee (2002) indicates that when PSC is low, individuals will have little faith in their ability to 
solve problems and cope with situations they encounter. In other words, an individual with 
low problem-solving beliefs has low self-efficacy beliefs.  Chaiken and colleagues (1989) 
highlight the importance of self-efficacy beliefs in their Heuristic-Systematic Model. For 
individuals to justify the deployment of the extra cognitive energy required to process 
information systematically, they need to have adequate expertise/access to relevant 
information in memory (e.g. Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985), i.e. they need to have high self-
efficacy. If individuals do not believe that they can obtain extra confidence that they have met 
their processing goal, such as resolving their worry, they will not be motivated to deploy 
systematic processing. Evidence that low self-efficacy beliefs lead to less systematic 
processing comes from Bohner, Rank, Reinhard, Einwiller and Erb (1998). They manipulated 
feedback to participants about their performance on an evaluative task. Participants in the 
high self-efficacy group were told their ability was ‘very high’, whereas participants in the low 
self-efficacy group were told their ability was ‘below average’. Participants with high self-
efficacy beliefs showed that they had taken into consideration the quality of the arguments 
that they were presented with when forming their attitudes, which is indicative of systematic 
processing, to a much greater extent that individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs. Similarly, 
Broemer, Jonas and Diehl (2000) found that when a situation contained inconsistencies, 
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participants with high self-efficacy persevered for longer than participants with low self-
efficacy.  
Problem-solving confidence in relation to systematic processing 
facilitators 
 Given that there is some uncertainty around whether low PSC will promote systematic 
information processing in an attempt to minimise discrepancies between actual and desired 
confidence levels, or whether it will reduce efficacy beliefs and reduce the deployment of 
systematic processing, it is useful to also consider the literature regarding the relationship 
between PSC and systematic processing facilitator variables. While there has been little, if any, 
examination of the relationship between low PSC and personal relevance and task 
importance, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that in situations where a task is more 
important and personally relevant, an individual will be more motivated to minimise any 
discrepancy between their actual and desired confidence levels and thus will be motivated to 
deploy systematic processing.  The discrepancy between actual and desired confidence levels 
is likely to be greater in individuals who have lower ‘actual’ levels of confidence due to their 
low PSC reducing their confidence in decisions and solutions that they generate. In terms of 
responsibility, researchers have demonstrated that scores on the Problem-Solving Inventory 
(not limited to PSC, but including general behaviours and attitudes related to problem-
solving) correlate with higher responsibility levels (Heppner & Anderson, 1985). 
Interestingly, some of the literature on PSC and responsibility seems to suggest that 
individuals with low confidence may be less likely to deploy systematic processing. Phillips, 
Pazienza and Ferrin (1984) suggested that those with low PSC were more likely to allocate 
responsibility to an external agent, and this is complemented by work by Baumgardner, 
Heppner and Arkin (1986) who demonstrated that self-appraised effective problem-solvers 
were more likely to view problems they encountered as their own responsibility. This 
suggests that low PSC is also likely to be associated with lower appraisals of control over a 
situation, which may motivate an individual to try to obtain greater control over the situation, 
or could equally mean that an individual feels helpless to control the situation. What is more, 
individuals who are do not perceive themselves as effective problem-solvers are less likely to 
enjoy and engage in thinking, i.e. low PSC is associated with lower levels of need for cognition 
(Heppner, Reeder, & Larson, 1983).  
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 This experiment is designed to examine whether low PSC operates in the same way as 
negative mood and increases worry through a mechanism of raised sufficiency thresholds. 
While the actual deployment of systematic processing may be undermined by an individual’s 
lack of self-efficacy beliefs, individuals who have low PSC may still have raised sufficiency 
thresholds. Individuals with low PSC are particularly likely to have a large discrepancy 
between their actual and desired confidence levels, as their low PSC will push down their 
feelings of confidence (i.e. actual confidence levels will be lower). It was predicted that if a 
greater discrepancy between actual and desired confidence does lead to greater systematic 
processing of worry-related thoughts, then lower PSC would facilitate (1) the endorsement of 
appraisals associated with systematic processing, and (2) self-report and behavioural 
measures of worrying.   
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 50 University of Sussex undergraduate students (10 males, 40 
females), with a mean age of 20.40 (SD = 3.34), ranging from 18-36. Participants were 
recruited on a voluntary basis and were remunerated with course credits or £5 for their time.  
6.2.2 Materials and procedure 
 The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 2 (see Chapter 5). The only 
exception was that rather than undergoing a manipulation of IU (see Stage 2 of the Procedure, 
Experiment 2, Chapter 5) participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions in a 
PSC manipulation.  
Stage 1 (informed consent). 
Participants read an information sheet about the nature of the tasks (without disclosing 
that the experiment is looking at manipulating PSC, and the relationship between PSC with worry 
and systematic processing), and provided informed consent. 
Stage 2 (Problem-solving confidence manipulation) 
This manipulation was based on the work by Davey, Jubb and Cameron (1996); for a 
discussion of the methodology of manipulating PSC, see Chapter 3. Participants were asked to 
provide solutions to four real-life problem scenarios drawn from the Means-Ends Problem-
Solving Test (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). The MEPS is a means of assessing social problem-
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solving ability, and thus it was a convincing task to use in order to make participants think 
that their problem-solving ability was being assessed. Participants read a short passage in 
which details of a problematic social scenario were described and the outcome of the scenario 
was listed. In the MEPS task, participants are required to generate a solution to each problem 
encountered by the characters in the stories, and in the actual administration of the MEPS, 
these solutions are then scored for their appropriateness. An example of a MEPS scenario is:   
‘Henry loved his girlfriend very much, but they had many arguments.  One day she left him.  
Henry wanted things to be better.  The story ends with everything fine between him and his 
girlfriend.  You begin the story with his girlfriend leaving him.’  
There are six MEPS scenarios, but in order to reduce the time that participants were 
required to be in the lab, and given that their problem-solving ability wasn’t actually being 
assessed, participants were only provided with four of the problems. These were chosen to 
ensure that there were two with a male protagonist and two with a female protagonist.  
The participants were given fifteen minutes to write the middle of each of the four 
stories, i.e. how the character in the story gets from the problematic start to the resolved 
finish. After completing the MEPS scenarios, the participant’s sheet was taken away from the 
laboratory and the participant was told that their answers were being assessed and scored 
against age and gender-matched norms. To increase the realism of this scenario, the 
participants were asked to provide their age and gender and this was written onto a score 
sheet. Following a five-ten minute break, in which the experimenter could realistically read 
the answers, participants were given the feedback sheet (with false feedback) that was either 
designed to increase PSC or decrease PSC. Participants were randomly assigned to each 
condition at the start of the experiment. Those participants in the condition designed to 
increase PSC were told that they had score in the top 75 percent, with a score of 28 compared 
to an average score of 17. Participants in the low PSC condition were told that they had score 
in the lowest 15 percent, with a score of 8 compared to an average score of 17. The feedback 
sheet contained the following information in a table: age bracket, gender, score, percentile, 
average score for this band. See Appendix J for an example feedback sheet. The feedback sheet 
also contained the following sentence “For a __________________ aged _________________ the average 
score expected on the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Task is 17. You scored [8/28]. This means 
you are in the [lowest 15%/highest 75%] for your age and gender.” The blanks were filled in 
with the participants’ actual age/gender. If participants questioned their score, they were told 
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that the scores were calculated by counting up problem-solving strategies, and that this score 
was converted to an age and gender-matched normalized score. Participants were encouraged 
to talk to the experimenter about their score at the end of the experiment if they had further 
questions. 
In order to encourage the participants to process the feedback, participants were 
asked to write a short paragraph discussing the implications of their test results (a cover story 
was presented that the data was being gathered for a future study into the impact of problem-
solving ability).  
Stage 3 (manipulation checks). 
Participants completed the manipulation check VASs. 
Stage 4 (vignettes and systematic processing facilitators questionnaire). 
Participants were presented with two worry vignettes and a set of questions measuring 
systematic processing facilitators (these questions were answered twice – i.e. they were 
completed after reading each worry vignette). See the Materials section above for details on the 
worry vignettes and systematic processing facilitator items. 
Stage 5 (catastrophising interview). 
Participants took part in a worry CI about a current main worry (See Chapter 3). 
Stage 6 (validated questionnaires). 
Participants completed the Intolerance of Uncertainty Questionnaire (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002) the Problem-Solving Inventory (PSI: Heppner & Petersen, 1982), and the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ: Meyer et al., 1990) (See Chapter 3 for details). 
Stage 7 (demographics and debrief). 
Participants provided demographic information (age, gender, year of study). Participants 
were then debriefed about the true aims of the experiment, those participants in the low PSC 
were reassured that their scores did not reflect their true performance, and they were offered a 
positive mood induction.  
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Demographics 
 Chi-square tests revealed no significant difference between the high and low PSC 
conditions in terms of gender, or subject of study, χ2 ≤ 1.33, ps ≥ .25. 
6.3.2 Manipulation checks 
IU and mood were measured in the manipulation check questions, alongside PSC. 
These are factors known to increase perseverative worry, and thus it is important to assess 
the purity of the PSC manipulation, and whether it also affects these variables. Prior to 
analysis, composite scores were calculated for the PSC and IU manipulation check items. 
Problem-solving confidence. 
 An independent t-test indicated that the low PSC group scored significantly lower on 
the composite of the two PSC VASs than the high PSC group, t(43.08) = -3.36, p = .002, r = .21. 
Further analysis revealed a significant difference between the low and high PSC groups on one 
of the individual items (‘how confident you feel about your ability to solve problems at this 
moment in time’), t(35.86) = -4.45, p < .001, r = .36. The low PSC group scored significantly 
lower than the high PSC group. The other VAS item (‘extent to which you would like to tackle 
problems at this point in time’) did not reach a statistically significant difference, t(48) = -1.63, 
p = .11, r = .05, but the means were in the predicted direction. Overall, the PSC manipulation 
generated differential amounts of PSC between the low- and high PSC group (see Table 6.18).  
 
Table 6.18 Descriptive statistics for the problem-solving manipulation check items by 
problem-solving confidence condition. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 Low PSC High PSC 
PSC composite* 101.83 (43.50) 135.58 (28.04) 
‘How confident you feel about your ability to solve 
problems at this moment in time’** 
48.73 (29.16) 72.13 (11.19) 
‘Extent you would like to tackle problems’, 52.35 (27.14) 63.46 (20.39) 
*p < .01, **p < .001.  
Mood. 
 Independent t-tests were conducted to examine whether the PSC manipulation 
affected mood states (see Table 6.19). The low PSC group scored significantly lower than the 
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high PSC group on happiness, t(41.62) = -2.53, p = .02, r = .13, significantly lower on arousal, 
t(46.10) = -2.25, p = .03, r = .10, and significantly higher on sadness, t(41.84) = 2.27, p= .03, r = 
.11. The PSC groups did not differ in anxiety, t(46.74) = 1.35, p = .19, r = .10.  
 
Table 6.19 Mean scores for the mood manipulation check 
items by problem-solving confidence condition. Standard 
 deviations are  shown in parentheses. 
 Low PSC High PSC 
Sadness* 29.08 (24.76) 16.04 (15.11) 
Anxiety 37.12 (26.58) 28.08 (20.73) 
Arousal* 47.54 (24.44) 61.21 (18.29) 
Happiness* 61.73 (19.21) 73.00 (11.61) 
         *p < .05. 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty. 
 Independent t-tests examined whether the PSC manipulation also affected IU, another 
factor known to increase worrying, and a key independent variable examined in this thesis. 
There was no significant difference between the two PSC groups on the composite IU score, 
t(48) = 1.64, p = .11, r = .05 (see Table 6.20). Closer inspection of the individual items revealed 
the low PSC group endorsed one item significantly more than the high PSC group (IU-Q2 ‘how 
uncertain you feel at this moment in time’), t(46.27) = 2.47, p = .02, r = .12. There was no 
significant difference on the other VAS (‘how much feelings of uncertainty concern you’), t(48) 
= 0.75, p = .45., r = .01. 
 
Table 6.20 Descriptive statistics for the intolerance of uncertainty manipulation check items 
by problem-solving confidence condition. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 Low PSC High PSC 
IU composite 86.23 (49.57) 65.50 (38.76) 
‘The extent at the present time that feelings of uncertainty 
concern you’* 
45.23 (28.81) 39.67 (22.69) 
‘How uncertain you feel at this moment in time’* 41.00 (24.61) 25.83 (18.61) 
*p < .05 
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6.3.3 Experimental Outcomes 
Composite scores were computed for each of the systematic processing facilitator 
variables (personal relevance, task importance, accountability, responsibility, desire for 
control, and need for cognition) by adding together the three VAS questions measuring each 
variable. When added together, these composite scores represented an individual’s sufficiency 
threshold. There was a composite score for the coursework questions and a separate 
composite score for the financial questions. For comparability with Experiment 2 (Chapter 4), 
separate analyses were run for the coursework vignette and the financial vignette.  
 
Table 6.21: Means and standard deviations for the VAS composite measures of the cognitive 
appraisals that facilitate systematic processing, shown by worry vignette and problem-solving 
confidence condition 
  Low PSC High PSC 
 M SD M SD 
Personal relevance Coursework 166.08 127.97 152.46 82.23 
 Financial 139.65 95.04 249.71 39.05 
Task importance Coursework 244.00 100.59 213.71 66.54 
 Financial 248.77 34.62 249.71 39.05 
Accountability Coursework 249.62 133.00 201.42 42.25 
 Financial 235.00 32.12 234.71 29.95 
Responsibility Coursework 226.23 30.77 222.67 36.85 
 Financial 265.54 23.30 259.08 28.68 
Desire for control Coursework 234.96 133.27 202.63 28.55 
 Financial 198.15 32.54 205.96 30.40 
Need for cognition Coursework 218.62 102.48 198.00 63.57 
 Financial 235.88 43.23 240.67 34.51 
Sufficiency threshold Coursework 1339.50 483.70 1190.88 240.54 
 Financial 1323.00 151.61 1302.96 147.19 
 
Coursework. 
 An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the low and high 
PSC group on the coursework vignette sufficiency threshold, t(48) = 1.36, p = .18, r = .04. 
However, the means (see Table 6.21) indicate the low PSC group had higher sufficiency 
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thresholds than the high PSC group. An independent t-test indicated no significant difference 
between the low PSC group (M = 73.42, SD = 13.78) and the high PSC group (M = 63.21, SD = 
27.89), on the coursework vignette worry VAS, t(32.98) = 1.62, p = .12, r = .07. Despite not 
reaching statistical significance, the participants in the low PSC group had higher mean worry 
scores than those in the high PSC group.  
Financial vignette. 
An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the low and high 
PSC group on the financial vignette sufficiency threshold, t(48) = 0.47, p = .638, r = .005. 
However, the mean sufficiency threshold (see Table 6.21) was higher in the low PSC group 
than the high PSC group. An independent t-test indicated that there was a significant 
difference between the low PSC group (M = 78.96, SD = 20.12) and the high PSC group (M = 
84.63, SD = 17.77), on the financial vignette worry VAS, t(48) = -1.05, p = .30, r = .02. This is in 
the opposite direction to that predicted. 
Individual cognitive appraisals 
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine if there were any differences in scores 
between the PSC conditions on the individual systematic processing facilitator appraisals 
(personal relevance, task importance, accountability, responsibility, desire for control, and 
need for cognition). For both the coursework and the financial vignette, there were no 
significant differences between the low- and high PSC groups on the systematic processing 
facilitator appraisals, ts ≤ 1.70, ps ≥ .10. See Table 6.21 for descriptive statistics.  
Catastrophising interview 
 An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the low PSC group 
(M = 7.58, SD = 3.55) and high PSC group (M = 8.88, SD = 3.90) in terms of the number of 
catastrophising steps that they generated, t(48) = -1.23, p = .22, r = .03. Catastrophising steps 
are represented in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8 Error bar graph showing the mean number of catastrophising 
 steps generated by problem-solving confidence condition.  
 
Validated questionnaire measures 
 Independent t-tests indicated no significant difference between the low and high PSC 
groups on the validated questionnaires, the PSI PSC subscale, t(37.20) = -0.98, p = .34, r = .03, 
the PSWQ, t(46) = -0.56, p =  .58, r = .007, and the IUS, t(44) = -0.77, p = .45, r = .01. See Table 
6.22 for descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 6.22 Descriptive statistics for the validated questionnaires 
by problem-solving confidence condition 
 Low PSC High PSC 
 M SD M SD 
PSC 44.75 8.28 46.67 4.87 
PSWQ 52.50 15.61 55.42 20.22 
IUS 56.78 17.79 61.13 20.66 
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6.3.4 Correlational analyses 
Correlational analyses examined whether composite PSC predicted an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold and measures of worry. This was because the confidence intervals are 
quite large for the composite PSC measure and the confidence intervals for the sufficiency 
thresholds for the coursework and financial vignettes indicate that there is overlap across the 
PSC groups. The results are shown separately for the coursework and financial vignettes in 
Tables 6.23 and 6.24, respectively. 
 
Table 6.23 Correlations between problem-solving confidence, systematic processing 
facilitators in relation to the coursework vignette, and worry 
 PSC ST PR TI ACC RESP NFC DC CI PSWQ PSI 
PSC 1 -.20 -.21 -.09 -.23 -.03 -.12 -.13 -.01 -.09 .49
***
 
ST  1 .73
***
 .68
***
 .87
***
 .37
**
 .81
***
 .84
***
 .02 .18 -.24 
PR   1 .21 .46
**
 .25 .66
***
 .47
**
 .01 .33
*
 -.33
*
 
TI    1 .58
***
 .30
*
 .36
**
 .55
***
 .01 .20 -.23 
ACC     1 .20 .60
***
 .80
***
 .06 .04 -.16 
RESP      1 .36
*
 .06 .41
**
 .24 -.03 
NFC       1 .55
***
 -.03 .11 -.07 
DC        1 -.12 -.02 -.16 
CI         1 -.05 .07 
PSWQ          1 -.33
*
 
PSI           1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. PSC = problem-solving confidence; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP = 
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; CI = catastrophising interview steps; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; PSI = PSC subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory. 
 
There was no significant correlation between PSC and either the coursework vignette 
sufficiency threshold, r = -.20, p > .05, or the financial vignette sufficiency threshold, r = -.13, p 
> .05.  Furthermore, PSC did not predict either catastrophising scores, r = -.01, p > .05, or 
PSWQ scores, r = -.09, p > .05. Despite this, the PSI PSC subscale did significantly correlate 
with worry scores, r = -.33, p < .05. While the direction of causation cannot be established 
from these correlational analyses, it was found that as PSC increased, worry levels decreased. 
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Table 6.24 Correlations between problem-solving confidence, systematic processing 
facilitators in relation to the financial vignette, and worry 
 PSC ST PR TI ACC RESP NFC DC CI PSWQ PSI 
PSC 1 -.13 -.26 -.09 -.15 -.14 -.02 .49
***
 -.01 -.09 .49
***
 
ST  1 .70
***
 .73
***
 .39
**
 .65
***
 .66
***
 .66
***
 .07 .41
**
 -.08 
PR   1 .24 -.13 .18 .07 .19 .001 .15 -.13 
TI    1 .48
***
 .59
***
 -.004 .56
***
 .24 .37
*
 -.01 
ACC     1 .44
**
 -.07 .31
*
 .12 .33
*
 -.06 
RESP      1 .42
**
 .10 .16 .35
*
 -.03 
NFC       1 .07 .12 .31
*
 -.13 
DC        1 -.33
*
 .11 .25 
CI         1 -.05 .07 
PSWQ          1 -.33
*
 
PSI           1 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Note. PSC = problem-solving confidence; ST = sufficiency threshold; ACC = accountability; RESP = 
responsibility; NFC = need for cognition; DFC = desire for control; CI = catastrophising interview steps; 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; PSI = PSC subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This experiment was designed to examine whether doubts about one’s problem-
solving ability might result in the deployment of systematic information processing, and lead 
to prolonged worry about an issue. Participants underwent a false-feedback manipulation 
designed to induce either low PSC or high PSC. This manipulation was successful, with those 
allocated to the low PSC group (who received feedback that they had done badly on a 
problem-solving task) reporting lower levels of PSC than those allocated to the high PSC 
group (who received feedback that they had done well on a problem-solving task). However, 
it was not a pure manipulation of PSC as the manipulation also resulted in mood changes and 
some changes in IU. This is not surprising as low confidence is likely to be associated with 
feeling negative, and individuals are more likely to be distressed if they feel uncertain about a 
scenario that they do not feel competent to manage. The impact of the experimental 
manipulations used in this thesis upon the three causal variables of interest will be explored 
in Chapter 7.  
The results indicated that there was no significant difference between the sufficiency 
thresholds of those in the low problem-solving group compared to those in the high problem-
solving group. Additionally, correlational analyses indicated that state PSC (the composite 
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problem-solving VAS measure) and trait PSC (as measured by the PSC subscale of the PSI), 
were not associated with an individual’s sufficiency threshold. As such, it cannot be argued 
that low PSC leads to systematic processing in an attempt to reach raised sufficiency 
thresholds. This counters the work of Tiedens and Linton (2001), Weary and Edwards (1994), 
and Weary and Jacobson (1997),who demonstrated that uncertainty results in increased 
effortful processing.  
One possibility is that those low PSC are less likely to deploy systematic processing 
due to lower self-efficacy beliefs, as suggested by Bohner et al. (1998) and Broemer et al. 
(2000). While the design of the current experiment aided comparison with other factors 
implicated in worry (negative mood, Chapter 4, and IU, Chapter 5), in order to examine 
whether PSC is indeed associated with efficacy beliefs and systematic versus heuristic 
processing, measures will need to be taken of these variables (see Chapter 8).  
Interestingly, this study did not support the work of Davey, Jubb and Cameron (1996) 
as PSC was not associated with worry as measured by the CI or the PSWQ. One possibility for 
this is that the manipulation had worn off by the time the participants completed the vignettes 
and reached the CI stage. In the original study, Davey et al. (1996) administered the CI 
immediately following PSC and mood manipulations, whereas in this experiment, participants 
completed the vignettes, which took around 10 minutes, before completing the CI. This issue 
has occurred in Experiments 1, 3 and 4, and will be covered in the General Discussion of this 
thesis (see Chapter 9). Alternatively, it may be that without taking trait anxiety into account, 
PSC is not a useful predictor of worry levels. This possibility is raised by work conducted by 
Davey et al. (1992) who demonstrated that when trait anxiety was held constant, worry was 
actually positively correlated with problem-solving strategies of information seeking and 
active behavioural coping. Indeed, it was trait anxiety that was seen to negatively correlate 
with PSC. In Chapter 8, questionnaire measures will be examined that can assist in 
disentangling the relationship between these variables. However, PSC as measured by the PSI 
correlated with higher PSWQ scores. Thus even though the exact direction of the relationship 
cannot be clarified in this study, there is a relationship between worry and PSC as described 
by Davey et al. (1992) and others.  
Phillips, Pazienza and Ferrin (1984) and Baumgardner, Heppner and Arkin (1986) 
suggested that individuals with low PSC were less likely to take responsibility for their 
judgments. However, this was not supported in the current study. Responsibility appraisals 
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did not differ between the high and low PSC groups, and there was no significant correlation 
between responsibility and PSC. This may be an artefact of the experimental design, in that 
individuals were not given ample opportunity to devolve responsibility to another individual. 
An experiment which enabled participants to seek advice from others may indicate that lower 
PSC is indeed associated with lower personal responsibility for judgements.  
 In conclusion, PSC was not found to affect sufficiency thresholds. As outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, low PSC may impact upon the deployment of systematic 
processing by (1) increasing the discrepancy between actual- and desired amounts of 
confidence, i.e. a raised sufficiency threshold, or by (2) affecting an individual’s beliefs about 
their ability to meet their sufficiency threshold through systematic processing. The lack of 
difference between the two PSC groups on the sufficiency threshold could indicate that both 
opposing processes are in play in the current experiment, and that these act to cancel one 
another out, resulting in no difference between the two groups. Trait PSC was shown to 
correlate with worry, emphasising that accounts of perseverative worry should incorporate 
PSC.    
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7 Searching for and coping with threats: The role of 
negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty, and poor 
problem-solving confidence  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the ways in which the worry promoters - negative mood, 
intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and problem-solving confidence (PSC) - affect threat 
perception and perceived ability to cope with threats. The work conducted in this thesis has 
examined whether the worry promoters lead to systematic processing of information. The 
results have been mixed; negative mood raised sufficiency thresholds in the context of a 
worry (Experiment 1), IU correlated with sufficiency thresholds (Experiments 2 and 3) but 
couldn’t be said to cause raised sufficiency thresholds, and low PSC did not appear to be 
related to sufficiency thresholds. In order to gain a better understanding of the way that 
negative mood, IU, and PSC may affect the worry process, this chapter focuses on two 
important aspects of worry - threat perception and coping – both of which also play a role in 
determining the likelihood that systematic processing is deployed. Worry is essentially a 
response to perceived threat, and is deployed as a coping mechanism. The different findings 
obtained in Experiments 1-4 may be because negative mood, IU and PSC affect different 
aspects of worry.  
7.1.1 Threat perception in the worry process 
As outlined in Chapter 1, threat detection is a component of functional accounts and 
descriptions of worry (e.g. Borkovec, 1994). Worry arises from cognitive processes involved 
in anxiety, which function to maintain high levels of vigilance to threats (Mathews, 1990). A 
number of studies, using various cognitive paradigms, have demonstrated that chronic 
worriers possess preconscious attentional biases towards threat-related material (e.g., 
dichotic listening task interference, Mathews & MacLeod, 1986; Stroop colour naming tasks, 
Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989). The way in which the worry promoters affect threat 
perception is outlined below.  
Negative mood and threat perception. 
There is convincing experimental evidence that affective states can influence high-
level cognitive processes (for a review, see Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Negative mood can 
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affect different aspects of threat perception: (1) inflating estimates of threat likelihood and (2) 
inducing negative interpretation biases of ambiguous stimuli. 
Threat likelihood. 
Negative mood is associated with appraising situations as more threatening. Johnson 
and Tversky (1983) induced a negative mood by asking participants to read a newspaper 
report about a death (caused by fire, homicide, or leukaemia) and then asked participants to 
estimate the number of fatalities thought to occur annually from 17 causes of death. They 
found that participants in the experimental condition (compared to the control condition who 
had not read a story about a death) reported higher estimates of the number of annual 
fatalities. The average frequency estimates of the experimental group were 74% higher than 
the control group’s estimates. Interestingly, this effect was a global effect of increased risk for 
the majority of causes of death, rather than for causes of death similar to the cause reported in 
the story. So, reading about a fatal stabbing increased estimates of the risk of a distantly 
related death, e.g., tornado, as much as a closely related death, e.g., homicide. However, 
studies that have utilised integral affect (arising from processing the target stimuli itself 
rather than a task-unrelated mood induction) have shown specific effects of mood. Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) asked a nationally representative American sample (n = 
973) to describe what it was about the 9/11 terrorist attacks that made them feel either angry 
or afraid. Individuals were asked to estimate the risk of future terrorist attacks. Individuals 
who described what had made them afraid reported higher risk estimates for future risks 
whereas those participants primed to feel angry reported lower risk estimates. Lerner et al. 
(2003) explain these findings as resulting from the different appraisal patterns associated 
with the two emotions: fear is associated with uncertainty, while anger is associated with 
certainty. It is postulated that uncertainty influences judgements and increases risk estimates. 
Threat interpretations of ambiguity. 
Quasi-experimental studies have indicated that anxious mood states are associated 
with increased threat detection (e.g., homophone tasks: Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; 
recognition memory tasks: Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; reading times for 
different interpretations: Calvo & Castillo, 2001) but it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the 
individuals’ anxious mood that affects their interpretations of ambiguous stimuli, or some 
other factor associated with being anxious. There is more convincing evidence for the role of 
affect in threat detection from studies that have manipulated participants’ mood state. 
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Experiments show induced anxious negative mood states are associated with negative 
interpretations of ambiguous stimuli using a range of dependent variables: self-report 
(Constans & Mathews, 1993), spellings (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Richards, Reynolds & 
French, 1993), and lexical decision tasks (Blanchette & Richards, 2003). Richards et al. (1993) 
used a multiple regression analysis to demonstrate that negative mood and trait anxiety 
provide significant unique contributions to threat interpretations.  
 The endemic negative anxious affect experienced by worriers provides a possible 
mechanism for increased threat detection and appraisals, such as those found in Experiment 
1, which indicate that a situation needs to be processed in detail using systematic processing. 
The impact of negative mood on threat detection will be examined in this experiment using 
self-report visual analogue questions tapping inflated threat perception, and a homophone 
task, which measures threat interpretation biases to ambiguous stimuli (see section 7.2.2). 
Intolerance of uncertainty and threat perception. 
 Early definitions of IU linked the construct with attempts to control things that may be 
threatening; IU was defined as “behavioural attempts to control the future and control 
uncertainty”. A number of factors increase the likelihood that an individual with high IU will 
have heightened threat perception. Firstly, IU is associated with interpreting ambiguous 
events as threatening and intolerable (Butler & Mathews, 1983, 1987). Secondly, individuals 
experiencing high levels of IU are more likely to overestimate the probability of negative 
events occurring (MacLeod, et al., 1991), suggesting that they are more likely to perceive a 
greater risk of threats. Thirdly, individuals who desire certainty will have greater difficulty 
accepting the possibility of threatening outcomes occurring (Berenbaum, 2010). This is not 
just because of the fear of these outcomes but because a high IU individual is unwilling to 
accept any uncertainty, which is inherent in any uncertain future threat.  
Problem-solving confidence and threat perception. 
Worriers have been found to have reduced confidence in their problem-solving 
abilities compared to non-worriers (Belzer, et al., 2002; Davey, et al., 1992). While there has 
been little explicit examination of whether individuals with low PSC are more likely to have 
raised threat perception, it has been suggested that worriers may perceive problems as 
threats, rather than challenges, and that this leads to avoidant coping strategies (Dugas, 
Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995). The relationship between PSC and threat 
perception has not been adequately examined in the literature, but it seems sensible to 
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predict that low PSC will be associated with increased threat perception as the threshold for 
feeling that one cannot deal with a situation will be lower (and thus the situation will appear 
more threatening). 
7.1.2 Coping beliefs in the worry process 
Borkovec (1994) highlighted the difficulty that worriers experience when they 
perceive a threat in their uncertain future: being future-oriented, the object of the worry does 
not, and may not ever, exist, preventing the worrier from using adaptive coping strategies to 
deal with the threat. Chronic worriers are likely to have their own ways of coping with threats 
they detect due to raised levels of IU, perfectionism, responsibility appraisals for making 
mistakes, and elevated evidence requirements (Dugas, et al., 1997; Frost, et al., 1990; Pratt, et 
al., 1997; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). Maldapative coping strategies have been identified in 
chronic worriers, namely avoidant coping strategies and emotion-focused coping (e.g. Davey, 
1993b). Matthews and Wells (2000) suggest pathological worry “directs attention toward 
monitoring for threat and away from restructuring of maladaptive self-knowledge” (p. 69). 
Alongside the role that increased threat detection has in the development of perseverative 
worry, perceived coping abilities also play a crucial role; “chronic and severe forms [of worry] 
emerge in individuals who diffusely perceive the world to be a dangerous place and who are 
afraid that they will not be able to cope with the events that their future folds for them” 
(Borkovec, 1994, p.28). Indeed, Borkovec (1994) describes worry as “a coping response to 
perceived threat” (p.24). 
Paradoxically, anxiety is associated with intial selective attention to threats, and 
subsequent avoidance of threat stimuli – the ‘vigilant-avoidant’ pattern (e.g. Garner, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2006). This may arise as anxious individuals fear that they cannot cope with the 
threats that they detect. Numerous studies have shown that worriers use avoidant coping 
strategies (e.g., Borkovec et al., 1998), which is consistent with functional accounts of worry 
as a form of cognitive avoidance of even more distressing thoughts and images. Davey et al. 
(1992) report worrying is associated with using problem-focused coping strategies and an 
information-seeking problem coping style. Matthews and Funke (2006) suggest that threat 
appraisals that indicate the threat is beyond personal control result in emotion-focused 
coping strategies, rather than task-focused coping. This then leads to the worrier engaging in 
strategies such as self-criticism for failing to anticipate such a threat, and strategies such as 
wishful thinking. This is in contrast to the problem-focused strategies reported by Davey et al. 
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(1992). However, discrepancies between these studies are likely to be due to the measures of 
worrying used: scales that incorporate the constructive continuum of worry-problem-solving, 
such as the Student Worry Scale and the Worry Domains Questionnaire correlate with 
problem-focused activities, whereas the PSWQ, which focuses on pathological worrying, does 
not (Davey, et al. 1992). The way that the worry promoters affect coping beliefs is outlined 
below.  
Negative mood and coping beliefs. 
 Negative mood does not only affect the interpretations individuals make of the world 
around them, it also affects the coping strategies that individuals deploy to deal with what 
they encounter, and the beliefs that they have about their ability to cope. Segerstrom, Taylor, 
Kemmeny and Fahey (1998) reported that avoidant coping is associated with higher levels of 
negative mood, and that avoidant coping is likely to mediate the relationship between 
negative mood and lower levels of optimism.  
Intolerance of uncertainty and coping beliefs. 
IU has been linked to the activation of coping strategies such as seeking information 
(Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). In Rosen and Knäuper’s (2009) study, participants in the upward IU 
manipulation condition were exposed to a linguistic manipulation which forced participants 
to select items on a questionnaire that indicated they had high levels of IU. This was achieved 
by pairing the high IU items with the qualifier ‘occasionally’ and the low IU items with the 
qualifier ‘almost always’. This linguistic manipulation was also coupled with false-feedback 
that they had high levels of IU. Individuals in this high IU condition reported a greater desire 
to have more information about the topic that they had received information about, and were 
more likely to take the experiment information sheet with them, but only when they also had 
high levels of situational uncertainty. However, uncertainty-oriented individuals’ (which 
includes high IU individuals, Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller & Shepperd (2010)) tendency to seek 
more information when they feel uncertain can actually lead to an increase in anxiety as 
uncertainties cannot always be resolved through more information (Rosen, et al., 2009).  
Problem-solving confidence and coping beliefs. 
Worrying may be deployed in an attempt to solve problems, but it may be 
unsuccessful due to deficiencies in the problem-solving process. Davey et al. (1992) suggest 
two potentially deficient aspects in the problem-solving processes of worriers: (1) low PSC, 
and (2) adoption of coping strategies that neglect to deal with the cause of the stress, and 
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instead focus on managing emotional reactions to the stress. Davey (1993a) explored the role 
of different coping strategies for dealing with threats. Two of the coping strategies, threat 
devaluation and positive reappraisal, were found to relate to adaptive problem-focused 
strategies. The coping strategy of denial, on the other hand, was related to problem avoidance. 
Davey (1993a) found that denial was most common in situations where individuals felt their 
situation was uncontrollable or where individuals had low PSC. Consequently, the high levels 
of low PSC that worriers have been shown to experience is a risk factor for opting to avoid 
problems rather than engage in more adaptive problem-focused coping strategies  
7.1.3 Threat perception and systematic processing 
Threat perception and coping beliefs also affect the deployment of systematic 
information processing. Threat perception raises sufficiency thresholds and thus greater 
threat perception is associated with an increased tendency to use systematic processing (e.g. 
Baron, Logan, Lilly, Inman, & Brennan, 1994; Giner-Sorolila & Chaiken, 1997). There is some 
indication that the impact of threat detection on systematic processing is dependent on the 
co-occurrence of fear appraisals (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001), and this means that 
individuals who are predisposed to experience greater amounts of fear/negative emotions 
may be more likely to deploy systematic processing in the context of threats.  
7.1.4 Coping beliefs and systematic processing 
In contrast to the promoting effect of threat perception on systematic processing, low 
self-efficacy beliefs, such as believing one cannot cope, are associated with a decreased 
tendency to use systematic processing as the extra cognitive expenditure is not perceived as 
worthwhile (Chaiken, et al., 1989). As shown in Figure 7.9, the balance between task 
importance (how threatening the unresolved worry is) and self-efficacy beliefs will determine 
the nature of information processing that is deployed.  
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Figure 7.9 Schematic diagram representing that the balance of self-efficacy beliefs and task 
importance determines whether systematic or heuristic processing is deployed. 
 
Differential impacts of the worry promoters on threat perception and coping beliefs 
may account for the different findings obtained in Experiments 1-4 regarding the relationship 
between factors associated with increased worry and systematic information processing. In 
an attempt to elucidate the mechanisms involved in perseverative worry, this chapter will 
focus on the impact of negative mood, IU and PSC on threat perception and coping. 
Implications for systematic information processing deployment will be considered in the 
general discussion.  
7.1.5 Predictions 
Given that threat detection and low coping beliefs are an integral part of worry, it was 
predicted that negative mood, IU and low PSC would result in (1) increased threat detection 
(as measured by the frequency and intensity visual analogue scale items, and threat-word 
spellings on the homophone task), (2) lower perceived ability to cope with any threats that 
were encountered, and (3) increased worry about threats. The relative contribution of each 
worry promoter to threat detection and coping beliefs will be examined using regression 
models. Given that threat detection will typically raise sufficiency thresholds, and only 
negative mood caused raised sufficiency thresholds in Experiments 1-4, it was predicted that 
(4) only negative mood would result in greater endorsement of appraisals linked to raised 
sufficiency thresholds (motivation and personal relevance). Furthermore, it was predicted 
that negative mood would make a greater contribution to threat perception than IU or low 
PSC.  
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7.2 Method 
Participants. 
There were 180 participants (127 females; 53 males) recruited via advertisement 
posters, recruitment emails to the University of Sussex International Summer School, and the 
University of Sussex online participant recruitment system, SONA. The majority of 
participants were students at the University of Sussex (n = 171; 100 studied Psychology or 
Psychology with another subject, 71 studied another course at the University of Sussex), while 
8 participants reported being employed (in all cases this was by the University of Sussex), and 
1 participant reported being unemployed. The age range was 18-50 yr (M = 21.36, SD = 4.48). 
Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and were compensated for their time at the 
rate of £5/hour, or with course credits if they were Psychology students fulfilling a course 
requirement to participate in research. 
Materials. 
The pre-manipulation questionnaire (baseline measures). 
A pre-manipulation questionnaire consisting of 100-point visual analogue scales 
(VASs; anchors: 0 = ‘Not at all’, 100 = ‘Extremely’) was used in order to measure baseline 
levels of sadness (‘You feel sad’), PSC (‘You trust your ability to solve new and difficult 
problems’), and IU (‘You feel concerned by uncertainty’). These single-items were based on 
the cardinal feature of each construct and were embedded amongst seven distracter 
questions, all ostensibly about general life well-being. Single items were used to avoid alerting 
participants to the aims of the experiment. 
The manipulation check questionnaire. 
Participants completed a short questionnaire comprising 100-point VASs. There were 
five measures of mood (sadness, happiness, anxiety, arousal, and negativity), four items 
measuring IU, and four items measuring PSC. The questions measuring IU were based on the 
conceptualisation of IU as “the excessive tendency of an individual to consider it unacceptable 
that a negative event may occur, however small the probability of its occurrence” (Dugas, 
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001, p. 552) and the final IU question is an item taken from the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The PSC questions were based on the 
PSC subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner & Petersen, 1982), an 11-
item subscale consisting of items such as ‘I am usually able to think up creative and effective 
138 
 
alternatives to solve a problem’. See Table 7.25 for the items used to measure mood, IU, and 
PSC. 
 
Table 7.25 Items measuring mood, intolerance of uncertainty, and problem-solving 
confidence 
Construct Item 
Sadness You feel sad 
Happiness You feel happy 
Anxiety You feel anxious 
Arousal You feel aroused (i.e. awake, alert or stimulated) 
Negativity You feel negative 
IU Q1 You find uncertainty unpleasant 
IU Q2 You feel concerned by uncertainty 
IU Q3 You feel uncertain 
IU Q4 You think it is unfair that there are no guarantees in life 
PSC Q1 You would like to tackle problems 
PSC Q2 You feel confident about your ability to think up creative and effective solutions to solve a 
problem 
PSC Q3 You trust your ability to solve new and difficult problems 
PSC Q4 You feel most problems are too complex for you to solve 
 
Threat and coping VAS questionnaire. 
Participants completed a 14-item questionnaire formed of 100-point VASs assessing 
threat perception and coping beliefs. The questions measured perceptions of threat (intensity 
and frequency), approach/avoidance of threatening situations, motivation to deal with 
threats, beliefs about coping ability, worry levels, and personal relevance of the mood 
induction procedure. The items used in this questionnaire are shown in Table 7.26. The focus 
of items and the precise wordings were generated through discussion with research 
colleagues about what constitutes a threat, and the different ways that people may deal with 
threats. Two questions measured each facet, except for the threat frequency and intensity 
aspects, which were only measured through 1 item each. The questions were then submitted 
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to three rounds of piloting to ensure that people were able to answer the items and 
understood what the questions asked.  
Threat and worry items. 
The questionnaire began with a definition of what was meant by a threat in this 
questionnaire: ‘In some of the following questions, you will be asked about threat. Please 
consider threat to be anything that is undesirable and may impact you in a negative way. The 
use of the word threat should not be considered only in terms of physical threats (e.g., 
catching an illness, being in an accident), but also in terms of social threats (e.g., upsetting 
your friends, not knowing anyone at a party) and more general emotional threats (e.g., 
missing a deadline, running out of money)’. Hence, a broad interpretation of the word threat 
was emphasised. The threat questions focused on (1) how many threats the individual 
expected to encounter; (2) how bad the individual felt the threats would be; and (3) how 
worried the individual was about encountering threats.  
Coping items. 
The coping questions assessed the ways that an individual can react to a threat 
(avoidance or approach tendencies) and how well they felt that they would cope with any 
threats that they encountered. Miller (1987) specifies two key approaches that individuals can 
take in order to deal with threats: monitoring and blunting. Monitoring is described as 
information-seeking, and is similar to the notion of approach behaviour. The approach 
questions were created by considering the principal characteristic of the monitoring style: 
“the person looks for information within the threatening situation by carefully paying 
attention to what is happening” (p.18, Muris, van Zuuren, de Jong, de Beurs, & Hanewald, 
1994). Blunting refers to distraction and is similar to the idea of avoidance behaviour. The 
avoidance questions were formed by considering the key feature of the blunting style: “the 
person avoids thinking about the situation, directs their attention to other things, or tries to 
forget the situation” (p.18, Muris, et al., 1994). Given that individuals can deploy a number of 
different coping styles when faced with threats, the questions assessing how well the 
participants felt that they would cope were phrased in a non-specific way, so as to be 
applicable to all coping styles. The questions were worded to assess the participants’ 
perceptions of how well they would cope, as self-efficacy beliefs are critical in determining 
which information processing style is deployed. 
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Motivation and personal relevance. 
VAS responses to threat perception and coping beliefs were anticipated to be affected 
by how motivated an individual felt and how personally-relevant the situation felt. Therefore 
questions were also included that assessed motivation and personal relevance.  
Assessing the validity of the threat and coping items. 
To assess the validity of the threat and coping items, correlations were performed. It 
was hypothesised that there would be a significant positive correlation between the questions 
assessing threat likelihood and threat intensity. If negative mood increases all threat 
appraisals, then it would also be predicted that the threat frequency and intensity items 
would correlate with the threat spellings on the homophone task. Additionally, it was 
predicted that the threat worry item would correlate with scores on the PSWQ. To assess the 
validity of the coping items, correlations were run between the approach/avoidance items 
and the MBQ monitoring and blunting subscales. It was predicted that the approach items 
would positively correlate with the MBQ monitoring subscale and that the avoidance items 
would positively correlate with the MBQ blunting subscale. The questions assessing coping 
were predicted to be negatively correlated with the worry threat item, with those individuals 
who felt that they would cope well with the threats being predicted to have lower worry 
levels about encountering threats. The validity of the personal relevance and motivation items 
was assessed by examining whether they correlated with one another, as a number of authors 
have shown that individuals are more motivated to deploy effortful processing when an issue 
is personally-relevant (e.g. Petty, et al., 1981). 
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Table 7.26 Items measuring threat and coping beliefs 
Construct Item Anchor points 
Threat frequency  How many things that pose some threat do you 
think you will encounter over the next week?  
None – Many 
Threat intensity On average, how bad do you think the 
threatening things you may encounter will be? 
Not at all – Extremely 
Approach Q1 If you encounter a threatening situation over 
the next week, to what extent will you try to 
think about this situation? 
Not at all – A great deal 
 
Approach Q2 To what extent will you try to focus your 
attention on thinking about any threatening 
situations you encounter? 
Not at all – A great deal 
 
Avoidance Q1 To what extent will you try to distract yourself 
from thinking about any threatening situations 
that you encounter over the next week?  
Not at all – A great deal 
 
Avoidance Q2 If you encounter a threatening situation over 
the next week, to what extent will you seek to 
avoid thinking about this situation? 
Not at all – A great deal 
 
Motivation Q1 Over the next week, to what extent will you feel 
motivated to deal with threatening situations 
you encounter?  
Not at all – Extremely 
Motivation Q2 To what extent will you want to deal with any 
threats as quickly as possible?’ 
Not at all – A great deal 
Coping Q1 To what extent do you think that you will have 
the ability to cope with any threatening 
situations that you encounter over the next 
week?   
Not at all – A great deal 
Coping Q2 How well will you cope with any threatening 
situations you encounter over the next week?’ 
Not very well - Very well  
 
Worry Q1 To what extent will you worry about any 
threatening situations you encounter over the 
next week?  
Not at all – A great deal 
Worry Q2 If you encounter a threatening situation over 
the next week, to what extent will you worry 
about this situation until the threat is dealt 
with? 
Not at all – A great deal 
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Personal relevance 
Q1 
To what extent did you personally identify with 
feelings related to this task? 
Not at all – A great deal 
Personal relevance 
Q2 
To what extent are any feelings that you have 
experienced in the previous stage of this 
experiment (prior to these questions) relevant 
to you? 
Not at all – A great deal 
Homophone task. 
Homophone spelling tasks can be used to investigate the interpretation of ambiguous 
material (see Blanchette & Richards, 2003). This task presents ambiguous words spoken 
through headphones, and the participant is asked to write down (spell) the word they hear. 
The version of the homophone task developed by Davey, Bickerstaffe and MacDonald (2006) 
was used to assess threat interpretation biases in a manner other than self-report 
questionnaires. Participants heard 64 words, presented three seconds apart. The words were 
recorded in two audio files; in one, the valenced version of the words were read aloud (e.g., 
wail), in the other the neutral version of the words were read aloud (e.g., whale). The two 
recordings controlled for subtle differences in the way that the words were read aloud during 
the recording. There were 16 words that could be spelt to reflect a negative or a neutral 
meaning (e.g., die/dye), 16 words that could be spelt to reflect a positive or neutral meaning 
(e.g., heal/heel), and there were 32 filler items that were not analysed. 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al. 1990) was used as a measure of 
worry frequency. The PSWQ is a 16-item questionnaire including items such as ‘Many 
situations make me worry’. The PSWQ has excellent internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability (Meyer, et al., 1990). See Chapter 3 for more details. 
Monitoring and Blunting Questionnaire 
The Monitoring and Blunting Questionnaire (Muris, et al., 1994) was used to assess 
the construct validity of the approach and avoidance items. It measures participants’ 
tendencies to want to use a monitoring strategy (i.e. searching for more information) or 
blunting strategy (i.e. distracting oneself from distressing information) when encountering a 
threatening situation. Muris et al.’s (1994) scale begins by informing the participant that 
when people are in a threatening situation, they can make use of two sorts of coping 
strategies: the monitoring strategy and the blunting strategy. Muris et al. describe the 
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characteristics of the monitoring strategy and the blunting strategy. Participants are then 
instructed to read ten threatening situations, e.g., ‘Late at night, you walk through a deserted 
neighbourhood of a city. Suddenly, a group of dubious looking people approach you from a 
side-road’. One of the threat situations was modified: Muris et al. included an item that 
referred to smoking on a plane. This aspect of the situation was removed to update the 
question to the current societal context. For each threatening situation, the participants were 
asked to provide a rating from 0 (‘Not at all’) to 10 (‘Very much’) to indicate the extent that 
they would make use of each strategy. Muris et al. (1994) report that the MBQ has good 
reliability; the monitoring scale (α = .71) and the blunting scale (α = .80) both have acceptable 
internal consistency. Furthermore, the scales have sufficient test-retest reliability 
(monitoring, r = .64, p < .01; blunting, r = .83, p < .01). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
Participants who underwent the IU manipulation completed the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). The IUS is a 27-
item scale assessing an individual’s reactions to ambiguous situations on an emotional, cognitive, 
and behavioural level, as well as the implications one believes being uncertain has, and attempts 
to control uncertainty. It consists of items such as ‘Uncertainty makes life intolerable’. 
Participants answer on a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Not at all representative’; 5 = ‘Completely 
representative’).  The IUS has excellent internal consistency (α = .91; Freeston et al., 1994) and 
good test-retest reliability (Buhr & Dugas, 2002).  
Problem-solving confidence subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory. 
Participants who underwent a PSC manipulation also completed the PSC subscale taken 
from Heppner and Petersen’s (1982) Problem-Solving Inventory. It consists of 11-items (e.g., ‘I 
trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems’). Participants respond on a 6-point Likert 
scale. In the original version, low scores indicated behaviours and attitudes associated with 
successful problem-solving, but in this study, the response scale was arranged so that high scores 
represented high PSC (1 = ‘Does not describe me well’; 6 = ‘Does describe me well’). Two items 
are reverse-scored. The problem-solving subscale has good internal consistency (α = .85) and 
good test-retest reliability (Heppner & Petersen, 1982). 
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Demographic questionnaire. 
Participants answered questions about their age, gender, occupation, their subject and 
year of study.  
Procedure. 
Stage 1. 
Participants read an information sheet about the study and completed an informed 
consent form.  
Stage 2 (baseline measures). 
Participants completed the pre-manipulation questionnaire with questions about 
sadness, IU and PSC embedded. 
Stage 3 (experimental manipulation). 
 The experiment was run in three stages. Firstly the mood manipulation conditions 
were run, secondly the IU manipulation conditions were run, and lastly the PSC manipulation 
conditions were run. The first 60 participants were randomly assigned to either a negative 
mood induction or a neutral mood induction. Participants 61-120 were randomly assigned to 
either a low IU manipulation or a high IU manipulation. Participants 121-180 were randomly 
assigned to either a low PSC manipulation or a high PSC manipulation.  
Mood manipulation 
The same negative and neutral vignette mood induction procedure was used as in 
Experiment 1 (the cognitive priming condition was not used in this experiment); See Chapter 
4 for a detailed discussion of the mood induction procedure. Vignettes (based on Scott & 
Cervone, 2002) were played through headphones. Participants in the negative mood group 
were asked to imagine memories they shared with their best friend, and their friend becoming 
terminally ill. Participants in the neutral mood group imagined their bedroom furniture. Each 
vignette lasted approximately 5 min.  
IU manipulation. 
The IU manipulation was based on a procedure used by Kelly (2009), and is the same 
as the manipulation used in Chapter 5. For a review of this particular IU manipulation 
compared to manipulations employed in other research on IU, refer to Chapter 3. This 
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manipulation uses four sets of two short stories (Appendices F-I). In one set, the character has 
high IU. In the other set, the character has low IU. For both sets, there is a male version and a 
female version. The scenarios are gender-congruent to ensure the participants can relate as 
fully as possible to the character and their gender-typical attitudes. In each of the scenarios, 
the character encounters an uncertain situation that has a potentially negative outcome. 
Participants were given ten minutes to read the stories and try to understand the 
motivations of the central character. Afterwards, participants were asked to “think of a 
situation in your own life where you aren’t sure whether the outcome will be good or bad” 
and to briefly describe the situation. After spending five minutes describing their own 
potentially negative life event, participants received the following instructions “We want you 
to imagine that you are Sean [or Sarah] from the stories you have just read, and that you keep 
a journal about your thoughts and feelings about key issues and events in your life. Please 
take fifteen minutes to write a journal entry describing how you would feel if you were Sean 
[or Sarah] and were experiencing the situation you have just described above. Try to be as 
detailed as possible in describing how you (Sean [or Sarah]) would feel about the dilemma”. 
After the fifteen minutes had passed, participants were given five minutes to read the diary 
entry they had written with an emphasis placed on understanding the feelings of the central 
character. 
PSC manipulation. 
The PSC manipulation was based on the work by Davey, Jubb and Cameron (1996) and 
is the same as the method used in Chapter 6; for a discussion of the methodology of 
manipulating PSC, see Chapter 3. Participants were asked to provide solutions to four real-life 
problem scenarios drawn from the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Test (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975). Participants read a short passage in which details of a problematic social scenario were 
described and the outcome of the scenario was listed. The participants were given fifteen 
minutes to write the middle of each of the four stories, i.e. how the character in the story gets 
from the problematic start to the resolved finish. 
After completing the MEPS scenarios, the participant’s sheet was taken away from the 
laboratory and the participant was told that their answers were being assessed and scored 
against age and gender-matched norms. To increase the realism of this scenario, the 
participants were asked to provide their age and gender and this was written onto a score 
sheet. Following a five-ten minute break, in which the experimenter could realistically read 
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the answers, participants were given the feedback sheet (with false feedback) that was either 
designed to increase PSC or decrease PSC. Participants were randomly assigned to each 
condition at the start of the experiment. Those participants in the condition designed to 
increase PSC were told that they had score in the top 75 percent, with a score of 28 compared 
to an average score of 17. Participants in the low PSC condition were told that they had score 
in the lowest 15 percent, with a score of 8 compared to an average score of 17. If participants 
questioned their score, they were told that the scores were calculated by counting up 
problem-solving strategies, and that this score was converted to an age and gender-matched 
normalized score. Participants were encouraged to talk to the experimenter about their score 
at the end of the experiment if they had further questions. 
In order to encourage the participants to process the feedback, participants were 
asked to write a short paragraph discussing the implications of their test results (a cover story 
was presented that the data was being gathered for a future study into the impact of problem-
solving ability).  
Stage 4 (VAS questionnaires). 
 Participants completed the manipulation check questionnaire measuring mood, IU 
and PSC, and the VAS questionnaire measuring threat and coping. 
Stage 5 (homophone task). 
Participants were randomly allocated to list A or list B (counterbalanced across 
groups) and listened to the word list, which was presented through headphones attached to a 
computer and played through Windows Media Player. Participants wrote down the spelling 
for each word on a piece of paper. 
Stage 6. 
Participants completed the MBQ, the PSWQ, and the demographic information sheet. 
Those participants who underwent an IU manipulation completed the IUS, and those 
participants who underwent a PSC manipulation completed the PSC subscale of the PSI.  
Stage 7. 
Participants were debriefed and thanked for participating. All participants were 
provided with the University of Sussex’s counselling service details. Participants who had 
experienced the negative mood induction of the PSC manipulation were offered a positive 
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mood induction. Participants who were in the high IU condition were provided with the low 
IU stories.  
7.3 Results 
 The analyses are designed to assess whether negative mood affects threat and coping 
appraisals. Firstly, the efficacy of the mood induction procedure (and its effect on the other 
key independent variables in this thesis) will be assessed. Secondly, a series of Bonferroni-
corrected t-tests will be conducted to examine whether there are any differences between the 
negative mood and neutral mood groups on the threat and coping items, as well as on the 
homophone task. Finally, correlational analyses will be performed to examine if there are 
relationships between the variables measured in this experiment.  
Demographic Statistics. 
 Chi-square tests revealed no significant difference between the manipulation 
conditions in terms of gender, χ2(5) = 3.02, p = .70, or occupation, χ2(10) = 10.90, p = .37. 
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA indicated no significant difference in the age of participants 
in different manipulation conditions, F(5, 174) = 2.14, p = .06. There was, however, a 
significant difference in the subject of study, χ2(15) = 88.53, p < .001, and the year of study, 
χ2(25) = 117.78, p < .001. This difference is driven by the mood manipulation condition only 
including Psychology students. This reflects that participants were more likely to take part in 
the mood manipulation when course credits were still available for the (first year) Psychology 
students.  
Baseline Measures 
One-way ANOVAs indicated no significant difference between the manipulation 
conditions on measures of sadness, IU or PSC at baseline, Fs ≤ 0.72, ps ≥ .61. See Table 7.27 for 
descriptive statistics. 
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Table 7.27 Descriptive statistics for the baseline measures of mood, intolerance of 
uncertainty, and problem-solving confidence by manipulation condition. 
Manipulation condition Sadness 
M (SD) 
IU 
M (SD) 
PSC 
M (SD) 
Negative mood 22.97 (22.81) 59.97 (23.52) 64.63 (21.42) 
Neutral mood 27.70 (25.75) 52.97 (29.72) 64.53 (23.14) 
High IU 29.87 (18.27) 62.07 (26.80) 68.97 (19.44) 
Low IU 32.50 (27.59) 58.00 (28.14) 68.20 (18.44) 
Low PSC 26.23 (18.70) 62.37 (22.75) 68.03 (14.17) 
High PSC 24.77 (19.28) 59.33 (20.97) 63.80 (20.47) 
 
Manipulation checks 
One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the manipulation 
conditions on all the manipulation check items, Fs ≥ 2.44, ps ≤ .04, with the exception of ‘You 
would like to tack problems’, F(5, 174) = 0.39, p = .86, and the average IU composite item 
(scores on all four IU items added together and divided by four), F(5, 174) = 1.29, p = .27. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7.28.  
The manipulations were not ‘pure’; the descriptive statistics shown in Table 7.30 
indicate that scores were similar post-manipulation across a number of conditions. However, 
to minimize Type 1 error rates, comparisons were only conducted between pairs of 
manipulations: the negative mood group was compared to the neutral mood group on the 
mood items; the high IU group was compared to the low IU group on the IU items; the low PSC 
group was compared to the high PSC group on the PSC items. The results are presented below.  
Mood. 
 A series of Bonferroni-corrected (p < .01) independent t-tests were conducted on the 
mood ratings taken after the mood inductions. The t-tests revealed a significant effect of the 
mood inductions on sadness, t(58) = 4.33, p < .001, r = .24, happiness, t(58) = -5.99, p < .001, r 
= .38, anxiety, t(58) = 3.59, p = .001, r = .18, and negativity, t(566) = 3.77, p < .001, r = .20. 
There was no significant difference in arousal, t(58) = -1.15, p = .26, r = .02. Participants in the 
                                                     
6
 Two participants failed to complete this item. 
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negative mood induction group reported feeling significantly sadder, less happy, more 
anxious and more negative than participants in the neutral mood induction condition.  
Intolerance of uncertainty. 
An independent t-test indicated no significant difference between the high IU group 
and the low IU group on the composite measure of IU, t(58) = 0.87, p = .39, r = .01. In terms of 
the single VAS items, the difference between the high and low IU groups approached 
significance on one question measuring IU (‘You find uncertainty unpleasant’), t(58) = 1.40, p 
= .17, r = .03. There was no significant difference between the high IU and low IU groups on 
the other single VAS items: ‘You feel concerned by uncertainty’, t(58) = 1.15, p = .25, r = .02, 
‘You feel uncertain’, t(58) = 0.18, p = .86, r < .001, ‘You think it is unfair that there are no 
guarantees in life’, t(58) = 0.14, p= .89, r < .001. These findings indicate that the IU 
manipulation was not successful in generating significant between group differences. 
Differences between responses to the IU question used at baseline and as a post-manipulation 
check question was assessed using a mixed 2(Time: Pre-manipulation vs. Post-manipulation) 
× 2(IU condition: high vs. low) ANOVA with time as the repeated measures.  There was no 
main effect of time, no main effect of IU condition, and no significant time × IU condition 
interaction, Fs ≤ .55, ps ≥ .46. 
Problem-solving confidence. 
An independent t-test indicated that the low PSC group scored significantly lower on 
the PSC composite measure than the high PSC group, t(43.61) = -3.01, p = .004, r = .17. The 
low PSC group scored significantly lower than the high PSC group on ‘You feel confident in 
your ability to think up creative and effective solutions to solve a problem’, t(45.83) = -3.80, p 
< .001, r = .24, and ‘You trust your ability to solve new and difficult problems’, t(50.00) = -2.68, 
p = .01, r = .13. There was no significant difference between the low and high PSC group on the 
items ‘You would like to tackle problems’, t(58) = 0.38, p = .70, r = .002, and ‘You feel most 
problems are too complex for you to solve’, t(58) = 0.02, p = .98, r < .001.    
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Table 7.28 Descriptive statistics for the manipulation checks by mood induction condition. 
 Negative 
mood 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
mood 
M (SD) 
High  
IU 
M (SD) 
Low  
IU  
M (SD) 
Low 
PSC 
M (SD) 
High 
PSC  
M (SD) 
Sadness*** 49.93 
(19.83) 
25.80 
(23.24) 
31.60 
(18.38) 
31.33 
(27.57) 
34.10 
(20.51) 
23.13 
(18.08) 
Anxiety*** 50.87 
(23.65) 
29.07 
(23.42) 
50.07 
(22.91) 
46.17 
(26.09) 
41.53 
(19.84) 
28.80 
(23.32) 
Negativity*** 50.67 
(23.16) 
27.00 
(24.62) 
36.70 
(19.58) 
35.03 
(26.87) 
41.53 
(19.12) 
25.33 
(14.43) 
Arousal  43.33 
(23.00) 
50.77 
(27.01) 
57.40 
(19.86) 
58.73 
(16.24) 
59.87 
(16.61) 
66.13 
(17.40) 
Happiness*** 45.90 
(17.36) 
72.70 
(17.29) 
63.27 
(15.55) 
64.17 
(25.11) 
60.20 
(17.96) 
75.77 
(12.03) 
Mean IU composite a ** 60.72 
(16.47) 
43.14 
(21.12) 
55.15 
(18.80) 
50.18 
(24.94) 
56.03 
(14.04) 
44.43 
(16.81) 
You find uncertainty unpleasant* 64.97 
(21.11) 
53.47 
(26.78) 
63.70 
(26.21) 
64.60 
(24.37) 
68.03 
(18.16) 
51.00 
(26.00) 
You feel concerned by uncertainty* 65.37 
(19.91) 
52.50 
(24.51) 
64.60 
(24.37) 
56.93 
(27.06) 
67.03 
(14.94) 
53.50 
(22.67) 
You feel uncertain*** 51.30 
(21.56) 
30.83 
(23.86) 
54.33 
(22.64) 
53.13 
(28.80) 
50.23 
(19.04) 
33.40 
(20.06) 
You think it is unfair that there are no 
guarantees in life ** 
61.23 
(25.75) 
34.82 
(25.43) 
37.97 
(28.40) 
37.00 
(26.17) 
38.80 
(26.40) 
39.83 
(26.29) 
Mean PSC composite a ** 58.43 
(12.84) 
65.59 
(19.57) 
70.09 
(16.03) 
70.79 
(14.25) 
63.36 
(15.51) 
70.36 
(10.32) 
You would like to tackle problems 72.90 
(21.40) 
70.13 
(24.11) 
76.70 
(18.88) 
71.90 
(18.60) 
71.87 
(11.89) 
73.50 
(20.04) 
You feel confident in your ability to think 
up creative and effective solutions to 
solve new and difficult problems ** 
55.40 
(20.24) 
64.57 
(21.88) 
64.50 
(20.76) 
69.73 
(14.89) 
53.00 
(21.77) 
70.33 
(12.31) 
You trust your ability to solve new and 
difficult problems ** 
54.07 
(20.30) 
64.33 
(24.77) 
65.80 
(20.83) 
70.17 
(17.84) 
65.80 
(20.83) 
70.17 
(17.84) 
You feel most problems are too complex 
for you to solve ** 
48.63 
(21.91) 
33.32 
(22.49) 
26.63 
(20.49) 
28.63 
(23.25) 
26.63 
(20.49) 
28.63 
(23.25) 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. a Mean composite of four VASs; Significant difference across groups  
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Experimental Outcomes. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted with each threat and coping variable entered as 
separate dependent variables, with manipulation condition used as the independent variable. 
Given that the IU manipulation was unsuccessful, between-group analyses were only 
conducted for the mood and PSC groups on the threat perception and coping belief items. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7.29. 
Approaching and avoiding threats. 
  There was a significant difference on both approach questions: (Q1) ‘If you encounter 
a threatening situation over the next week, to what extent will you try to think about this 
situation?’, F(3, 116) = 4.56, p = .005; (Q2) ‘To what extent will you try to focus your attention 
on thinking about any threatening situations you encounter?’, F(5, 174) = 4.36, p = .006. In 
both cases, Bonferroni post-hoc tests identified a difference between the neutral mood group 
and the low PSC group; Approach Q1 p = .04; Approach Q2 p = .03. In both cases, the low PSC 
group were more willing to approach threats than the neutral mood group – perhaps 
reflecting a mood repair/maintenance effect. There was also a significant difference between 
the negative mood and low PSC group on Approach Q2, p = .008, with the negative mood 
group reporting less willingness to approach threats than the low PSC group. A significant 
difference emerged on one of the avoidance questions, F(5, 174) = 4.43, p = .006. The negative 
mood group was significantly more likely to avoid threats than the low PSC group (p = .04).  
Coping beliefs. 
There was a significant difference on one of the perceived coping questions (Q2) 
(‘How well will you cope with any threatening situations you encounter over the next week?’), 
F(3, 112) = 2.86, p = .04. However, the conservative Bonferroni post-hoc test, used to 
compensate for multiple ANOVA tests, did not identify any significant differences between the 
mood and PSC groups.  
Motivation and personal relevance. 
There was a significant difference on the first motivation question (‘Over the next 
week, to what extent will you feel motivated to deal with threatening situations you 
encounter?’), F(3, 116) = 4.82, p = .003. Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that there was a 
significant difference between the negative mood and neutral mood groups, and between the 
negative mood group and the low PSC group. Examination of the means (see Table 7.29) 
indicates that the findings went against the predicted direction; the negative mood group 
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reported feeling less motivated to deal with their worries than the neutral mood group (and 
the low PSC group). 
There was a significant difference on the first personal relevance question (‘To what 
extent did you personally identify with feelings related to this task?’), F(3, 112) = 2.86, p = .04. 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that there was a significant difference between the 
negative mood group and the low PSC group, p = .02. The negative mood group was far more 
likely to endorse that the mood manipulation was personally relevant than the PSC 
manipulation, perhaps indicating that the participants in the PSC did not feel that their low 
marks were representative of their usual problem-solving skills (although the false-feedback 
was enough to generate lower PSC).  
 
Table 7.29 Descriptive statistics for the threat and coping belief items for the mood and 
problem-solving confidence conditions 
Construct Question Negative mood 
M (SD) 
Neutral mood 
M (SD) 
Low PSC 
M (SD) 
High PSC  
M (SD) 
Motivation  1** 55.33 (19.69) 70.20 (18.71) 68.57 (14.80) 67.07 (13.45) 
 2 65.83 (22.25) 70.93 (27.31) 77.07 (16.28) 75.03 (17.58) 
Avoidance 1* 51.30 (24.60) 46.60 (29.08) 38.90 (26.04) 41.77 (26.28) 
 2 58.40 (21.09) 56.80 (24.94) 41.47 (22.77) 42.80 (24.42) 
Approach 1** 49.50 (18.54) 49.03 (19.98) 62.53 (19.63) 61.63 (17.82) 
 2** 52.53 (19.78) 54.50 (23.12) 68.83 (12.61) 57.10 (19.56) 
Personal relevance 1* 63.97 (30.80) 56.17 (24.27) 44.87 (22.46) 57.03 (21.14) 
 2 55.28 (25.07) 54.21 (22.25) 49.00 (21.65) 52.79 (16.52) 
Coping 1 60.50 (20.35) 67.70 (21.23) 69.33 (17.25) 68.73 (12.67) 
 2* 53.41 (19.59) 65.38 (21.97) 65.83 (16.45) 65.41 (18.88) 
Worry 1 66.20 (20.23) 58.17 (25.07) 59.87 (20.69) 64.90 (20.16) 
 2 70.07 (22.04) 66.17 (22.80) 69.59 (13.76) 67.34 (17.48) 
Threat  Frequency 46.93 (24.98) 52.93 (24.78) 51.90 (21.24) 57.63 (22.34) 
 Intensity 42.23 (25.84) 36.93 (21.08) 39.43 (16.87) 38.33 (21.57) 
*p < .05, ** p < .001 
There was no significant difference between the mood and PSC groups on the threat 
frequency/intensity items, motivation Q2, avoidance Q2, cope Q1, personal relevance Q2, or 
the worry items, Fs ≤ ± 1.63, ps ≥ .19. 
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Correlation analyses. 
 There are two reasons for conducting correlation analyses. Firstly, the IU 
manipulation was unsuccessful; correlational analyses can determine whether there is a 
relationship between IU and threat perception and coping beliefs, even if the causal direction 
cannot be determined. Secondly, while the mood inductions and PSC manipulations were 
successful, the standard deviations for the two mood groups were very large. Consequently, 
correlations were run (ignoring which condition participants were assigned to). The results 
are shown in Table 7.32 and are discussed for each worry promoter, below. In order to 
simplify the analyses, composite measures were used by adding together the two questions 
measuring each of the constructs (except threat frequency and intensity, which were only 
measured by a single question each).  
Negative mood. 
Scores on the VAS measure of feeling negative were significantly positively correlated 
with threat frequency, r = .20, p = .007, threat intensity, r = .27, p < .001, threat spellings on 
the homophone task, r = .16, p = .03, and worry about threats, r = .24, p = .001. Thus, the more 
negative an individual felt, the more likely they were to (1) think that they would encounter 
more threats in the next week, (2) think that any encountered threats would be more 
threatening, (3) interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening, and (4) report heightened worry 
about threats. As predicted, negative mood correlated negatively with beliefs about being able 
to cope with threats, r = -.43, p < .001. Against the prediction that negative mood would 
positively correlate with variables known to increase sufficiency thresholds, negative mood 
was significantly negatively correlated with motivation, r = -.27, p < .001, and did not correlate 
with personal relevance, r = .06, p = .41. The more negative an individual reported feeling, the 
lower their motivation was to deal with any threats that they encountered, and the lower their 
beliefs were about their ability to cope. Additionally, negative mood was correlated with 
avoiding threats, r = .34, p < .001, and not with approaching threats, r = -.05, p = .49. 
Intolerance of uncertainty. 
Scores on the composite VAS measure of IU were significantly positively correlated 
with estimation of the frequency of threats that would be encountered in the next week, r = 
.30, p < .001, the intensity of threats anticipated, r = .33, p < .001, and worry about threats, r = 
.44, p < .001. IU did not correlate with homophone threat spellings, r = .09, p = .22. The greater 
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an individual endorsed IU, the more threats they felt that they would encounter in the next 
week, the more they reported that they would avoid these threats, and the more they 
reported they would worry about these threats. The composite measure of IU was 
significantly negatively correlated with coping, r = -.34, p < .001; the more intolerant of 
uncertainty one was, the less well they felt they would cope with any threats that they 
encountered. Furthermore, while IU did not correlate with approaching threats, r = .09, p = 
.22, it was positively correlated with avoiding threats, r = .36, p < .001. 
Problem-solving confidence. 
Scores on the VAS composite measure of PSC did not significantly correlate with the 
frequency of threats expected, r = .003, p = .97, the intensity of anticipated threats, r = -.12, p = 
.12, or homophone threat spellings, r = -.10, p = .17.  PSC did correlate with worry about 
threats, r = .36, p < .001, but this was not in the predicted direction; individuals with high PSC 
were more worried about threats than those with low PSC. PSC was correlated with coping 
beliefs, r = .51, p < .001. The greater an individual’s PSC, the greater their belief that they 
would cope with any threats that they encountered. PSC positively correlated with 
approaching threats, r = .22, p = .004, and negatively correlated with avoiding threats, r = -.35, 
p < .001. The higher an individual’s PSC, the more likely they were to approach threats and the 
less likely they were to avoid threats.  
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Relative contributions of the worry promoters to threat perception and coping 
beliefs. 
 As indicated by the manipulation check descriptive statistics, and by the finding that 
between group differences on the outcome measures were often between mood and PSC 
groups, rather than the two mood groups, or two PSC groups, it is clear that the interactive 
effects of the variables on threat and coping should be considered. Two hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to examine the relative contributions of negative mood, 
IU, and low PSC (the predictor variables) to (1) threat perception and (2) coping (the outcome 
variables). There were two outcome measures of interest. Firstly, this analysis was designed 
to examine the relative contributions of the worry promoters to threat perception. The threat 
outcome measure comprised a composite measure of the two threat VAS items taken from the 
threat and coping VAS questionnaire: ‘How many things that pose some threat do you think 
you will encounter over the next week?’, and ‘On average, how bad do you think the 
threatening things you may encounter will be?’ Secondly, this analysis was designed to 
examine the relative contributions of the worry promoters to beliefs about coping. The coping 
outcome measure comprised a composite measure of the two coping VAS items taken from 
the threat and coping VAS questionnaire: ‘To what extent do you think that you will have the 
ability to cope with any threatening situations that you encounter over the next week?’, and 
‘How well will you cope with any threatening situations you encounter over the next week?’.  
Participants had been exposed to a manipulation of either mood, IU and PSC. In order 
to control for this, the experimental condition that the participant was assigned to was 
entered in the first block of the regression model. The predictor items negative mood, IU and 
PSC were entered using a forced entry method. Two regressions were run, one with threat 
perception as the outcome variable, and the second with coping beliefs as the outcome 
variable. 
Regression 1: Worry promoters and threat perception. 
 The final model was a significant fit of the threat perception scores, F(4, 173) = 4.07, p 
= .004, and explained 8.6% of variance in threat perception. Table 7.31 shows the regression 
coefficients for the two steps in the hierarchical regression. In the final model, negative mood 
was the sole significant predictor of threat perception, t(173) = 3.46, p < .001. Experimental 
condition, t(173) = 1.47, p = .15, IU, t(173) = -0.46, p = .53, and PSC, t(173) = 0.58, p = .56, 
were all non-significant predictors of threat perception.  
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Table7.31 Regression coefficients for the worry  
promoter and threat perception model 
 b SE b β 
Step 1    
Constant 87.27 6.71  
Experimental condition 1.40 1.72 .06 
Step 2    
Constant 56.43 17.43  
Experimental condition 2.49 1.70 .11 
Negative mood 0.58 0.17 .34* 
IU -0.04 0.06 -.06 
PSC 0.12 0.21 .58 
R2 = .004 for step 1: ΔR2 = .082 for step 2 (p = .002). *p = .001. 
 
Given that the experimental manipulations may have resulted in changes to the 
distribution of scores for the variables, careful consideration was paid to the assumptions of 
regression. The tests of assumptions (see Appendix K) indicated that the model was reliable.   
Regression 2: Worry promoters and coping beliefs. 
 The final model was a significant fit of the coping belief scores, F(4, 170) = 29.45, p < 
.001, and explained 40.9% of variance in coping beliefs. Table 7.32 shows the regression 
coefficients for the two steps in the hierarchical regression. In the final model, negative mood, 
t(170) = -6.29, p < .001, IU, t(170) = 5.29, p < .001, and PSC, t(170) = 6.54, p < .001, were all 
identified as significant predictors of coping. The results indicate that increased negativity 
predicts lower coping beliefs. Interestingly, high IU levels predicted higher coping beliefs. 
High PSC predicted higher coping beliefs. Experimental condition, t(170) = 0.10, p = .90 did 
not significantly predict coping beliefs.  
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Table 7.32 Regression coefficients for the worry promoter 
 and coping beliefs model 
 b SE b β 
Step 1    
Constant 122.49 5.91  
Experimental condition 2.47 1.52  
Step 2    
Constant 81.81 12.42  
Experimental condition 0.12 1.21 .01 
Negative mood -0.75 0.12 -.50* 
IU 0.21 0.04 .41* 
PSC 0.12 0.21 .43* 
R2 = .015 for step 1: ΔR2 = .394 for step 2 (p < .001). *p < .001. 
 
Homophone task. 
The homophone task provided another measure of threat interpretation, namely 
threat interpretation biases of ambiguous stimuli. A three-way mixed 6(manipulation 
condition) by 2(word type: threat/neutral vs. positive/neutral) by 2(word list: A vs. B) 
ANOVA was conducted, with word type as the repeated measures variable. There was a 
significant main effect of homophone type (threat/neutral vs. positive/neutral), F(1, 168) = 
228.88, p < .001.  The mean number of words spelt as threat for the threat/neutral words, and 
positive for positive/neutral words for each manipulation condition are shown in Table 7.33. 
The means indicate that compared to neutral interpretations, more positive interpretations 
(M = 10.51, SD = 1.79) were reported than threat interpretations (M = 7.70, SD = 1.83), but 
this was irrespective of manipulation condition. All other main effects, two-way and three-
way interactions were non-significant, Fs ≤ 2.04, ps ≥ .08. 
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Table 7.33 Mean number of words spelt in threat form for the threat/neutral (‘threat’) and 
positive form for the positive/neutral (‘positive’) words, by word list and manipulation 
condition 
 
Word 
type 
Negative 
mood 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
mood 
M (SD) 
High IU 
M (SD) 
Low IU 
M (SD) 
Low PSC 
M (SD) 
High PSC 
M (SD) 
A 
Threat 7.93 (1.71) 7.53 (1.36) 7.40 (1.50) 7.63 (1.89) 7.63 (1.89) 8.21 (1.05) 
Positive 10.80 (0.86) 10.27 (1.71) 9.60 (1.62) 10.60 (2.29) 10.63 (2.00) 11.21 (1.53) 
B 
Threat 8.40 (2.16) 8.00 (2.04) 7.60 (2.03) 7.86 (2.11) 7.86 (2.11) 7.19 (2.17) 
Positive 9.27 (1.22) 9.60 (1.59) 10.73 (1.62) 11.00 (1.07) 11.14 (1.35) 10.75 (1.84) 
 
Questionnaire measures. 
One-way ANOVAs indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
manipulation conditions on the PSWQ, F(5, 170) = 0.11, p = .99, the MBQ Monitoring (M) 
subscale, F(5, 172) = 0.87, p = .50, or the MBQ Blunting (B) subscale, F(5, 172) = 1.62, p = .16. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7.34. Participants in the IU conditions also completed 
the IUS. Given that the IU manipulation was unsuccessful, the between-group comparison is 
meaningless, but the descriptive statistics are shown for information in Table 7.34. The PSC 
groups also completed the PSC subscale of the PSI. Independent t-tests indicated that there 
was no significant difference between the low PSC group and the high PSC group on the PSC 
subscale of the PSI, t(58) = -1.47, p = .15. 
Table 7.34 Descriptive statistics for the validated questionnaires by manipulation condition 
 Negative 
mood  
M (SD) 
Neutral mood  
M (SD) 
High IU  
M (SD) 
Low IU  
M (SD) 
Low PSC  
M (SD) 
High PSC  
M (SD) 
PSWQ 53.83 (13.16) 52.92 (13.05) 53.23 (12.53) 53.50 (15.24) 51.97 (13.33) 54.30 (10.27) 
MBQ M 61.63 (12.72) 63.48 (14.09) 66.10 (13.69) 63.50 (13.06) 63.17 (14.80) 67.93 (11.93) 
MBQ B 55.93 (12.36) 56.28 (13.81) 48.28 (13.79) 54.47 (17.92) 49.50 (14.72) 50.90 (14.75) 
IUS - - 62.34 (16.71) 57.47 (16.36) - - 
PSC - - - - 51.97 (13.33) 54.30 (10.27) 
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Assessing the validity of the Threat and Coping Questionnaire items. 
To assess the construct validity of the threat and coping questionnaire items, a 
number of correlations were conducted. The threat frequency and threat intensity items 
correlated with one another as predicted, r = .58, p < .001. There was also a significant 
positive correlation between the threat frequency item and worry about threats, r = .36, p < 
.001, and the threat intensity item and worry about threats, r = .36, p < .001. However, there 
was no correlation between the threat frequency and intensity items and the number of 
words that were written using the ‘threat’ spelling on the homophone task, rs ≤ .10, ps > .05. 
The threat worry item appeared to be a valid measure of worry as it correlated with scores on 
the PSWQ, r = .49, p < .001. The approach item had good validity as it correlated with the MBQ 
monitoring subscale, r = .21, p < .01. The validity of the avoidance items is questionable as the 
avoidance score did not correlate with the MBQ blunting subscale, r = -.05, p > .05. As 
predicted, individuals who felt that they would cope less well with threats were also more 
worried about threats, r = -.27, p < .001, providing some support that the coping items are 
measuring perceived ability to cope. The personal relevance and motivation items did not 
correlate, r = -.04, p > .05, raising questions around the validity of these two items. 
Consequently, the threat, worry, coping and approach items seem valid, but caution should be 
taken when interpreting the avoidance, personal relevance and motivation items.  
Summary of results.  
In summary, the negative mood induction resulted in higher self-reported feelings of 
sadness, anxiety, and negativity, as well as greater feelings of IU. The negative mood induction 
decreased motivation to approach threats, and increased desire to avoid threats, compared to 
the neutral and low PSC group, respectively. Negative mood was significantly positively 
correlated with anticipated threat frequency and intensity, worry about threats, and desire to 
avoid threats. Negative mood was significantly negatively correlated with coping beliefs and 
motivation.  
The IU manipulation failed to induce differential amounts of IU between the high and 
low IU groups. Nonetheless, correlation analyses indicated that scores on a composite 
measure of IU were significantly positively correlated with anticipated threat frequency and 
intensity, worry about threats, and desire to avoid threats. IU was significantly negatively 
correlated with coping.  
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The low PSC manipulation resulted in lower self-reported PSC, as well as raised 
feelings of sadness, anxiety, negativity, and IU. Surprisingly, high PSC was correlated with 
higher worry about threats. Individuals with low PSC were less likely to think that they could 
cope with threats, were less willing to approach threats, and more likely to avoid threats.  
7.4 Discussion 
This experiment was designed to explore the influence that negative mood, IU and low 
PSC have on threat perception and coping beliefs. Firstly the results will be examined in 
relation to the predictions that negative mood, high IU and low PSC would result in (1) 
increased threat detection, (2) lower perceived ability to cope with any threats that were 
encountered, and (3) increased worry about threats. The relative contributions of the worry 
promoters to threat perception and coping will be discussed, before turning to consider the 
implications of the findings of this experiment for the role of systematic processing in worry. 
Lastly, limitations of the experimental manipulations will be discussed. 
The relationship between worry promoters, threat perception and coping beliefs 
The between-group analyses did not provide support for negative mood and PSC 
playing a causal role in heightened threat perception and decreased coping beliefs. IU groups 
were not included in these analyses due to the failed manipulation. One possible reason for 
why negative mood and low PSC did not alter threat perception and coping beliefs is that, 
while the manipulations did generate between-group differences in mood and PSC, there was 
wide variation post-manipulation within groups. This is probably due to some participants 
finding the mood and PSC manipulation procedures more evocative than others. The 
correlations provide much stronger support for the role of mood, IU and PSC in threat 
perception and coping, but do not provide insights into causation.  
Prediction 1: Worry promoters and threat perception. 
There was partial support, albeit of a correlational nature, for prediction 1, namely 
that the worry promoters would increase threat perception. Negative mood and IU were both 
correlated with raised expectations regarding the frequency and intensity of threats that 
would be encountered over the next week. Negative mood was also correlated with the 
number of words spelt as threat words when participants listened to ambiguous words (with 
neutral or threat spellings) as part of a homophone task.  
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Prediction 2: Worry promoters and coping beliefs. 
There was also support from the correlation analyses for the worry promoters being 
related to how well an individual felt that they would cope with any threats that they 
encountered (prediction 2). Negative mood, high IU and low PSC were all associated with 
lower coping beliefs. Furthermore, all three worry promoters were associated with a greater 
desire to avoid threats. Low PSC was also associated with less willingness to approach threats. 
The experiment showed that being in a negative mood decreased participants’ beliefs about 
their ability to cope with any threats that they encountered. This is consistent with the idea 
that negative moods are associated with pessimism (Segerstrom et al., 1998). Negative moods 
in the context of threats may indicate that the situation is beyond personal control. This leads 
to more emotion-focused coping strategies, and can include self-criticism for failing to prevent 
the threat. The decrease in coping beliefs shown by those in a negative mood suggests that the 
negative mood group may be relying on emotion-focused coping and are critical of their self-
efficacy. This explanation is also consistent with feelings of personal inadequacy feeding into 
the worry process of high worriers (Davey & Levy, 1998). One possible mechanism for this is 
that negative moods result in semantic activation of memories when similar moods were 
experienced. If past negative moods have arisen from failures, current negative moods will 
strengthen associations between the current state and failing to cope. 
IU negatively correlated with coping beliefs; individuals who were more distressed by 
uncertainty were less likely to believe that they would cope if they encountered threats. There 
have been few, if any, studies in the IU worry literature that have examined the way that IU 
impacts upon self-efficacy beliefs in relation to coping. The reduced confidence may feed into 
the feelings of personal inadequacy reported by worriers (Davey & Levy, 1998b). The 
correlational analyses did not indicate that IU was related to a general tendency to approach 
or avoid threats, but other coping factors, such as whether coping is emotion-focused or task-
focused in high IU individuals could be explored in future experiments.  
Low PSC increased the desire to avoid threats, which can be considered as avoidant 
coping, supporting the work of Davey (1993a).  
Prediction 3: Worry promoters and worry about threats. 
All three worry promoters were correlated with increased worry about threats 
(prediction 3). The finding that being in a negative mood is linked to greater worry about 
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threats is consistent with findings that worriers are more likely to be in a negative mood 
(Davey et al., 1992; Metzger et al., 1990; Meyer, et al., 1990). However, as the current finding 
is based on a correlation, it is unclear whether negative mood leads to more worrying, or 
more worrying leads to a negative mood. In fact, there is literature supporting both assertions 
(e.g., Johnston & Davey, 1997; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), and an accurate reflection may be 
that negative mood functions to initiate and maintain worry bouts. The finding that IU is 
significantly correlated with worry about threats supports a large literature that implicates IU 
in worrying (e.g. Buhr & Dugas, 2006; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 
1998; Ladouceur, et al., 2000). Again, given the correlational nature of this analysis, it is not 
possible to comment on whether IU is a causal or outcome variable of worrying, but literature 
supports IU as a preceding factor of worry (e.g. Ladouceur, et al., 2000). A recent longitudinal 
study in adolescents supports the notion that there is a bidirectional and reciprocal 
relationship between IU and worrying, with each accounting for unique variance in the 
development of the other across time (Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012).  
Prediction 4: Negative mood and factors that raise sufficiency thresholds. 
 Unexpectedly, negative mood was negatively correlated with motivation, and 
between-group differences indicated individuals in a negative mood were less motivated than 
individuals with low PSC. This is difficult to rectify with the finding in Experiment 1 that 
negative moods are associated with raised sufficiency thresholds, which increase the 
likelihood that systematic processing is deployed. Chaiken et al. (1989) state that individuals 
must be motivated to deploy systematic processing. Consequently, the finding that motivation 
levels were lower suggests individuals were actually less likely to deploy systematic 
processing. This may be due to the wording of the questions, and will be revisited in the 
General Discussion in Chapter 9.  
Relative contributions of the worry promoters to threat perception 
When all three worry promoters were included in the same regression model (i.e. they 
were controlled against one another) that negative mood was the sole significant predictor of 
threat perception. This supports numerous findings showing that negative mood is associated 
with threatening interpretations of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Constans & Mathews, 1993; 
Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Richards, Reynolds & French, 1993; Blanchette & Richards, 
2003; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This may account for why individuals in a negative mood are 
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more likely to deploy systematic processing and ‘as many as can’ stop rules (see Experiment 
1, Chapter 4) – it may be an attempt to deal with an increased perception that negative 
outcomes may arise through unresolved/unmanaged threats. 
Relative contributions of the worry promoters to coping beliefs 
When the worry promoters were included in one regression model, negative mood, IU, 
and low PSC were all found to correlate with significant predictors of coping beliefs. As 
predicted, negative mood has a negative relationship with coping beliefs and PSC has a 
positive relationship with coping (because high values represent high confidence, thus high 
confidence is linked to strong beliefs one will cope). IU, on the other hand, has the opposite 
relationship with coping beliefs than would be expected both from theory and from the 
results of the correlation analyses. IU was identified as a positive predictor of coping beliefs, 
indicating that as IU levels increase, coping beliefs also increase. This does not appear to be 
the result of multicollinearity as VIF and tolerance values were acceptable (Field, 2009). 
Instead, it appears to suggest that there may be shared variance in IU and the negative mood 
variable, accounting for the negative relationship identified between IU and coping in 
correlation analyses. When this variance is accounted for by including negative mood in the 
regression model, the additional variance that IU contributes actually relates to greater beliefs 
in coping. It is possible that this is because the individual who has high IU levels will not stop 
(i.e. they will perseverate, perhaps using an ‘as many as can’ stop rule, Davey, et al., 2005) 
until they feel that they have resolved their worry. Consequently, the individual with high IU 
may learn that they can cope with threats, but using coping methods that are less adaptive 
than non-worriers/low IU individuals.  
Implications for the role of systematic processing in worry  
The implications for understanding the role of systematic processing in worry will 
now be outlined. The regression analyses showed that negative mood was the strongest 
predictor of heightened threat detection. Experiment 1 showed that negative mood increased 
a composite score reflecting the sufficiency threshold. This experiment suggests that negative 
mood may have its effect on processing sufficiency thresholds through increasing the sense 
that a situation is threatening. Such appraisals, according to the HSM, increase the likelihood 
information relevant to the situation is systematically processed (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 
1994; Bohner et al., 1998). However, the HSM also makes predictions about the role of 
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believing systematic processing can confer better judgements about a situation. Managing a 
situation through systematic processing (using information specific to the situation in a 
detailed manner in order to form a judgement) is similar to task-focused problem-solving, 
which worriers reportedly use less frequently than non-worriers (Matthews & Funke, 2006). 
This study found that a negative mood was associated with decreased motivation to deal with 
a threat and lower perceived coping skills, both of which are likely to thwart the deployment 
of systematic processing (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Chaiken et al., 1989).  When 
considering the way in which worry, systematic processing, threat detection and coping relate 
to one another, it may be that threat detection and systematic processing are processes 
involved in vigilance to threat, and that if an individual feels that they cannot cope, they 
deploy worrying as an avoidant coping strategy, i.e. the ‘vigilance-avoidance’ model outlined 
in the introduction to this experiment. 
Negative mood, IU and low PSC were all associated with decreased coping beliefs. In 
the HSM, low self-efficacy (such as believing one cannot cope or meet their sufficiency 
threshold) is linked to less use of systematic processing, and a reliance on heuristic 
processing. Consequently, this study offers an explanation for why negative mood caused 
increased sufficiency thresholds in Experiment 1 but IU and PSC did not cause increased 
sufficiency thresholds in Experiments 2 and 4. This study indicates that the lack of an effect of 
IU and PSC on sufficiency thresholds may be because they do not increase threat perceptions 
in the same way that negative mood was found to. A full understanding of the processing style 
profile of worriers will need to take into account characteristics of worriers that increase the 
deployment of systematic processing and the characteristics of worriers the decrease the 
deployment of systematic processing.  
The literature on the HSM does not provide exact details of how much of an impact 
factors that promote systematic processing and factors that demote it have on the final choice 
of processing strategy. The relationship between the worry promoters and systematic and 
heuristic processing will be examined in more detail in the questionnaire study in Experiment 
6 (see Chapter 8).  
Experimental manipulations 
Causal accounts of the role of the worry promoters in threat perception and coping 
beliefs can only be made on the basis of successful experimental manipulations. The mood 
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and PSC were both successful at generating between-group differences on mood and PSC 
measures respectively. Unfortunately, the manipulation of IU was unsuccessful at generating 
differential amounts of IU between the two groups; a clear limitation of this experiment. It is 
unclear why this manipulation was unsuccessful, although it is consistent with the failure to 
induce differential amounts of IU in Experiment 3, despite successfully manipulating IU levels 
with the same procedure in Experiment 2. One possibility is that the composite measure 
reflected a state part-way between dispositional IU tendencies, and raised/reduced state IU as 
a result of the manipulation (which may have been partially effective). Thus, the participants’ 
IU appraisals may have returned to baseline by the end of the experiment when they 
completed the IUS. The mean scores for the IU manipulation check questions appear higher in 
both the high IU and the low IU groups, compared to the mood and PSC groups. It is possible 
that writing about an uncertain event in their life raised feelings of IU in participants in both 
IU groups.  
One further methodological limitation of this study is that the manipulations of mood 
and PSC were not pure. The negative mood induction was also found to increase IU. This 
supports Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) assertion that negative moods such as sadness and 
anxiety are related to uncertainty. Generally, a negative emotion signals that something is 
problematic, and when a situation is identified as problematic we are less likely to tolerate 
feeling uncertain as this may increase the chance of a negative outcome arising; an uncertain 
individual cannot be sure that their management of the problematic situation is effective. 
Furthermore, the PSC manipulation did not purely affect PSC levels; mood and IU were also 
affected by the false-feedback procedure. It seems logical that mood levels may drop (i.e. 
higher negative mood) when an individual receives feedback that they have performed badly 
on a test, and it is likely that most occasions where an individual reports low PSC they will 
also report negative mood. The construct overlap between the worry promoters examined in 
this thesis will be explored in Experiment 6 (see Chapter 8).  
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8 Worry and systematic processing: A 
questionnaire analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to verify the relationships between (1) worry, (2) worry promoters 
(negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty, IU, and low problem-solving confidence, PSC), and 
(3) systematic processing, as measured by published questionnaires. Correlation analyses 
examined the inter-relationships and a principal components analysis examined the number 
of constructs underlying these variables. Three key relationships were explored: (1) the 
relationship between worry and systematic processing; (2) the relationship between worry 
promoters and systematic processing; and (3) the relationship between worry promoters and 
worry.  
 Systematic processing and worry have common features and appear to have similar 
underpinnings. As described in Chapter 2, whether an individual deploys systematic 
processing is in part dependent upon their sufficiency threshold – the discrepancy between 
the desired amount of confidence in their judgement and the actual amount of confidence in 
their judgement. The greater this discrepancy (with actual confidence being lower than 
desired confidence), the more likely it is that an individual will deploy systematic processing 
(Chaiken, et al., 1989). A number of factors that raise sufficiency thresholds have been 
identified in the social psychology literature including responsibility and accountability – 
appraisals that have also been shown to be elevated in worriers  (Wells & Carter, 2001; Wells 
& Papageorgiou, 1998). Furthermore, a number of dispositional characteristics of worriers 
are likely to raise their sufficiency thresholds as they strive to ensure they have met their 
goals successfully, such as perfectionism, IU and excessive concern over mistakes (Dugas, et 
al., 1997; Frost, et al., 1990; Pratt, et al., 1997; Stöber & Joormann, 2001b). Such 
characteristics are associated with the deployment of ‘as many as can’ (AMA) goals for 
determining when to stop worrying – AMA goals specify that one should continue worrying 
until as much has been done as possible (e.g. Davey, 2006b). Individuals deploying systematic 
processing in the context of worry may search for more information about their worry, and 
try to integrate all relevant information about the threat. What is more, many worriers hold 
the belief that worry is a necessary process in order to avoid future threats (Borkovec, et al., 
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1999; Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996; Wells, 1995), which is likely to raise sufficiency thresholds for 
making judgements about worry-related situations. 
 Despite the similarities in the underpinnings of systematic processing and worry, 
systematic processing is deployed in a broad range of situations, from decision making 
(Steginga & Occhipinti, 2004) to attitude formation (Martin & Hewstone, 2003). As such, it is 
possible that systematic processing is more akin to the functional, problem-solving aspect of 
worry (e.g. Davey, et al., 1992). Davey (1994a) suggests that constructive problem-solving 
consists of logical analysis, information-seeking and active behavioural coping. Systematic 
processing may be a part of worrying up until the point that the normal problem-solving 
processes associated with more adaptive forms of worry become thwarted as pathological 
worrying sets in. Problem-solving may be thwarted by the worrier experiencing increasing 
distress (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), catastrophic thinking (Davey & Levy, 1998b), and feeling 
that the worry process is uncontrollable (Borkovec, et al., 1983).  
 Experiments have shown that manipulating negative mood (Johnston & Davey, 1997), 
IU (Ladouceur, et al., 2000), and (low) PSC (Davey, Jubb, et al., 1996) increases worry 
perseveration. Negative mood is a promoter of analytic thinking and is implicated in 
systematic processing deployment (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The sorts 
of negative moods that have been linked to greater systematic processing are those associated 
with uncertainty. Bodenhausen et al. (1994) compared the impact of a negative mood 
associated with uncertainty (sadness) compared to a negative mood associated with certainty 
(anger) on information processing. Individuals in an angry mood were more likely to rely on 
heuristics (i.e. less likely to systematically process) than individuals in a sad mood. Uncertain 
negative mood states can inform the individual that they do not understand a situation, and 
that there is uncertainty about what will happen next (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The appraisal 
that uncertainty is unpleasant is associated with information seeking. High IU individuals 
require more information in order to be confident in their decision making (e.g. Carleton, et 
al., 2007), suggesting that they possess a higher sufficiency threshold (desired level of 
confidence). The relationship between PSC and systematic processing is less clear from the 
literature. On the one hand, one would presume that having low confidence in one’s 
judgements would lead to a greater discrepancy between actual confidence and desired level 
of confidence, leading to the deployment of systematic processing in an attempt to minimise 
this discrepancy (Chaiken, et al., 1989). On the other hand, Chaiken et al. (1989) argue that if 
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an individual does not believe that systematic processing is likely to confer extra confidence 
(i.e. their perceived self-efficacy is low), then an individual is unlikely to expend the cognitive 
energy required to process systematically. Consequently, this chapter will not only examine 
the way in which worry promoters relate to one another and to worrying, but also the way 
that worry promoters relate to systematic processing, as measured using a questionnaire. 
Experiments 1-4 indicate that the manipulations of the worry promoters are not 
‘pure’. For example, inducing low PSC in Experiment 4 also increased negative mood. Using 
validated questionnaire measures of these constructs will allow the inter-relationships to be 
verified. Uncertainty is associated with negative moods relevant to worrying. For example, 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) focused on the certainty-uncertainty appraisal dimension, and 
argued that some emotions, such as fear and sadness, are linked to uncertainty, whereas other 
negative emotions, such as anger, are more associated with certainty. Individuals 
experiencing a negative mood may appraise this as indicative of uncertainty. Worries are 
typically concerns about whether bad things will happen in the future. Consequently, 
experiencing a negative mood, which signals uncertainty, in the context of a worry will 
probably be unpleasant. Additionally, research shows that problem-solving orientation and IU 
make shared, as well as unique, contributions to worry (Dugas, et al., 1997). 
 It is also important to consider how the variables negative mood, IU and low PSC 
relate to worry; are they separable or integral to the worry process? For example, negative 
mood appears to be an integral part of worry. Negative mood, was identified as a front-end 
driver of worry in Experiment 1, but also increases as worry bouts progress (Davey, et al., 
2007; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). The results from Experiments 2 and 4 indicated that IU and 
low PSC, respectively, did not cause increased worrying, but were, nonetheless, positively 
correlated with worrying. It is plausible that a single factor may underlie worry and the worry 
promoter variables.  
8.1.4 Predictions 
Correlational analyses. 
A number of relationships were hypothesised to exist between the key variables 
explored in this thesis. Based on Experiment 1, it was predicted that there would be (1a) a 
significant positive correlation between worry and systematic processing, and (1b) a 
significant negative correlation between worry and heuristic processing 
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It was predicted that negative mood and IU would be (2a) significantly positively 
correlated with systematic processing, and (2b) significantly negatively correlated with 
heuristic processing. It was unclear from the literature what the nature of the relationship 
between PSC and systematic and heuristic processing would be. If it is presumed that having 
low PSC widens the discrepancy between actual confidence levels and desired confidence 
levels, then it can be predicted that PSC (high scores indicating high PSC) will be (3a) 
significantly negatively correlated with systematic processing, and (3b) significantly 
positively correlated with heuristic processing. Given the literature on self-efficacy and 
information processing, it was predicted that personal inadequacy would be (4a) significantly 
negatively correlated with systematic information processing, and (4b) significantly positively 
correlated with heuristic information processing.  
Turning now to consider worry and worry promoter variables, based on the 
correlations from Experiments 1-5, it was predicted that the worry promoter variables would 
significantly correlate with worry, and specifically this would be (5a) a positive correlation for 
negative mood and IUS, and (5b) a negative correlation for PSC (due to high scores indicating 
a high amount of confidence). It was also predicted that the worry promoter variables would 
significantly correlate with one another given that the manipulations used in Experiments 1-5 
affected more than worry promoter. Specifically, it was predicted that there would be (6a) a 
positive correlation between negative mood and IUS, and (6b) a negative correlation between 
PSC and the variables negative mood and IUS.  
Principal components analyses. 
 The possibility that there may be construct overlap between the worry promoters has 
been raised at various points throughout this thesis. This notion stems largely from the 
finding that inducing mood, IU or PSC did not only affect mood, IU and PSC respectively, but 
rather the variables affected one another. In Chapter 2, there was also discussion around 
whether worry and systematic processing might share the same underpinnings. To 
understand the role of systematic processing in perseverative worry, it is important to 
determine that these are indeed separate things, and it is not the case that worry is a form of 
systematic processing. It was predicted that there would be construct overlap between some 
of the key variables considered in this thesis and this was examined using an exploratory 
principal components analysis.  
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8.2 Method 
Participants 
 A total of 437 participants completed this study. Of these, 351 (80.3%) were female, 
and 86 were male (19.7%). Participants were aged 18-48 (M = 20.44, SD = 4.18). In terms of 
occupation, 433 participants reported being students at the University of Sussex (55 of these 
students reported also having a part-time job, and 1 reported having a full-time job). There 
were 393 people who reported studying psychology (or another subject with psychology), 
and 9 who reported studying a course other than psychology. There were 31 participants who 
reported that they were a student who did not specify the course that they were taking. The 
remaining four participants reported being in part-time employment (n = 2), full-time 
employment (n = 1), or unemployed (n = 1). All participants completed the study voluntarily. 
Those participants who studied psychology were remunerated with course credits. 
Materials 
In order to assess the relationship between worry, worry promoter variables, and 
systematic and heuristic processing, questionnaire measures were identified in the literature 
and administered to the participants. The most widely-used measures were selected. Details 
on these questionnaires are provided below. Worry was assessed using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire because this is the most widely used measure of worry frequency and worry-
related distress that is irrespective of worry content, and is well validated (e.g. Brown, 2003; 
Brown, et al., 1992; Davey, 1993a). The Worry Stop Rule Checklist was also selected as this 
can indicate pathological worrying, with individuals who worry more deploying stringent 
rules for stopping their worrying when they have done as much as they can on a task (Davey, 
et al., 2005). Worry measures that focused on process, rather than content, were selected as it 
is aspects of the worry process that are most likely to be affected by the variables in question 
(negative mood, IU, poor PSC), which in turn increases the likelihood of elucidating potential 
mechanisms of perseverative worry. To measure the worry promoters, three well established 
questionnaires were utilised. Negative mood was assessed using the Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect Scales (Watson, et al., 1988), IU was assessed using the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, et al., 1994), and poor PSC was assessed using the PSC subscale 
of the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory (Heppner & Petersen, 1982).  
Turning to consider systematic and heuristic processing, there are few self-report 
measures of information processing styles. The scale used comes from the work conducted by 
Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese and Dunwoody (2002). In order to assess the validity of the Heuristic 
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Systematic Processing Questionnaire (HSPQ), measures of variables known to influence 
systematic processing (as reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4) were included: need for cognition 
and desire for control were measured using well established scales, the Need for Cognition 
Scale (Cacioppo, et al., 1984) and the Desirability of Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979), 
respectively. To the author’s knowledge, responsibility has not been assessed using 
questionnaires in the information processing literature, so a well-established measure of 
responsibility (the Responsibility Attitude Scale, Salkovskis, et al., 2000) used in the clinical 
literature was utilised. No questionnaire measure of accountability was identified, so 
accountability appraisals were not assessed in this study. Lastly, personal inadequacy was 
assessed using the most widely-used questionnaire measure, the Brief Symptom Inventory 
(Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) is the most widely 
used valid measure of worry. It consists of 16-items (e.g., ‘Many situations make me worry’) 
and participants respond on a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Not at all typical’; 5 = ‘Very typical 
of me’). Five items are reverse-scored and total scores range from 16-80. Startup and Erickson 
(2006) report mean scores of 44.27 (SD = 11.44) for a group screened as not having GAD, 
47.42 (SD = 13.40) in a student sample, and 67.16 (SD = 9.16) in a sample diagnosed with 
GAD. The PSWQ has good test-retest reliability (Meyer et al., 1990) and internal consistency 
(α = .90; Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992). 
Worry Stop Rule Checklist. 
The Worry Stop Rule Checklist (Davey, et al., 2007; Davey, et al., 2005) is a 19-item 
questionnaire assessing thoughts people have when deciding whether to continue or stop 
worrying. It has a two-factor structure, with one subscale representing an ‘as many as can’ 
(AMA) approach (10 items) including items such as ‘I must find a solution to this problem, so 
keep thinking about it’, and the second subscale representing a ‘feel like continuing’ (FLC) 
approach (9 items) including items such as ‘Don’t worry about it, things will get better’. 
Participants respond using a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Not the kind of thing I think at all’; 5 
= ‘I think of this kind of thing a lot’). Scores are given for each subscale, and range from 10-50 
for AMA and 9-45 for FLC. The subscales have good internal consistency: AMA α = .88, FLC α = 
.83 (Davey et al., 2007) but test-retest reliability has not been examined. 
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Positive and Negative Affect Scales.  
 The Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) (Watson, et al., 1988) consists of two 
subscales: (1) negative affect; (2) positive affect. The negative affect scale consists of items 
such as ‘scared’, ‘distressed’, and ‘nervous’. The positive affect scale includes ‘excited’, 
‘inspired’, and ‘proud’. Participants respond on a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Very slightly or 
not at all’, 5 = ‘very much’). Watson et al. (1988) report that they have used the PANAS with 
the following time periods: ‘Moment’, ‘Today’, ‘Past few days’, ‘Week’, ‘Past few weeks’, ‘Year’, 
and ‘General’. The ‘today’ option was used in this study. The moment/today rating has good 
internal consistency (Negative affect subscale α = .85; Positive affect subscale α = .89). The 
PANAS has acceptable test-retest reliability (Watson, et al., 1988). Scores are calculated for 
each subscale, ranging from 10-50.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27-item scale assessing “emotional, cognitive and behavioral reactions 
to ambiguous situations, implications of being uncertain, and attempts to control the future” 
(Freeston et al., 1994, p. 791). It consists of items such as ‘Uncertainty makes life intolerable’.  
Participants respond on a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Not at all representative’; 5 = 
‘Completely representative’). Total scores range from 27–135. Freeston et al. (1994) found the 
IUS reliably distinguished individuals with GAD from those without GAD. The IUS has 
excellent internal consistency (α = .91; Freeston et al., 1994) and good test-retest reliability 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002).  
Problem-solving confidence subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory. 
The PSC subscale is taken from Heppner and Petersen’s (1982) Problem-Solving 
Inventory. It consists of 11-items (e.g., ‘I trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems’). 
Participants respond on a 6-point Likert scale. In the original version, low scores indicated 
behaviours and attitudes associated with successful problem-solving, but in this study, the 
response scale was arranged so that high scores represented high PSC (1 = ‘Does not describe 
me well’; 6 = ‘Does describe me well’). Two items are reverse-scored. The problem-solving 
subscale has good internal consistency (α = .85) and good test-retest reliability (Heppner & 
Petersen, 1982). 
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Heuristic Systematic processing Questionnaire.  
To assess general tendencies to use systematic or heuristic processing, participants 
completed Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese and Dunwoody’s (2002) questionnaire designed to 
measure systematic and heuristic processing of information in response to information about 
an environmental hazard. The questionnaire has two subscales. One measures systematic 
processing (five items) and includes items such as ‘After I encounter information about this 
topic, I am likely to stop and think about it’. The second subscale measures heuristic 
processing (four items), e.g., ‘There is far more information on this topic than I personally 
need’. The questionnaire was adapted so that rather than answering the questions after 
reading information about hazards of fish consumption, the questionnaire referred more 
generally to people’s preferences – the word ‘this’ was replaced with ‘a’. Participants respond 
on a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’; 5 = ‘strongly agree’). Scores are provided 
for each subscale separately, ranging from 5-25 for the systematic processing subscale, and 4-
20 for the heuristic processing subscale. Normative scores, and examination of the scale’s 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability are not reported in the original publication. The 
two subscales measuring systematic processing and heuristic processing were supported 
through a factor analysis, which indicated a two-factor structure (Griffin, et al., 2002).  
Responsibility Attitude Scale.  
The Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS: Salkovskis, Wroe, Gledhill, Morrison, 
Forrester, Richards, Reynolds, & Thorpe, 2000), is a 26-item questionnaire and includes items 
such as ‘I must always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions’. The RAS 
measures responsibility beliefs, particularly elevated responsibility associated with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Participants respond using a 7-point Likert scale. In its 
original form, the RAS used the anchor points 1 = ‘Totally agree’ and 7 = ‘Totally disagree’, and 
scores were averaged by the 26 items, so that participants were given a score from 1-7. In this 
study, to increase the ease of interpretation, the scale was altered so that high scores 
represented high levels of responsibility (1 = ‘Totally disagree’; 7 = ‘Totally agree’). 
Participants were then given a total score ranging from 26-182. The RAS has excellent internal 
consistency (α = .92) and test-retest reliability (Salkovskis, et al., 2000). The RAS was selected 
as a well-validated responsibility measure. However, it is derived from work with clinical 
populations. Thus, while it represents a continuum of responsibility appraisals, its derivation 
from clinical psychology means that it may be confounded with measures of worry.  
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Need for Cognition Scale (NFCS, Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). 
The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984) is an 18-item questionnaire 
that assesses an individual’s tendency to engage in effortful cognitive activity, and their 
enjoyment of this. The 18-item version is based on the 34-item version developed by Cacioppo 
and Petty (1982). It includes items such as ‘I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is 
likely chance I will have to think in depth about something’ (reverse-scored). Participants 
respond on a four-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Completely false’; 4 = ‘Completely true’). Scores range 
from 18-72. There are nine reverse-scored items. Test-retest reliability was not reported, but the 
scale has excellent internal consistency (α = .90).  
Desire for Control Scale. 
Burger and Cooper’s (1979) Desirability of Control Scale (DCS) is a 20-item scale 
designed to assess the extent that an individual desires control over events in their life. Items 
include ‘I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower’. Participants respond on a seven-
point Likert scale (1 = ‘The statement doesn’t apply to me at all’; 7 = ‘The statement always 
applies to me’). Five items are reverse-scored, and total scores range from 20-140. The DCS 
has good test-retest reliability and internal consistency (α = .80) (Burger & Cooper, 1979). 
Interpersonal Sensitivity subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory. 
The Interpersonal Sensitivity subscale is taken from the Brief Symptom Inventory 
(Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983), which is itself a revised version of the Symptom Checklist-90 
(SCL- 90) (Derogatis, 1977). According to Derogatis and Melisaratos (1983), the Interpersonal 
Sensitivity subscale “focuses on feelings of personal inadequacy and inferiority. Self-
deprecation, feelings of uneasiness, and marked discomfort during interpersonal interactions 
are characteristic of persons with high levels of interpersonal sensitivity” (p. 596). This 
measure of personal inadequacy consists of four items, e.g., ‘feeling inferior to others’. 
Participants respond on a five-point Likert scale (0 = ‘not at all’; 4 = ‘extremely’). In this study, 
scores were added across the four items, providing total scores that could range from 0–16. 
The Interpersonal Sensitivity subscale has adequate internal consistency (α = .74) and test-
retest reliability (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). 
Procedure 
This experiment was conducted online, and the participants had no direct contact with 
an experimenter. Participants signed up for the experiment using SONA (the University of 
Sussex participant recruitment system), which directed the participant to the Bristol Online 
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Survey site. Participants were informed about the nature of the study and provided informed 
consent by selecting a tick box. Participants completed the questionnaires listed above. 
Participants were then provided with debrief information and thanked for participating.  
8.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
 Descriptive statistics are provided for each of the questionnaires in Table 8.35. The 
questionnaires were administered electronically, and all items were programmed to be 
compulsory. However, on extracting the data from the software, it was found that there was 
missing data for each of the questionnaires (sample sizes shown in Table 8.35).  
 
 
Table 8.35 Questionnaire descriptive statistics 
Questionnaire n M SD Range 
PSWQ 400 53.607 11.71 19-80 
AMA 436 26.30 8.40 10-50 
FLC 436 24.91 8.63 9-45 
NEG 430 17.73 7.57 10-49 
POS 433 24.51 7.80 10-47 
IUS 406 64.89 21.47 27-131 
PSC 437 44.75 8.29 22-66 
SP 437 9.93 2.69 5-23 
HP 437 12.62 2.66 6-20 
RAS 392 101.39 25.24 26-175 
NFC 411 47.08 8.17 18-70 
DC 407 88.12 13.77 39-133 
PI 437 11.43 3.84 4-20 
 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; AMA = ‘as many as can’; FLC = ‘feel like continuing’; 
NEG = PANAS negative affect subscale; POS = PANAS positive affects subscale; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale; PSC = Problem-solving confidence; SP = systematic processing; HP = heuristic 
processing; RAS = Responsibility Attitude Scale; NFC = Need for Cognition; DC = Desirability of control; 
PI = personal inadequacy scale. 
                                                     
7
 An error meant that two of the PSWQ items were worded incorrectly. Consequently, PSWQ: ‘My 
worries overwhelm me’ (Q2) and ‘When I am under pressure, I worry a lot’ (Q6) were removed from 
the analyses. 
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Scale Total Correlations 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were obtained to examine the relationship between 
the total scores on each of the measures: PSWQ, SR Checklist (AMA subscale; FLC subscale), 
PANAS (Negative affect subscale; Positive affect scale), IUS, PSC, HSPQ (Systematic processing 
subscale; Heuristic processing subscale), RAS, NFC, DC, and Personal Inadequacy. Correlations 
are shown in Table 8.36. 
 (1a) Prediction 1a was not supported. Worry was correlated with systematic 
processing, r = -.11, p < .05, but in the opposite direction to the prediction. Higher 
worry levels were associated with a lower tendency to deploy systematic processing.  
 (1b) Prediction 1b was not supported; worry did not negatively correlate with 
heuristic processing, r = .07, p > .05.  Higher levels of worry were not associated with 
generally less deployment of heuristic processing.   
 (2a) Contrary to prediction 2a, there was no significant correlation between IU and 
systematic processing, r = .06, p > .05. Additionally, negative mood was not 
significantly correlated with systematic processing, r = .01, p > .05. However, positive 
mood was significantly negatively correlated with systematic processing, r = -.15, p < 
.01.  
 (2b) Opposing prediction 2b, negative mood was not significantly negatively 
correlated with heuristic processing, r = .09, p > .05, nor was IU, r = -.05, p > .05.  
 (3a) Prediction 3a was supported; there was a significant negative correlation 
between PSC and systematic processing. The lower an individual’s PSC the greater the 
likelihood they would report a tendency to deploy systematic information processing, 
r = -.33, p < .001.   
 (3b) Prediction 3b was supported; PSC was significantly positively correlated with the 
tendency to use heuristic processing, r = .24, p < .001. As an individual’s self-reported 
confidence in their problem-solving increased, they were increasingly likely to report 
using heuristic processing.  
 (4a) Prediction 4a was not supported; there was no significant correlation between 
personal inadequacy and systematic processing, r = .006, p > .05. Participants who 
endorsed higher feelings of personal inadequacy were not less likely to deploy 
systematic processing. 
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 (4b) Prediction 4b was not supported; there was no significant correlation between 
personal inadequacy and heuristic processing, r = -.04, p > .05. Participants who 
reported high levels of personal inadequacy were not more likely to use heuristic 
processing.  
 (5a) In support of prediction 5a, there was a significant positive correlation between 
worry and negative mood, r = .36, p < .001, and between worry and IU, r = .52, p < .001. 
 (5b) Prediction 5b was supported; there was a negative correlation between PSC and 
worry, r = -.34, p < .001. 
 (6a) Prediction 6a was supported; there was a significant positive correlation 
between negative mood and IU, r = .48, p < .001. Higher levels of negative mood are 
associated with higher levels of IU.  
 (6b) Prediction 6b was supported; there was a significant negative correlation 
between PSC and negative mood, r = -.23, p < .001, and between PSC and IU, r = -.42, p 
< .001. Lower PSC is associated with both higher amounts of negative mood and 
higher levels of IU.  
Additional correlations of interest. 
Although beyond the predictions of this study, it is interesting to observe that AMA 
deployment, which may represent the way that systematic processing manifests in the worry 
process, is significantly positively correlated with negative mood, r = .35, p < .001, and IU, r = 
.60, p < .001, and negatively correlated with PSC, r = -.11, p < .05. Those who are in a negative 
mood, have high levels of IU, and low levels of PSC are more likely to endorse AMA stop rule 
use. Furthermore AMA was also negatively correlated with the systematic processing subscale 
of the HSPQ, r = -.16, p < .01. This indicates that as AMA endorsement increases, participants 
are less likely to use systematic processing.   
Personal inadequacy significantly positively correlated with AMA endorsement, r = 
.40, p < .001, negative affect, r = .48, p < .001, IU, r = .55, p < .001, and the RAS, r = .40, p < .001. 
Personal inadequacy significantly negatively correlated with PSC confidence, r = -.35, p < .001, 
FLC endorsement, r = -.25, p < .001, positive affect, r = -.12, p < .05, and NFC, r = -.13, p < .05. In 
summary, the worry promoters correlate with higher feelings of personal inadequacy, as do 
worry, AMA and responsibility appraisals. High levels of FLC endorsement, positive affect and 
NFC, in contrast, are associated with lower feelings of personal inadequacy.  
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The correlations regarding the systematic processing facilitators and the measures of 
systematic processing and heuristic processing are somewhat counterintuitive. There was a 
significant negative correlation between responsibility and systematic processing, r = -.18, p < 
.001, and between NFC and systematic processing, r = -.35, p < .001, indicating that individuals 
are less likely to deploy systematic processing when they have high levels of responsibility or 
a strong NFC. There was no significant correlation between desire for control and systematic 
processing, r = -.002, p > .05. NFC positively correlated with heuristic processing, r = .41, p < 
.001, and as did desire for control, r = .01, p > .05. This suggests that individuals who desire 
high levels of cognition are more likely to use heuristic processing. There was no significant 
correlation between responsibility and heuristic processing, r = .03, p > .05. The pattern of 
results between the ‘systematic processing facilitators’ (which do not seem to have facilitated 
systematic processing) and HSPQ items raises some important questions around the validity 
of the HSPQ, which will be considered in the discussion.  
In summary, the correlations indicate that the worry promoters are indeed related to 
worry, but negative mood, IU, and worry are not positively correlated with systematic 
processing. If anything, worry is negatively correlated with systematic processing, suggesting 
worriers do not have a general tendency to deploy systematic processing.  
Principal components analysis 
 A principal components analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted to 
examine the factor structure of worry, worry promoters and systematic processing. It was 
intended to answer the following three questions: (1) Is worry a separate construct to 
systematic processing? (2) Are the worry promoters separate from systematic processing? (3) 
Are the worry promoters separate to worry or an integral part of the worry experience, 
reflecting a shared underlying factor? 
The items from the PSWQ, the HSPC, the IUS, the negative mood subscale of the 
PANAS, and the PSC subscale of the PSI were entered into the principal components analysis. 
only those variables pertaining to the key questions were included to ensure the analysis had 
an adequate number of participants per variable.   
 The KMO statistic (0.94) was ‘superb’ according to Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), 
supporting the use of factor analysis. Similarly, Bartlett’s test of sphericity supports that factor 
analysis is appropriate, χ2(2346) = 17593.17, p < .001. 
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Kaiser’s (1960) criterion for extracting factors with eigenvalues above 1 was deemed 
unreliable as the condition of average communalities exceeding 0.6 was not met (Field, 2009). 
Examination of the scree plot (Figure 8.10) indicated a four-factor solution. Consequently, the 
principal components analysis was re-run, with a four-factor extraction specified. The factors 
extracted, and the items with loadings greater than .4 are shown in Table 8.37.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.10 Scree plot showing the components and their corresponding  
eigenvalues for the worry, worry promoter, and information processing items. 
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Table 8.37 Factor loadings for the worry, worry promoter, and information processing items 
Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
Factor 1: IU     
IUS-Q26: The ambiguities in life stress me .79    
IUS-Q10: One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises .76    
IUS-Q25: I must get away from all uncertain situations .76    
IUS-Q15: When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well .75    
IUS-Q14: When I am uncertain, I can’t go forward .75    
IUS-Q19: I can’t stand being taken by surprise .73    
IUS-Q17: Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy or sad .73    
IUS-Q7: Unforseen events upset me greatly .73    
IUS-Q18: I always want to know what the future has in store for me .72    
IUS-Q27: I can’t stand being undecided about my future .72    
IUS-Q9: Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life .71    
IUS-Q5: My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen 
tomorrow 
.70    
IUS-Q6: Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed .70    
IUS-Q21: I should be able to organize everything in advance .69    
IUS-Q12: When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me .68    
IUS-Q13: Being uncertain means I am not first rate .67    
IUS-Q3: Uncertainty makes life intolerable .65    
IUS-Q11: A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the 
best planning 
.65    
IUS-Q8: It frustrates me not having all the information I need .64    
IUS-Q20: The smallest doubt can stop me from acting .64    
IUS-Q22: Being uncertain means that I lack confidence .61    
IUS-Q24: Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly .60    
IUS-Q4: It’s unfair having no guarantees in life .59    
IUS-Q2: Being uncertain means that a person is disorganised .51    
IUS-Q23: I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure about their 
future 
.50    
IUS-Q16: Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their 
lives  
.45    
IUS-Q1: Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion .41    
Factor 2:Dealing with problems and information     
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PSC-Q6: Given enough time and effort, I believe I can solve most problems 
that confront me 
 .75   
PSC-Q2: I have the ability to solve most problems even though no solution 
is immediately apparent 
 .73   
PSC-Q5: When I make plans to solve a problem, I am almost certain that I 
can make them work 
 .72   
PSC-Q8: I trust my ability to solve new and difficult problems  .69   
PSC-Q7: When faced with a novel situation I have confidence that I can 
handle any problems that may arise 
 .68   
PSC-Q11: When I become aware of a problem, one of the first things I do is 
try and find out exactly what the problem is 
 .64   
PSC-Q1: I am usually able to think up creative and effective alternatives to 
solve a problem 
 .63   
PSC-Q9: After making a decision, the outcome I expected usually matches 
the actual outcome 
 .61   
HSPQ-Q3: After thinking about a topic, I have a broader understanding  -.57   
HSPQ-Q8: When I see or hear information about a topic, I rarely spend 
much time thinking about it 
 .52   
PSC-Q4: I make decisions and am happy with them later  .51   
HSPQ-Q4: When I encounter information about a topic, I read or listen to 
most of it, even though I may not agree with its perspective 
 -.45   
HSPQ-Q1: After I encounter information about a topic, I am likely to stop 
and think about it 
 -.43   
HSPQ-Q2: If I need to act on a matter, the more viewpoints I get the better  -.41   
Factor 3: PSWQ     
PSWQ-Q5: I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it   -.77  
PSWQ-Q4: Many situations make me worry   -.72  
PSWQ-Q13: I notice that I have been worrying about things   -.70  
PSWQ-Q14: Once I start worrying, I cannot stop   .69  
PSWQ-Q10: I never worry about anything   -.69  
PSWQ-Q7: I am always worrying about something   -.69  
PSWQ-Q3: I do not tend to worry about things   .64  
PSWQ-Q15: I worry all the time   -.64  
PSWQ-Q9: As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about something 
else I have to do 
  -.62  
PSWQ-Q8: I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts   .63  
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PSWQ-Q12: I have been a worrier all my life   -.62  
PSWQ-Q16: I worry about projects until they are done   -.59  
PSWQ-Q11: When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not 
worry about it any more 
  .58  
PSWQ-Q1: If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry 
about it 
  .53  
Factor 4 negative affect     
PANAS-Q7: Scared    .80 
PANAS-Q20: Afraid    .79 
PANAS-Q13: Ashamed    .69 
PANAS-Q2: Distressed    .66 
PANAS-Q4: Upset    .65 
PANAS-Q18: Jittery    .65 
PANAS-Q15: Nervous    .64 
PANAS-Q6: Guilty    .62 
PANAS-Q8: Hostile    .58 
PANAS-Q11: Irritable    .55 
Eigenvalue 19.09 5.53 4.34 3.63 
Note. Only loadings greater than .4 are shown 
 
Five items did not have loadings greater than .4 on any of the factors: HSPQ-Q9 ‘If I 
need to act on a matter, the advice of one expert is enough for me’; HSPQ-Q5 ‘It is important 
for me to interpret information about a topic in a way that applies directly to my life’; HSPQ-
Q6 ‘When I encounter information about a topic I focus on only a few key points’; PSC-Q3 
‘Many problems I face are too complex for me to solve’ (Q3); PSC-Q10 ‘When confronted with 
a problem, I am unsure of whether I can handle the situation’.  
Factor one contains 27 items that represent IU, containing all 27 items from the IUS. 
The items loading on this factor are shown in Table 8.37. The IU factor (IUS scale) accounted 
for 19.09% of the variance. The IUS had excellent internal consistency, α = .96, (Field, 2009).  
Factor two contains 14 items (see Table 8.37), which appear to represent dealing with 
problems and information. Factor 2 contains nine items from the PSI PSC subscale and four 
items from the HSPQ systematic processing subscale. The systematic processing items were 
reverse-loaded. Factor 2 also included one item from the heuristic processing HSPQ subscale: 
‘When I see or hear information about a topic, I rarely spend much time thinking about it’. 
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This factor accounted for 5.53% of the variance. The dealing with problems and information 
factor had good internal consistency, α = .77.  
Factor three represents worry, and contains all 14 items that were included from the 
PSWQ (see Table 8.37). Items reflecting high worry levels were reverse-loaded, while reverse-
scored items on the PSWQ did not have reversed loadings. The worry factor accounted for 
4.34% of the variance. The worry factor had excellent internal consistency, α = .92.  
Factor four represents negative affect. It contains all 10 items of the PANAS negative 
affect subscale. The negative affect factor accounted for 3.63% of the variance. The negative 
affect factor had excellent internal consistency, α = .88.  
8.4 Discussion 
 This questionnaire study explored the relationships between: (1) worry and 
information processing styles; (2) worry promoters (negative mood, IU, and low PSC) and 
information processing styles; (3) the worry promoters, and their relationship with worry. 
Potential relationships were investigated through correlation analyses. A principal 
components analysis was also conducted to examine the factor structure of the variables. Of 
particular interest was whether the variables emerged as separate factors, or whether a one-
factor solution, indicating a shared underlying construct, fitted the data better.   
 It was predicted that worry would positively correlate with systematic information 
processing and negatively correlate with heuristic processing. Worry significantly negatively 
correlated with the general measure of systematic processing. Consequently, this suggests 
that worriers have a general tendency to avoid deploying systematic processing. This does not 
negate the possibility that worriers may deploy systematic processing when considering 
information related specifically to worry thoughts (as indicated in the raised sufficiency 
thresholds in Experiment 1). Future studies could examine whether adapting the measures to 
reflect systematic processing about worries/threat information shows a positive relationship 
with worry frequency and distress.  It is important to recognise that at the extreme end, the 
PSWQ is a measure of pathological worry (Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003), and it 
may be that systematic processing is associated with more adaptive forms of worry-like 
processes, such as problem-solving. AMA stop rule endorsement was also negatively 
correlated with systematic processing. AMA is closely related to perseverative, catastrophic 
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worry, and worriers have been shown to deploy AMA stop rules for their worrying more 
readily than non-worriers (Davey, et al., 2005; Startup & Davey, 2001). This finding indicates 
that individuals who are likely to worry more are in actual fact less likely to use systematic 
processing. While this seems at odds with the finding that negative mood states cause raised 
sufficiency thresholds, one possible explanation for this is that other characteristics that 
accompany worry, such as thoughts of personal inadequacy (Davey & Levy, 1998b), mean that 
the worriers do not feel confident that systematic processing will assist them in reaching their 
sufficiency threshold/enable them to do ‘as much as they can’. According to Chaiken et al. 
(1989) this lack of belief in systematic processing assisting in the attainment of the sufficiency 
threshold will prevent the extra cognitive energy being expended on systematic processing, 
and the individual will use heuristic processing instead. Worriers may deploy AMA stop rules 
as a way of identifying all of the things that could go wrong, rather than attempting to 
strategise and select solutions for these potential problems based on systematic processing. 
Another possibility is that AMA deployment requires greater cognitive energy, and thus the 
worrier has less working memory resources available. Indeed, research supports the notion 
that worriers have lower working memory (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 
2011). Low working memory is associated with greater reliance on a processing system with 
less capacity demands (i.e. heuristic processing within the HSM), and less use of a processing 
system with high capacity demands (i.e. systematic processing within the HSM) (Neys, 2006). 
Additionally, the correlations between measures known to promote systematic processing 
(responsibility, NFC and desire for control) suggest that this particular measure of systematic 
processing is tapping something different. This is because these measures were negatively 
correlated with systematic processing, rather than positively correlated, as would be 
predicted. One possible explanation is that these ‘promoters’ actually relate to appraisal 
processes designed to increase systematic processing, rather than reflecting the systematic 
processing itself.  
 There was a significant negative correlation between PSC and systematic processing, 
indicating that individuals with low PSC were more likely to endorse using systematic 
processing. Consistent with this, there was a significant positive correlation between PSC and 
heuristic processing, suggesting that individuals who are confident in their problem-solving 
are more likely to report using heuristic processing. These results indicate that when 
individuals are not confident that they have solved a problem adequately, they are more likely 
to think carefully about the problem, seek more information, and relate information to 
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existing knowledge (i.e. systematically process). Thus, it appears that low PSC does not 
undermine an individual’s general tendency to use systematic processing. However, it must be 
stressed that the direction of causation is not clear from the correlational analysis. It may well 
be that individuals who find systematic processing does not enable them to meet their 
sufficiency threshold develop low PSC. There was no significant correlation between negative 
mood and the information processing styles, or between IU and the information processing 
styles.  
Participants’ scores on the PSWQ were significantly correlated with the worry-related 
variables in the predicted direction: negative mood and IUS were positively correlated with 
PSWQ scores, and high PSC was negatively correlated with PSWQ. The worry promoter 
variables also correlated with one another in the predicted manner: PANAS negative affect 
scores were significantly positively correlated with scores on the IUS, and both the PANAS 
negative affect scores and the IUS scores were significantly negatively correlated with high 
PSC.  
The principal components analysis did not support a one-factor solution; four 
separate factors emerged representing IU, dealing with problems and information, worry, and 
negative affect. This highlights that worry and systematic processing are indeed different 
processes, despite their similarities in terms of being verbally-based analytical processes 
involving raised sufficiency thresholds, and overlapping neuroanatomical regions. Where 
construct overlap is apparent is between systematic processing and low PSC. The items from 
these two scales loaded onto the same factor (Factor 2: Dealing with problems and 
information). This implies that systematic processing may be more linked to the problem-
solving aspects of worry, and this will be revisited in the general discussion (Chapter 9).  
 Lastly, there are limitations in this study, which should be addressed in future work. 
Firstly, the measures used were a mixture of trait measures and a state measure (the PANAS). 
Using questions about specific worry-related incidents would provide a better understanding 
of the role that systematic processing plays in perseverative worry. Secondly, the measure of 
systematic processing and heuristic processing has not been used in this general way before, 
and there are questions around its psychometric properties. It would be useful to validate this 
questionnaire by correlating it with additional measures of systematic processing (such as 
thought-listing, time taken to consider the issue and information presented, etc). Thirdly, the 
participants in this study were predominantly a female, student sample. It is possible that 
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students experience a heightened period of worry during their studying (the PSWQ mean 
score is quite high), which may interfere with the general relationships that exist between 
these variables at other developmental time-points. However, it seems unlikely that sample 
characteristics are responsible as the ranges of scores on the questionnaires (see Table 8.37) 
occupy the full spectrum of possible scores. Lastly, it may be that individuals are not very 
aware of their reliance on systematic and heuristic processing (particularly heuristic 
processing) and are reporting what they think they would do, rather than what they actually 
do. However, if this was the case, it would seem likely that worriers who frequently display 
high levels of perfectionism (Stöber & Joormann, 2001b) and elevated evidence requirements 
(Tallis, et al., 1991) would report using systematic processing more than non-worriers, rather 
than the other way around as found in this study.  
 In summary, this study has demonstrated that worriers are generally less likely to 
deploy systematic processing. Secondly, this study supports the evidence for pathological 
worrying being associated with negative mood, IU, and low PSC. Lastly, this study does not 
support the notion that negative mood is associated with general use of systematic 
processing. Instead, a positive mood was associated with greater endorsement of systematic 
processing. This may reflect the general measure of systematic processing used. A measure 
that was tailored to a specific, threatening situation may have resulted in the predicted 
pattern of results. Low PSC was found to be related to deploying more systematic processing, 
and there appears to be some construct overlap between PSC and systematic processing. This 
may reflect that problem-solving is intimately linked to systematic processing, and some 
individuals feel that they need to deploy careful processing to compensate for a (believed) 
lack of problem-solving skills.   
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9 General Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to enhance understanding of the role that negative mood, intolerance 
of uncertainty (IU) and low problem-solving confidence (PSC) have in worry perseveration. In 
particular, it investigates whether systematic information processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989) is 
a proximal mechanism through which these worry promoters exert an effect on worry 
perseveration.  
Negative mood, IU, and low PSC have been shown to increase worry perseveration 
(Davey, Jubb, et al., 1996; Johnston & Davey, 1997; Ladouceur, et al., 2000; Startup & Davey, 
2001). However, little is known about the mechanisms accounting for these findings. One 
possible mechanism is systematic information processing, which is defined as “a 
comprehensive, analytic orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinize all useful 
information in forming their judgments” (Chaiken, 1980, p. 212). As outlined in Chapter 2, 
there is empirical support for negative mood increasing the deployment of systematic 
processing (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
Furthermore, there is a theoretical rationale for suggesting that worry promoters should raise 
sufficiency thresholds. Firstly, negative mood states provide information about existing 
threats that require further consideration (Cervone, et al., 1994; Scott & Cervone, 2002). 
Secondly, individuals with high IU require more information when making decisions (Rosen & 
Knäuper, 2009), which fits with the notion that systematic processing involves searching for, 
and integrating information. Finally, low PSC may widen the gap between an individual’s 
desired and actual confidence levels, triggering systematic processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). 
This thesis has included experimentally manipulating the worry promoters and examining the 
impact that they have on an individual’s sufficiency threshold (which determines whether 
systematic processing is deployed), threat perception (which is linked to an individual’s 
sufficiency threshold), and coping/self-efficacy beliefs (which can thwart deployment of 
systematic processing if they are low). Additionally, this thesis has examined relationships 
between worry, the worry promoters, and systematic processing. This chapter will review the 
findings from the experimental work and consider implications regarding the role of 
systematic processing in worry. There will then be a discussion of the limitations of the 
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experimental work conducted in this thesis, before recommendations are made for future 
work.  
9.2 Main findings: A review 
Experiment 1: Negative mood and appraisals that facilitate systematic 
information processing 
Experiment 1 examined whether systematic processing may be a mechanism through 
which negative mood increases worry. A mood induction based on a procedure used by Scott 
and Cervone (2002) generated differential mood states amongst participants, who then 
completed a measure of their sufficiency threshold. The sufficiency threshold represents the 
amount of processing that an individual feels is necessary in order to minimize any 
discrepancy between the amount of confidence that they have in their decision/judgement 
and their desired level of confidence (Chaiken, et al., 1989). When considering worry, this may 
refer to an individual’s confidence that they have met their goals for worrying. Participants 
also completed behavioural and self-report measures of worry. Individuals induced into a 
negative mood state reported higher sufficiency thresholds than individuals induced into a 
neutral mood state, indicating that individuals in a negative mood state were more likely to 
deploy systematic processing. This supports and extends previous work showing that 
negative mood states increase systematic processing (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Armitage, et al., 
1999; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Bodenhausen, et al., 1994; Bohner, et al., 1988; Bohner, et al., 
1992; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Inclusion of a cognitive priming mood induction indicated that 
these findings could not be explained simply by priming, as the cognitive priming group (who 
did not experience the same mood changes but heard the same negative words) did not show 
raised sufficiency thresholds. The negative mood group also more readily endorsed using an 
‘as many as can’ (AMA) stop rule for worrying (whereby the individual strives to do all that 
they can before ceasing to continue with a task). Following the mood induction, self-reported 
worry was greater in the negative mood group than in the neutral mood group. A mediation 
analysis indicated that an individual’s sufficiency threshold and their endorsement of 
deploying an AMA stop rule fully mediated the link between negative mood and worrying. 
This experiment is consistent with work showing that negative mood can cause perseverative 
worry (Johnston & Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001), and suggests that raised sufficiency 
thresholds are a mechanism for this.    
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Experiments 2 & 3: Intolerance of uncertainty and appraisals that 
facilitate systematic information processing 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to explore whether IU also exerted an effect on worry 
through a mechanism of systematic processing. IU was hypothesised to raise sufficiency 
thresholds because it is associated with increased information-seeking (Rosen & Knäuper, 
2009) and a strong desire to control uncertain situations (Freeston, et al., 1994). Participants 
underwent either a high or low IU manipulation using vignettes containing a character who 
exhibited either negative or positive appraisals of uncertainty, respectively (based on Kelly, 
2009). The IU manipulation was successful at generating differential amounts of IU between 
the high and low IU groups. IU correlated with PSWQ scores, but not CI steps. Furthermore, 
there was no difference between the high and low IU groups on self-report or behavioural 
measures of worry. This counters earlier experimental manipulations which indicated that 
experimentally increasing IU caused increases in worry (Ladouceur, et al., 2000). The lack of 
group differences on the CI is consistent with an experiment conducted by Deschenes et al. 
(2010), who failed to find that inducing IU increased the number of steps generated on the CI. 
Also, while IU correlated with sufficiency thresholds for one worry vignette, it did not for the 
other worry vignette. Nor were there differences between the groups on the sufficiency 
thresholds for either vignette. Experiment 2 measured an individual’s sufficiency threshold in 
a different way to Experiment 1, and this could explain why IU was not found to increase 
sufficiency threshold levels. The change in assessment of the sufficiency threshold was to 
enable assessment of personal relevance and task importance. It also meant that the questions 
could be phrased in a way that didn’t include the word ‘worry’, which was a potential 
confound of Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to imagine that they 
were worrying, and then were asked to think about appraisals related to systematic 
processing (e.g., accountability: ‘the extent to which you feel that you may have to justify your 
worries to others’). In Experiment 2, participants read two vignettes in which a character was 
worrying about their finances or coursework. After reading the vignettes, participants were 
asked to imagine they were the character in the story, and were asked to think about 
appraisals related to systematic processing (e.g., accountability: ‘Imagine you are in 
[character’s name] position and have to share your thoughts with others. To what extent 
would you want to make sure you could justify your thoughts to others?’).  A number of 
studies have highlighted that systematic processing is more likely when a situation is 
personally relevant (Chaiken, et al., 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Smith & Shaffer, 1991), and 
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it is plausible that asking participants to read a third-person vignette reduces the motivation 
to systematically process.  
Experiment 3 was conducted in order to determine whether differences in 
methodology may explain why negative mood caused increased sufficiency thresholds 
(Experiment 1) while IU did not (Experiment 2). Thus, Experiment 3 was an amalgamation of 
Experiments 1 and 2 in that participants underwent the same manipulation of IU that 
participants underwent in Experiment 2, but the measure of the sufficiency threshold was the 
same as that used in Experiment 1 (i.e. it was based on questions phrased in the first-person, 
rather than imagining a third-person character). The IU manipulation was unsuccessful in 
Experiment 3, despite using the same methodology as the successful manipulation in 
Experiment 2. Consequently, correlation analyses (rather than between-groups analyses) 
were examined. IU significantly positively correlated with sufficiency thresholds, AMA 
deployment, and worry. This is the first experiment to explicitly demonstrate that IU 
correlates with AMA deployment, and supports previous research detailing an association 
between IU and worry (e.g. Buhr & Dugas, 2006; de Bruin, et al., 2007). 
Experiment 4: Problem-solving confidence and appraisals that 
facilitate systematic information processing 
Experiment 4 was designed to investigate whether a third worry promoter, low PSC 
(Davey, Jubb, et al., 1996), might increase worry by affecting systematic processing 
deployment. The literature did not clearly predict whether low PSC would increase or 
decrease systematic processing. It could be anticipated that low PSC would increase 
systematic processing as low confidence results in a greater discrepancy between actual and 
desired confidence levels. Alternatively, low PSC might decrease systematic processing 
because low levels of confidence in oneself having the ability to resolve a situation through 
systematic processing leads to increased reliance on heuristic processing (Chaiken, et al., 
1989). Participants underwent a PSC manipulation utilising false-feedback (based on Davey, 
Jubb, et al., 1996). Participants who were informed that they had done poorly on the problem-
solving task reported lower PSC than participants who were told that they had performed 
well on the problem-solving scenarios. The results indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the low and high PSC groups on the sufficiency threshold measures or the 
worry measures. However, scores on the PSC subscale of the Personal Problem-Solving 
Inventory were negatively correlated with PSWQ scores, indicating that lower PSC is 
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associated with higher worry levels. The results suggest that low PSC is related to 
perseverative worry, but did not replicate the finding that low PSC is a causal factor.   
Experiment 5: The impact of worry promoters on searching for and 
coping with threat 
Given that the findings from Experiments 1-4 generated mixed results about the role 
of systematic processing in perseverative worry, Experiment 5 was designed to explore 
whether the worry promoters may influence different aspects of the worry process, namely 
threat detection and coping with threats. The same manipulations were used as in 
Experiments 1-4, and participants completed measures relating to threat detection and 
coping beliefs. Threat detection is linked to increased systematic processing (e.g. Baron, et al., 
1994), while low self-efficacy/coping beliefs are associated with reduced systematic 
processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that an induced negative mood state was associated with 
reduced motivation and coping beliefs, but not with increased threat detection, compared to a 
neutral mood state. However, there was wide variation in the negative mood scores following 
the induction, and when correlation analyses were conducted, negative mood predicted 
higher levels of expected threat frequency, threat intensity, desire to avoid threats, worry 
about threats, and personal relevance. These are all factors likely to increase the deployment 
of systematic processing. Additionally, negative mood predicted low coping beliefs and 
motivation, factors which may thwart the deployment of cognitively demanding systematic 
processing. However, the finding that low mood predicted low motivation is a likely effect of 
the way the questions were phrased; participants may not be motivated to deal with issues 
quickly as they may wish to take care and consider the issues. 
Despite successful use of the IU manipulation in Experiment 2 and in work conducted 
by Kelly (2009) the IU manipulation did not generate differences in IU between the ‘high’ and 
‘low’ participants. Correlation analyses indicated that IU was associated with increased worry 
and lower coping beliefs. IU was also positively correlated with threat frequency and intensity 
estimations, but not with threatening interpretations of ambiguity.  
The PSC manipulation generated significant differences on measures of PSC, but not 
between-group differences in threat perception or coping beliefs. However, PSC correlated 
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with coping beliefs; individuals with low PSC felt less equipped to cope with threats. PSC did 
not correlate with threat estimations.  
Regression analyses examined the relative contributions of worry promoters to threat 
perception and coping beliefs. Negative mood was identified as the sole worry promoter that 
significantly predicted threat perception. This supports numerous findings showing that 
negative mood is associated with threatening interpretations of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., 
Constans & Mathews, 1993; Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1993; 
Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This may account for why individuals in a negative mood were 
found to be more likely to deploy systematic processing and deploy AMA stop rules 
(Experiment 1) – it may be an attempt to deal with an increased perception that negative 
outcomes may arise through unresolved/unmanaged threats. It also suggests that the 
association between IU and increased threat estimations is accounted for by negative mood 
related to the IU experience.  
Experiment 6: Worry and systematic processing: A questionnaire 
analysis 
This work has focused on the role that systematic processing plays in worry, and has 
examined whether worry promoters act as systematic processing facilitators or thwarters. 
Experiment 6 investigated the relationships between measures of worry, worry promoters, 
and systematic processing. It also aimed to clarify the ways the worry promoters relate to one 
another. Participants completed questionnaire measures of worry, worry promoters and 
information processing styles. Worry negatively correlated with systematic processing, as did 
AMA deployment. These results show that worriers do not possess a general tendency to 
deploy systematic processing. The results may be different if a threat context was provided. 
Negative mood correlated positively with IU and negatively with PSC, and IU negatively 
correlated with PSC. Systematic processing negatively correlated with PSC, and there was 
some indication that these two constructs overlap as they were identified as occupying the 
same factor in a principal components analysis. This suggests an intimate link between 
systematic processing and problem-solving, and this may mean that systematic processing 
plays a greater role in adaptive problem-solving worry.  
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9.3 Theoretical implications 
This thesis attempts to expand understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
perseverative worry, focusing on systematic information processing as a candidate 
mechanism. Specifically, this thesis has examined whether negative mood, IU, and PSC 
increase sufficiency thresholds, threat perception and coping beliefs. In this section, the three 
worry promoters will be considered in turn.  
9.3.1 Negative mood 
Negative mood increased sufficiency thresholds and threat perception, both of which 
promote systematic processing. Interestingly, negative mood was associated with lower levels 
of motivation and coping beliefs, which reduce the likely deployment of systematic 
processing. The relationship between negative mood and worry was supported in 
Experiments 1 (PSWQ) and 5 (worry about threats), but negative mood did not increase 
catastrophising steps (Experiment 1).  
Experiment 1 supported work demonstrating an association between endemic 
negative mood and perseverative worry (Davey, et al., 1992; Metzger, et al., 1990; Meyer, et 
al., 1990; Tallis, et al., 1991; Wisocki, et al., 1986), and research showing that inducing 
negative mood increases worry (in this instance, as reported on the PSWQ) (Johnston & 
Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001). In Chapter 1, several possible mechanisms were 
outlined to account for the role of negative mood in worry.  
One suggested mechanism accounting for negative mood increasing worry is 
systematic processing (Davey, 2006b; Startup & Davey, 2001). The work conducted in 
Experiment 1 supports the notion that systematic processing plays a role in perseverative 
worrying. Negative mood raised sufficiency thresholds in a worry context. Furthermore, 
systematic processing was identified as a pathway between negative mood and worry, with 
the raised sufficiency threshold partially mediating this association. One way in which 
systematic processing may be manifested in the worry process is in the ‘what if...?’ 
questioning that characterises catastrophic worry. Indeed, the finding in Experiment 5 that 
negative mood increases threat perception, when taken in conjunction with the notion that 
worriers have higher sufficiency thresholds, suggests that worriers may be comprehensively 
analysing their current situation for threats, posing ‘what if...?’ questions. This may result from 
being in a negative mood, but would probably also increase distress and negative affect.   
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Negative mood decreased motivation in Experiment 5. This finding is challenging to 
reconcile with the idea that worriers are deploying systematic processing, which requires 
high levels of motivation. One possible explanation focuses on the way the motivation 
questions were framed. One of the questions asked participants the extent to which they 
would want to ‘deal with any threats as quickly as possible’. While this can be construed as 
representing motivation, in that it is seemingly at odds with doing nothing about an issue, it 
does not sit easily with what is known about worriers and individuals with Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Such individuals prefer to take care over issues, and a question 
tapping task importance, rather than the speed with which someone wished to remove an 
unpleasant issue would perhaps get better at the kind of motivation that might underlie 
worriers’ deployment of systematic processing.  Worriers are more inclined to ensure a task is 
done properly, rather than quickly. For example, worriers have elevated evidence 
requirements (Tallis, et al., 1991), and worrying is associated with the deployment of AMA 
stop rules (Davey, et al., 2005), which specify that an individual must complete a task properly 
before stopping.  
While Experiment 1 provides evidence that systematic processing can mediate the 
link between negative mood and worrying, Chapter 1 outlined a number of other potential 
mechanisms that the work conducted in this thesis informs. These mechanisms include (1) 
mood provides information about whether task goals are met (mood-as-input hypothesis) 
(Davey, 2006b; Meeten & Davey, 2011), (2) negative mood states prime the retrieval of 
semantically similar material (Neely, 1977), and (3) negative mood evokes appraisals of 
uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Experiment 1 provided further information regarding 
conceptualization of the mood-as-input hypothesis, which states that mood and stop rules 
operate together to determine how long someone will persevere with a task. In early 
formulations of the mood-as-input hypothesis, mood and stop rules were treated as if they 
were independent (Startup & Davey, 2001). Later formulations queried this assumption, and 
postulated that mood and stop rules may in fact be interdependent (Davey, 2006b). 
Experiment 1 shows that individuals in a negative mood are more likely to endorse using an 
AMA stop rule (which leads to greater perseveration when experienced in conjunction with 
negative mood) than individuals in a neutral mood. While inducing people to experience an 
AMA stop rule in the context of a positive mood is important for establishing proof of 
principle of the mood-as-input theory, this may not represent a naturally occurring state 
outside of the laboratory. Raised sufficiency thresholds cannot fully explain why negative 
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mood states result in AMA stop rule endorsement because Experiment 1 identified the 
sufficiency threshold and AMA deployment as separate mediators, both contributing 
independently to reported worry.  
Experiment 1 also provides information that the role of negative mood on worry is not 
purely the result of priming, with negative mood leading to the retrieval of negative thoughts 
(e.g. Neely, 1977). Individuals who underwent a cognitive priming procedure heard the same 
negative words as individuals in the negative mood induction, but did not experience the 
words in a first-person manner. Such individuals did not show raised sufficiency thresholds or 
higher PSWQ scores. Consequently, accounts of the role of negative mood in worry should not 
be limited to priming accounts.  
Lastly, Experiment 5 demonstrated that negative moods can cause uncertainty in 
individuals. Participants who underwent negative mood inductions scored significantly higher 
on the question ‘how uncertain do you feel?’ than individuals who had undergone the neutral 
mood induction. This supports the work of Tiedens and Linton (2001), and highlights the 
importance of considering uncertainty appraisals when conceptualizing the informative 
properties of negative mood states.  
9.3.2 Intolerance of uncertainty 
IU was correlated with sufficiency thresholds in Experiments 2 and 3. However, 
between-group differences based on the experimental manipulation of IU were not observed 
in Experiment 2 (and could not be examined in Experiment 3 due to the unsuccessful IU 
manipulation). Consequently, while it is apparent that IU is related to higher sufficiency 
thresholds, it cannot be claimed that IU causes increases in sufficiency thresholds. IU was 
predicted to raise sufficiency thresholds given that individuals with high levels of IU have 
been shown to search for more information before feeling confident in their decisions (e.g. 
Carleton, et al., 2007; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). One possibility is that the increased 
deployment of systematic processing, which results from worriers being in a negative mood 
actually increases IU. Future studies will need to be conducted in which different amounts of 
systematic processing are induced and the effects on IU are examined. Alternatively, IU and 
sufficiency thresholds may correlate because of their common relationship with negative 
mood.  
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IU was correlated with increased threat perception and was associated with lower 
coping beliefs, a factor that makes the deployment of systematic processing less likely. IU may 
relate to threat perception by triggering ‘what if...?’ thinking, which should raise more threat 
possibilities in the mind of the worrier (Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998). The results indicate that 
worry is inherently difficult to cope with as the things that individuals tend to worry about are 
typically future based concerns, which by their very nature are uncertain. For an individual 
who is intolerant of uncertainty, this may be an overwhelming situation, resulting in the 
individual feeling that they will not be able to cope. 
IU was related to worry in Experiments 2, 3, 5 and 6, but the lack of a reliable IU 
manipulation method prevented conclusions from being drawn about the causal link between 
IU and worry. However, the principal components analysis conducted in Experiment 6 
suggests that worry and IU are separable factors. Considering the role that systematic 
processing may play in worrying, it is possible that when an individual deploys systematic 
processing due to their raised sufficiency thresholds and threat perception, they are 
increasingly convinced that the issue is an important one (which justifies the cognitive 
expenditure). As such, the individual is less likely to tolerate uncertainty in their thoughts. It 
would be interesting to examine whether feelings of IU increase as the worry bout progresses, 
which would indicate that uncertainty becomes less acceptable as the cognitive investment in 
the worry increases. Given the results obtained in this thesis, it would appear that if IU does 
cause increases in worrying, it operates through a mechanism other than systematic 
processing.  
9.3.3 Problem-solving confidence 
 Low PSC correlated with a general tendency to deploy systematic processing, but 
inducing low PSC did not affect sufficiency thresholds. This would seem to indicate that there 
is a relationship between PSC and systematic processing, but the more likely direction is that 
the systematic processing of information related to worry thoughts causes lower PSC. 
Individuals who deploy systematic processing in an attempt to deal with worries may suffer 
reduced confidence as many worries cannot be ‘solved’ because of their very nature as future-
based problems that have not yet occurred (Borkovec, 1994). However, an alternative 
explanation is that an association exists between PSC and systematic processing because 
these factors are both associated with negative mood. 
199 
 
 Low PSC was not found to increase threat perception but did reduce coping beliefs. It 
is not surprising that low PSC resulted in participants feeling that they would be less able to 
cope, given that PSC is defined as “belief and trust in one’s problem-solving abilities (general 
problem-solving self-efficacy) and coping effectiveness” (Heppner & Lee, 2002, p.347). Low 
PSC was also associated with higher worry scores. Perhaps individuals with low PSC believe 
deploying worry as a coping strategy will deal with their problems. After all, many worriers 
hold beliefs that worrying will help them to solve problems (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; 
Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996). 
9.3.4 Worry promoters and systematic processing 
 Overall, the results from the experiments in this thesis indicate that negative mood 
states may encourage individuals to systematically process the greater number of threats that 
they perceive. In this sense, systematic processing can be considered as a potential 
mechanism, alongside AMA deployment. However, worry is accompanied by diminished self-
efficacy/coping beliefs (influenced by all three worry promoters) and may serve to dissuade 
the individual from typically deploying cognitively demanding systematic processing. This 
may explain why high levels of worry correlated with less endorsement of systematic 
processing. Interestingly, only experimentally-induced negative mood raised worry levels. 
While IU and PSC were found to correlate with worry, experimental manipulations of IU and 
PSC did not cause changes in worry. Consequently, negative mood appears to be more of a 
front-end driver of worry than IU or PSC. It may be that being in a negative mood leads the 
individual to detect a greater number of threats, which raises their sufficiency threshold. In an 
attempt to minimize the discrepancy between their desired amount of confidence and their 
actual amount of confidence, worriers may deploy systematic processing. This involves 
careful, analytical and detailed consideration of worry information. However, as worry 
thoughts are generated, the individual experiences increasing distress, IU and low PSC. These 
diminish an individual’s beliefs that they can cope with the situation, and may result in the 
individual abandoning systematic processing in favour of heuristic processing, such as ‘how 
do I feel about this?’ (affect heuristic) (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).  
9.3.5 Worry and systematic processing 
 There are a number of reasons for predicting an association between systematic 
processing and worry. Human beings are economy-minded and will only deploy cognitively-
demanding systematic processing when their sufficiency threshold is high enough to warrant 
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the energy expenditure (Chaiken, et al., 1989). The sufficiency threshold was conceptualised 
by Chaiken et al. (1989) as a ‘judgement confidence continuum’, with higher confidence 
requirements resulting in the deployment of systematic processing. In terms of worrying, this 
may link to worriers’ confidence that they have met the goals for their worrying. Worriers are 
likely to possess high sufficiency thresholds given that worry is associated with the belief that 
worry is necessary to engage in to avoid future threats and problems (Borkovec, et al., 1999; 
Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Breitholtz, et al., 1998; Davey, Tallis, et al., 1996; Wells, 1995), 
deploying AMA stop rules (Davey, et al., 2005), and a number of dispositional characteristics 
such as IU, perfectionism, elevated evidence requirements, heightened feelings of 
responsibility for negative events, and inflated concern over mistakes (Dugas, et al., 1997; 
Frost, et al., 1990; Pratt, et al., 1997; Tallis, et al., 1991; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). In 
addition, appraisals of responsibility and accountability have been identified as important in 
systematic processing (Bohner, et al., 1995; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) and 
worry (Brain, et al., 2008; Langlois, et al., 2000; Startup & Davey, 2003). What is more, worry 
and systematic processing have both been identified as predominantly left-hemisphere 
activities (Leynes & Phillips, 2008; Leynes, 2002).   
9.3.6 Do worriers deploy systematic processing? 
 Experimental findings contained in this thesis provide some indication that worry 
promoters are related to systematic processing. Negative mood was shown to increase 
sufficiency thresholds (Experiment 1), which mediated the link between negative mood and 
worry. In Experiments 2 and 3, IU correlated with an individual’s sufficiency threshold. Low 
PSC was also identified as correlating, and overlapping, with systematic processing 
deployment (Experiment 6). However, the work carried out in this thesis does not indicate 
that there is a general tendency by worriers to deploy systematic processing. Firstly, there 
was a negative correlation between worry and systematic processing in Experiment 6. 
Secondly, AMA stop rule endorsement (e.g. Davey, et al., 2005) negatively correlated with a 
general tendency to deploy systematic processing (Experiment 6). Furthermore, the links that 
were established between worry promoters and systematic processing were not replicated 
across the experimental work conducted in this thesis. The finding that negative mood and IU 
were associated with raised sufficiency thresholds when examined using manipulations and 
visual analogue scale items was met with non-significant correlations when mood, IU and 
systematic processing were measured using questionnaires.  
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9.3.7 Are there different kinds of worry processes? 
 This raises the question of whether there may be different kinds of worry processes, 
some of which are affected by systematic processing, and others which are not. Worry is a 
chain of negative thoughts about future, uncertain events (Borkovec, et al., 1983), but it can 
also take the form of catastrophic thinking (Davey & Levy, 1998a). In other situations still, 
worrying may be more akin to problem-solving (Davey, 1994b). Given that negative mood has 
been shown to increase systematic processing in a broad range of contexts (Chaiken, et al., 
1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999), it seems possible that systematic processing will play a role in 
the aspect of worry that is most applicable to settings beyond the worry context, namely 
problem-solving. It was found in this thesis that being in a negative mood and IU led to greater 
perception of threats. Threat detection is associated with raised systematic processing, which 
may manifest as problem-focused, analytical thinking, in order for individuals to ensure that 
they reach sufficient confidence that they have successfully dealt with the threats.  
 Despite the similarities between systematic processing and problem-solving worry, 
they are not the same things. Both represent forms of effortful, analytic thought, but 
systematic processing is deployed in a broad range of judgment tasks having both personal 
and social significance. To this extent, systematic processing might be viewed as a form of 
analytic thought that many individuals might call worrying, but more properly represents 
constructive problem-solving in which activities such as logical analysis, problem-solving, 
information-seeking, and active behavioral coping all play a central role (Davey, 1994b). It is 
only when this adaptive, analytical process is ‘thwarted’ that the characteristics of 
pathological worrying begin to emerge (e.g., increasing emotional discomfort, catastrophising, 
feelings of lack of control over the worry process). If systematic processing is the effortful, 
analytic, verbally-based thought that many researchers have also used to define worrying 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston, et al., 1996), then pathological worrying is additionally 
defined by those processes that ‘thwart’ the effectiveness of systematic processing. Such 
processes may involve poor PSC (Davey, 1994b; Davey, Jubb, et al., 1996), metacognitions 
about the negative consequences of worrying (Wells, 1995), feelings of personal inadequacy 
that infiltrate the worry process (Davey & Levy, 1998b), IU (Dugas, Buhr, et al., 2004),  a 
narrow negative focus (Gasper & Clore, 2002), and an avoidance coping style (see Berenbaum, 
2010, for some further examples of processes that may ‘thwart’ closure of the worry process; 
Davey, 1993b; Meyer, et al., 1990).  
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9.3.8 Summary 
Participants induced into a negative mood were found to be more likely to deploy 
systematic processing. High IU and low PSC manipulations did not cause an in increase the 
likelihood that an individual would deploy systematic processing, but these variables were 
correlated with an increased likelihood of deploying systematic processing. When the relative 
contributions of the worry promoters were examined in the context of threat and coping, only 
negative mood correlated with increased threat perception, while all three worry promoters 
were found to correlate with decreased coping beliefs. When a general measure of systematic 
processing was used, a small negative correlation was found between worry and systematic 
processing. Consequently, while negative mood states may encourage individuals to 
systematically process the greater number of threats that they perceive, worry is also defined 
by IU and low PSC, factors which do not in themselves raise sufficiency thresholds. Instead, IU 
and PSC diminish self-efficacy beliefs (coping) and may serve to dissuade the individual from 
typically deploying cognitively demanding systematic processing. Evidently, systematic 
processing is a candidate mechanism for explaining part of the impact of negative mood on 
worry, but does not account for the mechanisms of IU and PSC in the context of processing 
information about worries.  
9.4 Limitations of the current research 
 The experiments reported in this thesis were intended to elucidate whether 
systematic processing is a proximal mechanism accounting for the relationship between 
worry promoters and perseverative worry. The results have given some indication that worry 
promoters may be linked to systematic processing, but the evidence is far from conclusive. 
This may be due to the theory being more complex than a simple linear relationship, with 
worry promoters acting both to facilitate and thwart systematic processing depending on the 
specific situation, or when the worry promoters are considered in conjunction. However, the 
mixed results may also reflect that there are methodological factors that may have influenced 
the findings, and these issues should be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
results presented in this thesis.  
9.4.1 Measuring systematic processing 
The experiments presented in this thesis used an indirect estimation of systematic 
processing by approximating an individual’s sufficiency threshold. This method is based upon 
the assumption that higher sufficiency thresholds lead to greater amounts of systematic 
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processing (e.g. Chaiken, et al., 1989). Additionally, the likelihood of deploying systematic 
processing was inferred from threat detection, based on the theoretical assumptions that this 
increases systematic processing (e.g. Baron, et al., 1994), while having low confidence in one’s 
ability to reach the sufficiency threshold through systematic processing was presumed to 
decrease its deployment (e.g. Chaiken, et al., 1989). Lastly, a questionnaire was adapted from 
the risk perception literature (Griffin, et al., 2002). While it is positive that a number of 
different methods have been used to estimate an individual’s likelihood of deploying 
systematic processing, the results presented in this thesis rest in part upon the assumption 
that approximations of sufficiency thresholds map onto actual use of systematic processing. 
Furthermore, the measures used in this thesis rely upon self-report. Individuals are 
potentially unaware of the processing styles they use in any given situation (see Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999, for a discussion of conscious versus unconscious awareness of processing 
styles). Ideally a more direct measure of systematic processing would have been employed, 
but there is currently no validated measure of systematic processing. Future studies 
examining systematic processing in worrying could utilise thought-listing methods (e.g. 
Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991), but it is unclear what thoughts an individual would need to 
record to indicate that they had systematically processed worry-relevant information, rather 
than heuristically processed the information. The problem is compounded by the idea 
presented by Chaiken et al. (1989) that both systematic and heuristic processing are capable 
of leading to the same outcome. Thus, an individual who lists a thought about a threat/worry 
may have generated that thought through systematic or heuristic processing. 
9.4.2 Manipulating worry promoters 
 In order to examine the causal impact of worry promoters on sufficiency thresholds, 
the majority of the Experiments in this thesis included experimental manipulations, in which 
participants were exposed to something aimed to change their mood, IU, or PSC. The ability to 
accurately identify causal pathways is reliant upon successful manipulations of the constructs 
in question. This thesis utilised a manipulation of IU which involved participants reading 
about a character who either reported positive appraisals of uncertainty (intended to 
generate low IU) or negative appraisals of uncertainty (intended to generate high IU). 
Participants were then asked to write about an uncertain event in their own life through the 
perspective of the character in the story. This IU manipulation was based on the work of Kelly 
(2009), who found it a successful way to manipulate IU. Similarly, recent work by Meeten, 
Dash, Scarlet and Davey (2012) successfully used this manipulation to generate between-
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group differences in IU. However, in this thesis, the findings are less encouraging. The use of 
the IU vignettes alongside the diary entry was successful in Experiment 2, but unsuccessful in 
Experiments 3 and 5.  This limits the conclusions that can be drawn in Experiments 3 and 5, 
and also suggests that the findings of Experiment 2 should be interpreted cautiously as the 
manipulation does not seem to be particularly reliable. Possible reasons for the lack of 
reliability include participants selecting different topics to write about (Experiments 3 and 5 
were conducted later in the academic year, which may have resulted in more students 
choosing to write about ‘exams’ as their uncertain topic, reducing variance), and individual 
differences in the participants selecting to take part in experiments at different times in the 
year (participants who took part to fulfil a course credit early in the academic year may be 
different to participants who undertook this later on in the academic year).  
Additionally, while the mood and PSC manipulations were successful at generating 
between-group differences, these manipulations still had two limitations. Firstly, in both 
cases, the variation within groups was extremely large. Secondly, the manipulation 
procedures were not pure, in that the PSC manipulation also affected mood. The large 
variation within groups may mask the impact of the variable on the measures taken, while the 
issue of manipulations affecting a wide range of appraisals related to worry limits the ability 
to draw firm conclusions about the impact of any one particular worry promoter.  
An additional methodological step, which may have strengthened the experiments 
that used manipulations, would be to introduce absolute criteria to ensure that participants 
have sufficiently been affected by the manipulation to warrant being included in a particular 
experimental group. For example, participants in the negative mood group in Experiment 1 
could have been required to reach a score on the sadness VAS of greater than 50 (where 0 = 
‘not at all’; 100 = ‘extremely’). If they did not reach/exceed this score, they would be excluded 
from the experiment. This would provide greater certainty that the participants in the 
experimental groups had raised (or decreased depending on which group they were allocated 
to) subjective experiences of the psychological phenomena that the manipulations were 
designed to alter (mood, IU and PSC). One potential disadvantage of using absolute criteria is 
that it raises the possibility that, if a manipulation is not very effective, only those individuals 
who have high trait levels of the variable that is being manipulated will exceed the cut-off. 
Such participants are likely to be different for many reasons, and the basic premise of 
experimental methodology (participants being identical to one another for all intents and 
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purposes except for the experimental manipulation) begins to break down. Selecting 
participants in an experimental study that reach a specific criterion for inclusion after the 
manipulation runs the risk of selecting a group that is now not a random selection of the 
relevant population. For example, participants that meet a criterion of 50 on the sad VAS scale 
may possess other cognitive or emotional attributes that cause the individual to exceed 50, 
and these other cognitive or emotional attributes (not the variable that is being manipulated) 
may cause the observed experimental effects. In future studies, one possible solution would 
be to use baseline measures of the constructs of interest, and ensure that, once all those 
participants who did not fulfil the absolute criteria for the group that they were randomly 
assigned to are removed from the sample, all of the groups are equal on these baseline 
measures. 
9.4.3 Measuring worry 
 Two methods for measuring worry were used in this thesis: (1) the PSWQ and (2) the 
CI. The PSWQ is a trait measure of frequency and excessiveness of worry, while the CI 
measures iterative worry thoughts. In Experiments 1-3, no differences were observed 
between participant groups on the CI. This may be due to the CI coming later in the 
experiment than it has done in experiments that have found effects of worry promoters on 
catastrophic worry (e.g., Johnston & Davey, 1997; Meeten et al. 2012). Using the PSWQ to 
measure state worry is not ideal, as it was designed to be a trait measure (Meyer, et al., 1990). 
Nevertheless, it has been used successfully in clinical contexts to measure therapeutic change 
(Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Goldman, et al., 2007; Treanor, et al., 2011). The finding that a 
short-term negative mood induction raised scores on the PSWQ (Experiment 1) was 
surprising. However, this apparent mood-induced memory and appraisal bias of one’s 
worrying may link to metacognitive theory of worry in GAD and account for the onset of Type 
2 worry/meta-worry (Wells, 1995). The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the test-retest 
reliability of the PSWQ would likely be much lower if administered in different mood states. It 
may be preferable in future studies to use a modified version of the 1-week version of the 
PSWQ, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Past Week (Stöber & Bittencourt, 1998) or the 
past-day version (Joos, et al., 2012), although these were not used in this thesis as there is less 
available data on its psychometric properties or comparative sample scores.  
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9.4.4 Analogue, female samples 
 The participants were predominantly young, female, university students. Given that 
the focus of this thesis was on mechanisms of perseverative worry, the extension of the 
findings obtained with this specific sample to those affected by GAD, which is characterised by 
excessive, uncontrollable worry, should be considered. Young, single females have been 
identified as having the highest levels of worry of all the groups examined in the work by 
Hunt, Wisocki and Yanko (2003). Therefore, the samples used in this thesis may show 
elevated worry levels compared to the general population. Ruscio (2002) demonstrated that 
highly distressing amounts of worry can occur in those without a clinical diagnosis of GAD, 
lending support to the use of undiagnosed individuals. What is more, this thesis represents 
the first attempt to examine the role of systematic processing in worry, and attempting to 
establish proof of principle in an analogue sample is an appropriate initial step. Nonetheless, 
in order to examine whether, for example, negative mood also increases sufficiency 
thresholds in individuals with GAD, future studies should consider using these paradigms 
with clinical populations.  
9.4.5 Statistical Power 
 Power calculations can be conducted to determine the minimum sample size required 
to detect an effect of a specified size. Experiments 1-4 conducted in this thesis had sample 
sizes of approximately 60 participants in each. This is consistent with published work (Davey, 
et al., 2007; Davey, et al., 2003; Hawksley & Davey, 2010) that has used 60 participants in 
studies employing experimental manipulations. Given the exploratory nature of the work 
contained in this thesis in applying the HSM to perseverative worry, it was difficult to 
calculate the required sample size using power calculations because the magnitude of the 
expected effects of systematic processing were unknown. Consequently, sample sizes were 
based on those used in published work examining psychopathological mechanisms. Pilot 
studies would have enabled better estimates of the required sample size (Lenth, 2001). Post-
hoc power calculations would enable greater certainty that the experiments conducted in this 
thesis were adequately powered. To ensure that future studies are adequately powered, the 
information gleaned from the experiments in this thesis should be used in a priori power 
calculations to determine the required sample sizes for future work.  
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9.5 Further studies 
The experiments included in this thesis raise interesting questions worthy of future 
consideration. Firstly, the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) does not specify what balance of 
factors that promote or thwart systematic processing manifest in the deployment of 
systematic processing. Future work should aim to determine whether the raised sufficiency 
thresholds of worriers result in the deployment of systematic processing. This will require the 
development of procedures that provide a more direct measurement of systematic processing 
and can be applied to the worry context. Secondly, future experiments could enhance 
procedures for manipulating constructs related to worry by systematically examining which 
manipulations work for whom, and when, and which manipulations provide the purest 
manipulation of only the particular construct of interest. Thirdly, while this thesis has focused 
on systematic processing, the HSM also includes heuristic processing, and the heuristics that 
are relevant to the worry process could be examined. Lastly, Experiment 1 indicated that 
mood states affect the goals an individual has for their worrying, and the relationship between 
mood states and goals could be examined in a clinical population. Similarly, Experiment 6 
indicated that the worry promoters are linked to one another, and it would be interesting to 
examine whether these relationships are greater in magnitude in clinical populations.  
9.6 Clinical implications 
The work conducted in this thesis has implications for clinical work with individuals 
who are experiencing worry-based problems. The findings highlight the importance of 
considering the goals that individuals have for their worrying when working clinically, as 
negative mood and IU were both found to increase AMA endorsement. Furthermore, attention 
should be paid to the appraisals that worriers hold about the importance of their task, such as 
feeling accountable and desiring control, as these raise sufficiency thresholds, increasing the 
likelihood that an individual will feel the need to consider worry thoughts in detail. Thus, the 
findings support the use of cognitive-behavioural therapy and metacognitive therapy for GAD, 
and also emphasise the need for treatments focusing on the role of low mood and the 
treatment of comorbid depression.  
9.7 Final conclusions 
The research described in this thesis has implications for the ways in which negative 
mood states, IU and low PSC are thought to relate to perseverative worry. Research from 
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social psychology has indicated that sufficiency thresholds are important in determining 
whether an individual deploys systematic processing (Chaiken, et al., 1989). Despite worriers 
possessing a large number of characteristics that should increase their sufficiency thresholds, 
it was found that negative mood had the greatest influence on systematic processing, while 
other worry promoters – IU and low PSC – were not found to cause raised sufficiency 
thresholds. This is consistent with previous work showing that negative moods lead to 
increased systematic processing (e.g., Ambady & Gray, 2002). Negative mood may operate on 
perseverative worry through a mechanism of systematic processing, but this mechanism does 
not seem to account for IU and low PSC, and worriers do not show a general tendency to 
deploy systematic processing.  
Worry can be conceived as a multifaceted phenomenon, consisting of problem-solving, 
threat anticipation, and chains of catastrophic, negative thinking (Borkovec et al., 1983; 
Davey, 1993, Mathews, 1990). The work conducted in this thesis suggests that negative mood 
may operate on worry through the proximal mechanism of systematic processing, which also 
functions in other psychological processes, such as decision making and forming attitudes. It 
is an exciting prospect that raised sufficiency thresholds and increased systematic processing 
may provide an account of a proximal mechanism of perseverative worry, derived from core 
psychological processes. This may help to explain why worry is such a universal phenomenon. 
Future research should examine whether other factors that have been associated with chronic 
worrying, such as IU and low PSC, do so through their role in thwarting systematic processing, 
resulting in normal functional worry becoming maladaptive, or whether they operate through 
other mechanisms. 
 
 
  
209 
 
10  References 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. 
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007). Overcoming intuition: 
Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 136(4), 569-576. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569 
Ambady, N., & Gray, H. M. (2002). On being sad and mistaken: Mood effects on the accuracy of 
thin-slice judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(4), 947-961. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.947 
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3 
ed.). Washington, DC: author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(4th ed., text rev ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Armitage, C. J., Conner, M., & Norman, P. (1999). Differential effects of mood on information 
processing: evidence from the theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 419-433. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0992(199906)29:4<419::AID-EJSP933>3.0.CO;2-L 
Barahmand, U. (2008). Age and gender differences in adolescent worry. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 45(8), 778-783. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2008.08.006 
Baron, R., Logan, H., Lilly, J., Inman, M., & Brennan, M. (1994). Negative emotion and message 
processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 181-201. doi: 
10.1006/jesp.1994.1009 
Batra, R., & Stayman, D. M. (1990). The role of mood in advertising effectiveness. The Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17(2), 203-214.  
Baumgardner, A. H., Heppner, P. P., & Arkin, R. M. (1986). Role of causal attribution in personal 
problem-solving. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(3), 636-643. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.50.3.636 
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., & Steer, R. A. (1988). An inventory for measuring clinical 
anxiety: Psychometric properties. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56(6), 
893-897. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.56.6.893 
Behar, E., Alcaine, O., Zuellig, A. R., & Borkovec, T. D. (2003). Screening for generalized anxiety 
disorder using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire: a receiver operating characteristic 
analysis. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 34(1), 25-43. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7916(03)00004-1 
Belzer, K. D., D'Zurilla, T. J., & A., M.-O. (2002). Social problem solving and trait anxiety as 
predictors of worry in a college student population. Personality and Individual Differences, 
33(4), 573-585. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00173-8 
Berenbaum, H. (2010). An initiation-termination two-phase model of worrying. Clinical 
Psychology Review. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2010.06.011 
Biesanz, J. C., Falk, C. F., & Savalei, V. (2010). Assessing Mediational Models: Testing and 
Interval Estimation for Indirect Effects. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 45(4), 661-701. 
doi: 10.1080/00273171.2010.498292 
Birrell, J., Meares, K., Wilkinson, A., & Freeston, M. H. (2011). Toward a definition of intolerance 
of uncertainty: A review of factor analytical studies of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 31(7), 1198-1208. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2011.07.009 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgement: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24, 45-62. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420240104 
210 
 
Bohner, G., Bless, H., Schwarz, N., & Strack, F. (1988). What triggers causal attributions? The 
impact of valence and subjective probability. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
18(4), 335-345. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420180404 
Bohner, G., Crow, K., Erb, H.-P., & Schwarz, N. (1992). Affect and persuasion: Mood effects on 
the processing of message content and context and on subsequent behaviour. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 22(6), 511-530. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420220602 
Bohner, G., & Dickel, N. (2011). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 
391-417.  
Bohner, G., Erb, H.-P., & Siebler, F. (2008). Information processing approaches to persuasion: 
Integrating assumptions from the dual- and single-processing perspectives. In W. D. Crano 
& R. Prislin (Eds.), Attitudes and attitude change. New York: Psychology Press, Taylor & 
Francis Group. 
Bohner, G., Moskowitz, G. B., & Chaiken, S. (1995). The Interplay of Heuristic and Systematic 
Processing of Social Information. European Review of Social Psychology, 6, 33 - 68. doi: 
10.1080/14792779443000003 
Bohner, G., Rank, S., Reinhard, M.-A., Einwiller, S., & Erb, H.-P. (1998). Motivational 
determinants of systematic processing: expectancy moderates effects of desired confidence 
on processing effort. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28(2), 185-206. doi: 
10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199803/04)28:2<185::aid-ejsp864>3.0.co;2-o 
Borkovec, T. D. (1994). The nature, functions, and origins of worry. In G. C. L. Davey & F. Tallis 
(Eds.), Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Borkovec, T. D., & Costello, E. (1993). Efficacy of applied relaxation and cognitive-behavioral 
therapy in the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 61, 611-619. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.61.4.611 
Borkovec, T. D., Hazlett-Stevens, H., & Diaz, M. L. (1999). The role of positive beliefs about 
worry in generalized anxiety disorder and its treatment. Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 6, 126-138. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0879(199905)6:2<126::AID-
CPP193>3.0.CO;2-M 
Borkovec, T. D., & Inz, J. (1990). The nature of worry in generalized anxiety disorder: A 
predominance of thought activity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 153-158. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(90)90027-G 
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stöber, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon intimately linked 
to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral processes. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 22(6), 561-576. doi: 10.1023/A:1018790003416 
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary exploration of 
worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21(1), 9-16. 
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(83)90121-3 
Borkovec, T. D., & Roemer, L. (1995). Perceived functions of worry among generalized anxiety 
disorder subjects: Distraction from more emotionally distressing topics? Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26(1), 25-30. doi: 10.1016/0005-
7916(94)0064-5 
Bower, G. H. (1991). Mood congruity of social judgements. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and 
social judgments. Oxford, UK: Pergammon. 
Brain, K., Henderson, B. J., Tyndel, S., Bankhead, C., Watson, E., Clements, A., et al. (2008). 
Predictors of breast cancer-related distress following mammography screening in younger 
women on a family history breast cancer screening programme. Psycho-Oncology, 17(12), 
1180-1188. doi: 10.1002/pon.1355 
Breitholtz, E., Westling, B. E., & Öst, L.-G. (1998). Cognitions in Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
and Panic Disorder Patients. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12(6), 567-577. doi: 
10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00034-6 
211 
 
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Barden, J. (2007). Happiness versus sadness as a determinant of thought 
confidence in persuasion: A self-validation analysis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 93(5), 711-727. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.711 
Broemer, P., Jonas, K., & Diehl, M. (2000). Effects of evaluative (in-)consistency and perceived 
self-efficacy on attitude formation. Swiss Journal of Psychology/Schweizerische Zeitschrift 
für Psychologie/Revue Suisse de Psychologie, 59(3), 183-195. doi: 10.1024//1421-
0185.59.3.183 
Brown, T. A. (1997). The Nature of Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Pathological Worry: Current 
Evidence and Conceptual Models. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 42, 817-825.  
Brown, T. A. (2003). Confirmatory factor analysis of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire: Multiple 
factors or method effects? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(12), 1411-1426. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00059-7 
Brown, T. A., Antony, M. M., & Barlow, D. H. (1992). Psychometric properties of the Penn state 
worry questionnaire in a clinical anxiety disorders sample. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 30(1), 33-37. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(92)90093-V 
Brown, T. A., Campbell, L. A., Lehman, C. L., Grisham, J. R., & Mancill, R. B. (2001). Current 
and lifetime comorbidity of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders in a large clinical 
sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 585-599. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.110.4.585 
Brown, T. A., DiNardo, P. A., & Barlow, D. H. (1994). Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for 
DSM-IV. Albany: Graywind Publications. 
Bruce, S. E., Machan, J. T., Dyck, I., & Keller, M. (2001). Infrequency of "pure" GAD: Impact of 
psychiatric co-morbidity on clinical course. Depression and Anxiety, 14, 219-225. doi: 
10.1002/da.1070 
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2006). Investigating the construct validity of intolerance of uncertainty 
and its unique relationship with worry. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 20(2), 222-236. doi: 
10.1016/janxdis.2004.12.004 
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2009). The role of fear of anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty in 
worry: An experimental manipulation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 215-223. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2008.12.004 
Burger, J. M., & Cooper, H. M. (1979). The desirability of control. Motivation and emotion, 3(4), 
381-393. doi: 10.1007/BF00994052 
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1983). Cognitive processes in anxiety. Advances in Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 5(1), 51-62. doi: 10.1016/0146-6402(83)90015-2 
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk perception. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 11(5), 551-565. doi: 10.1007/BF01183858 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 42, 116-131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of Need for Cognition. 
Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Kao, C. F., & Rodriguez, R. (1986). Central and peripheral routes to 
persuasion: An individual difference perspective. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51(5), 1032-1043. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.5.1032 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Morris, K. J. (1983). Effects of need for cognition on message 
evaluation, recall, and persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 805-
818. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.805 
Calleo, J. S., Hart, J., Björgvinsson, T. r., & Stanley, M. A. (2010). Obsessions and worry beliefs in 
an inpatient OCD population. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 24(8), 903-908. doi: 
10.1016/j.anxdis.2010.06.015 
212 
 
Carleton, N. R., Sharpe, D., & Asmundson, G. J. G. (2007). Anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of 
uncertainty: Requisites of the fundamental fears? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(10), 
2307-2316. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2007.04.006 
Carter, W. R., Johnson, M. C., & Borkovec, T. D. (1986). Worry: An electrocortical analysis. 
Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8(4), 193-204. doi: 10.1016/0146-
6402(86)90004-4 
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about Worry and Intrusions: The Meta-
Cognitions Questionnaire and its Correlates. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11(3), 279-296. 
doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00011-X 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory approach to 
human behaviour. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Cervone, D., Kopp, D. A., Schaumann, L., & Scott, W. D. (1994). Mood, self-efficacy, and higher 
performance standards: Lower moods induce higher standards of performance. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 499-512. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.499 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus 
message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 752-766. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752 
Chaiken, S., Giner-Sorolla, R., & Chen, S. (1996). Beyond accuracy: Defense and impression 
motives in heuristic and systematic information processing. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. 
Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 
553-578). New York: Guilford Press. 
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing 
within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), 
Unintended Thought. New York: Guilford Press. 
Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: 
Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude 
judgement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(3), 460-473. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.66.3.460 
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
Chen, S., & Chaiken, S. (1999). The Heuristic-Systematic Model in its broader context. In S. 
Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
Chen, S., Duckworth, K., & Chaiken, S. (1999). Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing. 
Psychological Inquiry, 10(1), 44-49. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli1001_6 
Chen, S., Shechter, D., & Chaiken, S. (1996). Getting at the truth or getting along: Accuracy- versus 
impression-motivated heuristic and systematic processing. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 71(2), 262-275. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.262 
Cohen, A. R., Stotland, E., & Wolfe, D. M. (1955). An experimental investigation of need for 
cognition. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 291-294. doi: 
10.1037/h0042761 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155-159. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.112.1.155 
Craske, M. G., Rapee, R. M., Jackel, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1989). Qualitative dimensions of worry 
in DSM-III-R generalized anxiety disorder subjects and nonanxious controls. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 27(4), 397-402. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(89)90010-7 
D'Zurilla, T. J., Maydeu-Olivares, A., & Kant, G. I. (1998). Age and gender differences in social 
problem-solving ability. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 241-252. doi: 
10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00029-4 
213 
 
Davey, G. C. L. (1993a). A comparison of three cognitive appraisal strategies: The role of threat 
devaluation in problem-focussed coping. Personality and Individual Differences, 14(4), 
535-546. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(93)90146-T 
Davey, G. C. L. (1993b). A comparison of three worry questionnaires. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 31(1), 51-56. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(93)90042-S 
Davey, G. C. L. (1994a). Pathological worrying as exacerbated problem-solving. In G. C. L. Davey 
& F. Tallis (Eds.), Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Davey, G. C. L. (1994b). Worrying, social problem-solving abilities, and social problem-solving 
confidence. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(3), 327-330. doi: 10.1016/0005-
7967(94)90130-9 
Davey, G. C. L. (2006a). The catastrophising interview procedure. In G. C. L. Davey & A. Wells 
(Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders. Chichester, Uk: Wiley. 
Davey, G. C. L. (2006b). A mood-as-input account of perseverative worrying. In G. C. L. Davey & 
A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Davey, G. C. L., Eldridge, F., Drost, J., & MacDonald, B. A. (2007). What ends a worry bout? An 
analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview task. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(6), 1231-1243.  
Davey, G. C. L., Hampton, J., Farrell, J., & Davidson, S. (1992). Some characteristics of worrying: 
Evidence for worrying and anxiety as separate constructs. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 13(2), 133-147. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(92)90036-0 
Davey, G. C. L., Jubb, M., & Cameron, C. (1996). Catastrophic worrying as a function of changes 
in problem-solving confidence. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 333-344. doi: 
10.1007/BF02228037 
Davey, G. C. L., & Levy, S. (1998a). Internal statements associated with catastrophic worrying. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 26(1), 21-32. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00162-7 
Davey, G. C. L., & Levy, S. (1998b). Catastrophic worrying: Personal inadequacy and a 
perseverative iterative style as features of the catastrophizing process. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 107(4), 576-586. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.107.4.576 
Davey, G. C. L., & MacDonald, B. (2009). Negative mood facilitates the intention to resolve 
worries: An experimental study.   
Davey, G. C. L., Startup, H. M., MacDonald, B., Jenkins, D., & Patterson, K. (2005). The use of 'as 
many as can' versus 'feel like continuing' stop rules during worrying. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 29, 155-169. doi: 10.1007/s10608-005-3162-5 
Davey, G. C. L., Startup, H. M., Zara, A., MacDonald, C. B., & Field, A. P. (2003). The 
perseveration of checking thoughts and mood-as-input hypothesis. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 34, 141-160.  
Davey, G. C. L., Tallis, F., & Capuzzo, N. (1996). Beliefs about the consequences of worrying. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20(5), 499-520. doi: 10.1007/BF02227910 
de Bruin, G., Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2007). The Prediction of Worry in Non-Clinical Individuals: 
The Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty, Meta-Worry, and Neuroticism. Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 29(2), 93-100. doi: 10.1007/s10862-006-
9029-6 
Derogatis, L. R. (1977). The SCL-90 Manual 1: Scoring, administration and procedures for the 
SCL-90. Baltimore: Clinical Psychometric Research. 
Derogatis, L. R., & Melisaratos, N. (1983). The Brief Symptom Inventory: an introductory report. 
Psychological Medicine, 13, 595-605. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700048017 
Deschenes, S. S., Dugas, M. J., Radomsky, A. S., & Buhr, K. (2010). Experimental manipulation of 
beliefs about uncertainty: Effects on interpretive processing and access to threat schemata. 
Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, 1(1), 52-70. doi: 10.5127/jep.008510 
214 
 
Di Nardo, P. A., Barlow, D. H., Cerny, J., Vermilyea, J. A., Himadi, W., & Waddell, M. (1985). 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule - Revised (ADIS-R). Albany, NY: Phobia and 
Anxiety Disorders Clinic, State University of New York at Albany. 
Dugas, M. J., Buhr, K., & Ladouceur, R. (2004). The role of intolerance of uncertainty in the 
etiology and maintenance of generalized anxiety disorder. In R. G. Heimberg, C. L. Turk & 
D. S. Mennin (Eds.), Generalized anxiety disorder: Advances in research and practice (pp. 
143-163): Guilford Press. 
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (1997). Intolerance of uncertainty and problem 
orientation in worry. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 593-606. doi: 
10.1023/A:1021890322153 
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., Ladouceur, R., Rhéaume, J., Provencher, M., & Boisvert, J.-M. 
(1998). Worry Themes in Primary GAD, Secondary GAD, and Other Anxiety Disorders. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12(3), 253-261. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00013-9 
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalized anxiety disorder: a 
preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 215-226. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00070-3 
Dugas, M. J., Gosselin, P., & Ladouceur, R. (2001). Intolerance of Uncertainty and Worry: 
Investigating Specificity in a Nonclinical Sample. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25(5), 
551-558. doi: 10.1023/A:1005553414688  
Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (2000). Treatment of GAD: Targeting intolerance of uncertainty in 
two types of worry. Behavior Modification, 24, 635-657. doi: 10.1177/0145445500245002  
Dugas, M. J., Laugesen, N., & Bukowski, W. (2012). Intolerance of Uncertainty, Fear of Anxiety, 
and Adolescent Worry. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 40(6), 863-870. doi: 
10.1007/s10802-012-9611-1 
Dugas, M. J., Letarte, H., Rhéaume, J., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (1995). Worry and 
problem solving: Evidence of a specific relationship. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
19(1), 109-120. doi: 10.1007/bf02229679 
Dugas, M. J., Schwartz, A., & Francis, K. (2004). Brief Report: Intolerance of Uncertainty, Worry, 
and Depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(6), 835-842. doi: 10.1007/s10608-
004-0669-0  
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1984). Cognitive theories of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 267-359). Orlando, FL: 
Academic Press. 
Egan, S. J., Wade, T. D., & Shafran, R. (2011). Perfectionism as a transdiagnostic process: A 
clinical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(2), 203-212. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2010.04.009 
Endler, N. S., & Parker, J. D. A. (1990). Multidimensional assessment of coping: A critical 
evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 844-854. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.58.5.844 
Erb, H.-P., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Spiegel, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007). Biased processing of 
persuasive information: On the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1057-1075. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.420 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Field, A. P. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS: and sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll (3rd 
Edition) (3 ed.). London: Sage. 
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., & Williams, J. (1997). Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders, Clinician Version (SCID-CV). Washington, DC.: American 
Psychiatric Press. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social Cognition (2 ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
Freeston, M. H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1996). Thoughts, images, worry, and anxiety. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20(3), 265-273. doi: 10.1007/BF02229237  
215 
 
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do people 
worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17(6), 791-802. doi: 10.1016/0191-
8869(94)90048-5 
Fresco, D. M., Mennin, D. S., Heimberg, R. G., & Turk, C. L. (2003). Using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire to identify individuals with generalized anxiety disorder: a receiver operating 
characteristic analysis. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 34(3-4), 
283-291. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2003.09.001 
Frost, R. O., Marten, P., Lahart, C., & Rosenblate, R. (1990). The dimensions of perfectionism. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14(449-468). doi: 10.1007/BF01172967  
Furnham, A., & Ribchester, T. (1995). Tolerance of ambiguity: A review of the concept, its 
measurement and applications. Current Psychology, 14(3), 179-199. doi: 
10.1007/BF02686907 
Garner, M., Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2006). Orienting and maintenance of gaze to facial 
expression in social anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(4), 760-770. doi: 
10.1037/0021-843X.115.4.760 
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local 
processing of visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 33-39. doi: 10.1111/1467-
9280.00406  
Gerrards-Hesse, A., Spies, K., & Hesse, F. W. (1994). Experimental inductions of emotional states 
and their effectiveness: A review. British Journal of Psychology, 85(1), 55-78. doi: 
10.1111/j.2044-8295.1994.tb02508.x 
Gilet, A. L. (2008). Mood induction procedures: A critical review. L'Encéphale, 34(3), 233-239. 
doi: 10.1016/j.encep.2006.08.003  
Giner-Sorolila, R., & Chaiken, S. (1997). Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic Processing 
Under Defense Motivation. Pers Soc Psychol Bull, 23(1), 84-97. doi: 
10.1177/0146167297231009 
Goldman, N., Dugas, M. J., Sexton, K. A., & Gervais, N. J. (2007). The impact of written exposure 
on worry. Behavior Modification, 32(4), 512-538. doi: 10.1177/0145445506298651  
Gove, W. R. (1980). Mental illness and psychiatric treatment among women. Psychology of women 
quarterly, 4, 345-362. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-6402.1980.tb01109.x 
Greenwald, A. G. (1968). Cognitive learning, cognitive response to persuasion, and attitude change. 
In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological foundations of 
attitudes (pp. 147-170). New York: Academic Press. 
Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Giese, J., & Dunwoody, S. (2002). Linking the Heuristic-Systematic 
Model and depth of processing. Communication Research, 29, 705-732. doi: 
10.1177/009365002237833  
Griffin, R. J., Zheng Y., ter Huurne, E., Boerner, F., Ortiz, S., & Dunwoody, S. (2008). After the 
Flood. Science Communication, 29(3), 285-315. doi: 10.1177/1075547007312309 
Hale, W. W., Klimstra, T. A., & Meeus, W. H. J. (2010). Is the generalized anxiety disorder 
symptom of worry just another form of neuroticism? A 5-year longitudinal study of 
adolescents from the general population. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. Retrieved from  
doi:10.4088/JCP.09m05506blu 
Hamm, R. M. (2004). Theory about heuristic strategies based on verbal protocol analysis: The 
emperor needs a shave. Medical Decision Making, 24, 681-686. doi: 
10.1177/0272989X04271329  
Harkins, S. G., & Petty, R. E. (1982). Effects of task difficulty and task uniqueness on social 
loafing. . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(6), 1214-1229. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.43.6.1214 
Hawksley, J., & Davey, G. C. L. (2010). Mood-as-input and depressive rumination. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 48(2), 134-140. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.10.004 
216 
 
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2011). Indirect and direct effects of a multicategorical causal agent 
in statistical mediation analysis.   
Hayes, S., Hirsch, C. R., & Mathews, A. (2008). Restriction of Working Memory Capacity During 
Worry. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117(3), 712-717. doi: 10.1037/a0012908 
Heppner, P. P. (1988). The Problem Solving Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist 
Press. 
Heppner, P. P., & Anderson, W. P. (1985). The relationship between problem-solving self-appraisal 
and psychological adjustment. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 9(4), 415-427. doi: 
10.1007/BF01173090  
Heppner, P. P., & Lee, D.-G. (2002). Problem-solving, appraisal and psychological adjustment. In 
C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Heppner, P. P., & Petersen, C. H. (1982). The development and implications of a personal problem-
solving inventory. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 29(1), 66-75. doi: 10.1037/0022-
0167.29.1.66 
Heppner, P. P., Reeder, B. L., & Larson, L. M. (1983). Cognitive variables associated with personal 
problem-solving appraisal: Implications for counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
30(4), 537-545. doi: 10.1037/0022-0167.30.4.537 
Hoehn-Saric, R., Lee, J. S., McLeod, D. R., & Wong, D. F. (2005). Effect of worry on regional 
cerebral blood flow in nonanxious subjects. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 140(3), 
259-269.  
Hoehn-Saric, R., Schlund, M. W., & Wong, S. H. (2004). Effects of Citalopram on worry and brain 
activation in patients with generalized anxiety disorder. Psychiatry Research: 
Neuroimaging, 131, 11-21. doi: 10.1016/j.psychresns.2004.02.003 
Holaway, R. M., Rodebaugh, T. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2006). The epidemiology of worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder. In G. C. L. Davey & A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its 
psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd. 
Hoyer, J., Becker, E. S., & Roth, W. T. (2001). Characteristics of worry in GAD patients, social 
phobics, and controls. Depression and Anxiety, 13, 89-96. doi: 10.1002/da.1021 
Hsee, C. K., & Abelson, R. P. (1991). The velocity relation: Satisfaction as a function of the first 
derivative of outcome over time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 341-
347. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.60.3.341 
Hunt, S., Wisocki, P., & Yanko, J. (2003). Worry and use of coping strategies among older and 
younger adults. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17(5), 547-560. doi: 10.1016/S0887-
6185(02)00229-3 
Johnston, W. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (1997). The psychological impact of negative TV news 
bulletins: The catastrophizing of personal worries. British Journal of Psychology, 88(1), 85. 
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1997.tb02622.x 
Joos, E., Vansteenwegen, D., Brunfaut, E., Bastiaens, T., Demyttenaere, K., Pieters, G., et al. 
(2012). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire—Past Day: Development and Validation of a 
Measure Assessing Daily Levels of Worry. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 34(1), 35-47. doi: 10.1007/s10862-011-9265-2 
Kahlor, L., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R. J., & Neuwirth, K. (2006). Seeking and Processing 
Information about Impersonal Risk. Science Communication, 28(2), 163-194. doi: 
10.1177/1075547006293916 
Kahlor, L., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., & Giese, J. (2003). Studying Heuristic-
Systematic Processing of Risk Communication. Risk Analysis, 23(2), 355-368. doi: 
10.1111/1539-6924.00314 
Kaiser, H. F. (1960). The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. Educational and 
psychological measurement, 20, 141-151. doi: 10.1177/001316446002000116 
217 
 
Kelly, O. (2009). The escalation of non-pathological worry into generalized anxiety disorder: An 
investigation of two influential models. University of Western Australia.    
Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: Effects of sadness 
and anger on social perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(5), 740-
752. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.740 
Kendall, P. C., & Ingram, R. E. (1987). The future for cognitive assessment of anxiety: Let's get 
specific. In L. Michaelson & L. M. Ascher (Eds.), Anxiety and stress disorders: Cognitive-
behavioral assessment and treatment. New York: Guilford Press. 
Kenealy, P. M. (1986). The velten mood induction procedure: A methodological review. Motivation 
and emotion, 10(4), 315-335. doi: 10.1007/bf00992107 
Kertz, S., & Woodruff-Borden, J. (2011). Human and Economic Burden of GAD, Subthreshold 
GAD, and Worry in a Primary Care Sample. Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical 
Settings, 18(3), 281-290. doi: 10.1007/s10880-011-9248-1 
Koerner, N., & Dugas, M. J. (2008). An investigation of appraisals in individuals vulnerable to 
excessive worry: The role of intolerance of uncertainty. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
32, 619-638. doi: 10.1007/s10608-007-9125-2 
Kofta, M., & Sedek, G. (1998). Uncontrollability as a source of cognitive exhaustion: Implications 
for helplessness and depression. In M. Kofta, G. Weary & G. Sedek (Eds.), Personal 
control in action: Cognitive and motivational mechanisms. New York: Plenum Press. 
Ladouceur, R., Blais, M. H., Freeston, M. H., & Dugas, M. J. (1998). Problem solving and problem 
orientation in generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12(2), 139-152. 
doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00002-4 
Ladouceur, R., Gosselin, P., & Dugas, M. J. (2000). Experimental manipulation of intolerance of 
uncertainty: a study of a theoretical model of worry. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
38(9), 933-941. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(98)00002-4 
Ladouceur, R., Talbot, F., & Dugas, M. J. (1997). Behavioral Expressions of Intolerance of 
Uncertainty in Worry. Behavior Modification, 21(3), 355-371. doi: 
10.1177/01454455970213006 
Langlois, F., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (2000). Differences and similarities between 
obsessive intrusive thoughts and worry in a non-clinical population: Study 1. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 38, 157-173. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00027-3 
Lee, H., Herr, P. M., Kardes, F. R., & Kim, C. (1999). Motivated search: Effects of choice, 
accountability, issue involvement, and prior knowledge on information acquisition and use. 
. Journal of business research, 45(1), 75-88. doi: 10.1016/S0148-2963(98)00067-8 
Leigh, E., & Hirsch, C. R. (2011). Worry in imagery and verbal form: Effect on residual working 
memory capacity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(2), 99-105. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2010.11.005 
Lenth, R. V. (2001). Some practical guidelines for effective sample size determination. The 
American Statistician, 55(3), 187-193.  
Leynes, A., & Phillips, M. C. (2008). Event-Related Potential (ERP) evidence for varied 
recollection during source monitoring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 34(4), 741-751. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.4.741 
Leynes, A. P. (2002). The effect of specific test queries on source-monitoring event-related 
potentials. Brain and Cognition, 50(2), 218-233. doi: 10.1016/S0278-2626(02)00505-5 
Livingston, S. D., & Sinclair, L. (2008). Taking the watchdog off its leash: Personal prejudices and 
situational motivations jointly predict derogation of a stigmatized source. Pers Soc Psychol 
Bull, 34, 210-223. doi: 10.1177/0146167207310028  
MacLeod, A. K., Williams, M. J., & Bekerian, D. A. (1991). Worry is reasonable: The role of 
explanations in pessimism about future personal events. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
100(4), 478-486. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.100.4.478 
218 
 
Maheswaran, D., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation 
settings: Effect of incongruent information on processing and judgement. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61(1), 13-25. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.61.1.13 
Martin, M. (1990). On the induction of mood. Clinical Psychology Review, 10(6), 669-697. doi: 
10.1016/0272-7358(90)90075-L 
Martin, R., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Majority versus minority influence: when, not whether, source 
status instigates heuristic or systematic processing. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
33(3), 313-330. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.146 
Martin, R., Hewstone, M., & Martin, P. Y. (2007). Systematic and heuristic processing of majority- 
and minority-endorsed messages: The effects of varying outcome relevance and levels of 
orientation on attitude and message processing. Pers Soc Psychol Bull, 33(1), 43-56. doi: 
10.1177/0146167206294251 
Mathews, A. (1990). Why worry? The cognitive function of anxiety. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 28(6), 455-468. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(90)90132-3 
Matthews, G., & Wells, A. (2000). Attention, Automaticity, and Affective Disorder. Behavior 
Modification, 24(1), 69-93. doi: 10.1177/0145445500241004 
Mayer, J. D., Allen, J. P., & Beauregard, K. (1995). Mood inductions for four specific moods: A 
procedure employing guided imagery vignettes with music. Journal of Mental Imagery, 
19(1&2), 133-150.  
Meeten, F., Dash, S. R., Scarlet, A. L. S., & Davey, G. C. L. (2012). Investigating the effect of 
intolerance of uncertainty on catastrophic worrying and mood. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 50(11), 690-698.  
Meeten, F., & Davey, G. C. L. (2011). Mood-as-input hypothesis and perseverative 
psychopathologies. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(8), 1259-1275. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2011.08.002 
Melrose, K. L., Brown, G. D. A., & Wood, A. M. (2012). Am I Abnormal? Relative Rank and 
Social Norm Effects in Judgments of Anxiety and Depression Symptom Severity. Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making. doi: 10.1002/bdm.1754 
Mennin, D. S., Heimberg, R. G., Turk, C. L., & Fresco, D. M. (2005). Preliminary evidence for an 
emotion dysregulation model of generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 43(10), 1281-1310. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2004.08.008 
Metzger, R. L., Miller, M. L., Cohen, M., Sofka, M., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Worry changes 
decision making: The effect of negative thoughts on cognitive processing. Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 48, 76-88. doi: 10.1002/1097-4679(199001)46:1<78::AID-
JCLP2270460113>3.0.CO;2-R 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and validation 
of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 487-495. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(90)90135-6 
Miller, S. M. (1987). Monitoring and blunting: Validation of a questionnaire to assess styles of 
information-seeking under threat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 345-
353. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.52.2.345 
Mischel, W. (1979). On the interface of cognition and personality. American Psychologist, 34, 740-
754. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.34.9.740 
Mohlman, J., Price, R. B., Eldreth, D. A., Chazin, D., Glover, D. M., & Kates, W. R. (2009). The 
relation of worry to prefrontal cortex volume in older adults with and without generalized 
anxiety disorder. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 173(2), 121-127. doi: 
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2008.09.010 
Molina, S. M. S., & Borkovec, T. D. (1994). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire: Psychometric 
properties and associated characteristics. In G. C. L. Davey & F. Tallis (Eds.), Worrying: 
Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd. 
219 
 
Moulding, R., & Kyrios, M. (2007). Desire for control, sense of control and obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 31, 759-772. doi: 10.1007/s10608-006-9086-x 
Muris, P., Meesters, C., Merckelbach, H., & Hülsenbeck, P. (2000). Worry in children is related to 
perceived parental rearing and attachment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(5), 487-
497. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00072-8 
Muris, P., van Zuuren, F. J., de Jong, P. J., de Beurs, E., & Hanewald, G. (1994). Monitoring and 
blunting coping styles: the Miller behavioural style scale and its correlates, and the 
development of an alternative questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 17(1), 
9-19. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(94)90257-7 
Mushtaq, F., Bland, A. R., & Schaefer, A. (2011). Uncertainty and Cognitive Control. Front. 
Psychology, 2, 249. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00249 
Neely, J. H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of inhibitionless 
spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 106(3), 226-254. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.106.3.226 
Neys, W. D. (2006). Dual Processing in Reasoning. Psychological Science, 17(5), 428-433. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01723.x 
Niceli, M., & Castelfranchi, C. (2001). Anxiety as an 'epistemic' emotion: An uncertainty theory of 
anxiety. Anxiety, Stress & Coping: An international journal, 18(4), 291-319. doi: 
10.1080/10615800500209324  
Nolde, S. F., Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1998). The role of prefrontal cortex during tests of 
episodic memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(10), 399-406. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(98)01233-9 
O'Neill, G. W. (1985). Is worry a valuable concept? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23(4), 479-
480. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(85)90177-9 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2005). Psychometric validation of the 
obsessive belief questionnaire and interpretation of intrusions inventory - part 2: Factor 
analyses and testing of a brief version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(11), 1527-
1542. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00099-2 
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & Tormala, Z. L. (2002). Thought confidence as a determinant of 
persuasion: The self-validation hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
82, 722-741. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.5.722 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects of involvement on responses to argument 
quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 46(1), 69-81. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.39 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986b). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a determinant of 
argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 847-853. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.39 
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1999). The elaboration likelihood model: Current status and 
controversies. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology. 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Phillips, S. D., Pazienza, N. J., & Ferrin, H. H. (1984). Decision-making styles and problem-solving 
appraisal. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 31(4), 497-502. doi: 10.1017/0022-
0167.31.4.497 
Pignatiello, M. F., Camp, C. J., & Rasar, L. A. (1986). Musical mood induction: An alternative to 
the Velten technique. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95(3), 295-297. doi: 
10.1234/12345678 
220 
 
Pittman, T. S., & D'Agostino, P. R. (1989). Motivation and cognition: Control deprivation and the 
nature of subsequent information processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
25(6), 465-480. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(89)90001-2 
Platt, J. J., & Spivack, G. (1975). Unidimensionality of the Means-Ends Problem-Solving (MEPS) 
procedure. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 31, 15-16. doi: 10.1002/1097-
4679(197501)31:1<15::AID-JCLP2270310106>3.0.CO;2-8  
Pratt, P., Tallis, F., & Eysenck, M. (1997). Information-processing, storage characteristics and 
worry. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 1015-1023. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(97)00057-0 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in 
simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 36(4), 717-731. doi: 
10.3758/BF03206553  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40(3), 
879-891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879  
Purdon, C. L., & Harrington, J. (2006). Worry in psychopathology. In G. C. L. Davey & A. Wells 
(Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and treatment. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Robichaud, M., & Dugas, M. J. (2005). Negative problem orientation (Part I): psychometric 
properties of a new measure. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(3), 391-401. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2004.02.007 
Robichaud, M., Dugas, M. J., & Conway, M. (2003). Gender differences in worry and associated 
cognitive-behavioral variables. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17(5), 501-516. doi: 
10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00237-2 
Roelofs, J., Huibers, M., Peeters, F., Arntz, A., & van Os, J. (2008). Rumination and worrying as 
possible mediators in the relation between neuroticism and symptoms of depression and 
anxiety in clinically depressed individuals. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 1283-
1289. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2008.10.002 
Roemer, L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1993). Worry: Unwanted cognitive activity that controls unwanted 
somatic experience. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), Handbook of mental 
control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, US: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Roemer, L., Molina, S. M. S., & Borkovec, T. D. (1997). An Investigation of Worry Content among 
Generally Anxious Individuals. . The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(5), 314-
319.  
Rosen, N. O., & Knäuper, B. (2009). A Little Uncertainty Goes a Long Way: State and Trait 
Differences in Uncertainty Interact to Increase Information Seeking but Also Increase 
Worry. Health Communication, 24(3), 228-238. doi: 10.1080/10410230902804125 
Rosen, N. O., Knäuper, B., Di Dio, P., Morrison, E., Tabing, R., Feldstain, A., et al. (2009). The 
impact of intolerance of uncertainty on anxiety after receiving an informational intervention 
about HPV: A randomised controlled study. Psychology & Health, 25(6), 651-668. doi: 
10.1080/08870440902822913 
Rosenfield, S. (2000). Gender and dimensions of the self: implications for internalizing and 
externalizing behavior. In E. Frank (Ed.), Gender and its effects on psychopathology. 
Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press. 
Ruiter, R. A. C., Abraham, C., & Kok, G. (2001). Scary warnings and rational precautions: A 
review of the psychology of fear appeals. Psychology & Health, 16(6), 613-630. doi: 
10.1080/08870440108405863 
Ruscio, A. M. (2002). Delimiting the boundaries of generalized anxiety disorder: differentiating 
high worriers with and without GAD. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16(4), 377-400. doi: 
10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00130-5 
221 
 
Ruscio, A. M., & Borkovec, T. D. (2004). Experience and appraisal of worry among high worriers 
with and without generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(12), 
1469-1482. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2003.10.007 
Ruscio, A. M., Borkovec, T. D., & Ruscio, J. (2001). A taxometric investigation of the latent 
structure of worry. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(3), 413-422. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.110.3.413 
Salkovskis, P. M., Wroe, A. L., Gledhill, A., Morrison, N., Forrester, E., Richards, C., et al. (2000). 
Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are characteristic of obsessive compulsive 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(347-372). doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(99)00071-6 
Salters-Pedneault, K., Roemer, L., Tull, M. T., Rucker, L., & Mennin, D. S. (2006). Evidence of 
Broad Deficits in Emotion Regulation Associated with Chronic Worry and Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30(4), 469-480. doi: 10.1007/s10608-
006-9055-4  
Sanderson, W. C., & Barlow, D. H. (1990). A description of patients diagnosed with DSM-III-R 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 178(9), 588-
591.  
Schotte, D. E., Cools, J., & McNally, R. J. (1990). Film-induced negative affect triggers overeating 
in restrained eaters. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 99(3), 317-320. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.99.3.317 
Schwarz, N. (2002). Situated cognition and the wisdom of feelings: Cognitive Tuning. In L. 
Feldmann Barrett & P. Salovey (Eds.), The wisdom in feeling (pp. 144-166). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being. 
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45(3), 513-523. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513 
Scott, W. D., & Cervone, D. (2002). The impact of negative affect on performance standards: 
Evidence for an affect-as-information mechanism. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 
19-37. doi: 10.1023/A:1013837520031 
Shafran, R., Cooper, Z., & Fairburn, C. G. (2002). Clinical perfectionism: A cognitive-behavioural 
analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(7), 773-791. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(01)00059-6 
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2007). The affect heuristic. European 
Journal of Operation Research, 177, 1333-1352.  
Smith, S. M., & Shaffer, D. R. (1991). The effects of good moods on systematic processing: 
“Willing but not able, or able but not willing?”. Motivation and emotion, 15(4), 243-279. 
doi: 10.1007/bf00995645 
Sookman, D., & Pinard, G. (2002). Overestimation of threat and intolerance of uncertainty in 
obsessive compulsive disorder. In R. O. Frost & G. Steketee (Eds.), Cognitive approaches 
to obsessions and compulsions: Theory, assessment and treatment. Oxford: Elsevier 
Science, Ltd. 
Spielberger, C. C. (1983). State-trait anxiety inventory. Palo Alto, California: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2001). Mood-as-input and catastrophic worrying. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 110(1), 83-96. doi: 10.1037//0021-843X.110.1.83  
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2003). Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for 
catastrophic worrying. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 495-503. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(02)00245-0 
222 
 
Startup, H. M., & Erickson, T. M. (2006). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire. In G. C. L. Davey 
& A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and 
treatment. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Startup, H. M., Freeman, D., & Garety, P. A. (2007). Persecutory delusions and catastrophic worry 
in psychosis: Developing the understanding of delusion distress and persistence. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 45, 523-537. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2006.04.006 
Stavosky, J. M., & Borkovec, T. D. (1988). The phenomenon of worry: Theory, research, treatment 
and its implication for women. Women and Therapy, 6, 77-95. doi: 
10.1300/J015V06N03_07 
Steginga, S. K., & Occhipinti, S. (2004). The application of the heuristic-systematic processing 
model t treatment decision making about prostate cancer. Medical decision making, 24(6), 
573-583. doi: 10.1177/0272989X04271044  
Sternheim, L., Konstantellou, A., Startup, H. M., & Schmidt, U. (2011). What does uncertainty 
mean to women with anorexia nervosa? An interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
European Eating Disorders Review, 19(1), 12-24. doi: 10.1002/erv.1029 
Stöber, J., & Bittencourt, J. (1998). Weekly assessment of worry: an adaptation of the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire for monitoring changes during treatment. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 36(6), 645-656. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00031-X 
Stöber, J., & Joormann, J. (2001a). A short form of the worry domains questionnaire: construction 
and factorial validation. Personality and Individual Differences, 31(4), 591-598. doi: 
10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00163-X 
Stöber, J., & Joormann, J. (2001b). Worry, Procrastination, and Perfectionism: Differentiating 
Amount of Worry, Pathological Worry, Anxiety, and Depression. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 25(1), 49-60. doi: 10.1023/A:1026474715384  
Stokes, C., & Hirsch, C. R. (2010). Engaging in imagery versus verbal processing of worry: Impact 
on negative intrusions in high worriers. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(5), 418-423. 
doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.12.011 
Sugiura, Y. (2007). Responsibility to continue thinking and worrying: Evidence of incremental 
validity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1619-1628. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2006.08.001 
Sweeny, K., Melnyck, D., Miller, W., & Shepperd, J. A. (2010). Information avoidance: Who, 
what, when, and why. Review of General Psychology, 14(4), 340-353. doi: 
10.1037/a0021288  
Swerdzewski, P. J. (2008). Should we worry about the way we measure worry over time? A 
longitudinal analysis of student worry during the first two years of college. James Madison 
University.    
Szabó, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2002). The Cognitive Content of Naturally Occurring Worry 
Episodes Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26(2), 167-177. doi: 10.1023/A:1014565602111  
Szabó, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2006). Worry episodes and perceived problem solving: A diary-
based approach. Anxiety, Stress & Coping, 19(2), 175-187. doi: 
10.1080/10615800600643562 
Tallis, F., Davey, G. C. L., & Capuzzo, N. (1994). The phenomenology of non-pathological worry: 
A preliminary investigation. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Tallis, F., & DeSilva, P. (1992). Worry and obsessional symptoms: A correlational analysis 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 103-105.  
Tallis, F., Eysenck, M. W., & Mathews, A. (1991). Elevated evidence requirements and worry. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 505-520. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(91)90128-X 
Tallis, F., Eysenck, M. W., & Mathews, A. (1992). A questionnaire for the measurement of 
nonpathological worry. Personality and Individual Differences, 13(2), 161-168. doi: 
10.1016/0191-8869(92)90038-Q 
223 
 
Taylor, S. E., & Fiske, S. T. (1978). Salience, attention, and attribution: Top of the head 
phenomena. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 11, 
pp. 249-288). New York: Academic Press. 
Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Accountability and the perseverance of first impressions. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 46(4), 285-292.  
Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution effect. 
Journal of personality and social psychology, 57(3), 388-398. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.57.3.388 
Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: The 
effects of specific moods on information processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(6), 973-988. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.973 
Tormala, Z. L., Rucher, D. D., & Seger, C. R. (2008). When increased confidence yields increased 
thought: A confidence-matching hypothesis. . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
44, 141-147. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.11.002 
Treanor, M., Erisman, S. M., Salters-Pedneault, K., Roemer, L., & Orsillo, S. M. (2011). 
Acceptance-based behavioral therapy for GAD: Effects of outcomes from three theoretical 
models. Depression and Anxiety, 28(2), 127-136. doi: 10.1002/da.20766 
Trumbo, C. W. (1999). Heuristic-Systematic Information Processing and Risk Judgment. Risk 
Analysis, 19(3), 391-400. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.1999.tb00415.x 
Trumbo, C. W. (2002). Information Processing and Risk Perception: An Adaptation of the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model. Journal of Communication, 52(2), 367-382. doi: 
10.1111/j.1460-2466.2002.tb02550.x 
Turk, C. L., & Wolanin, A. T. (2006). Assessment of generalized anxiety disorder. In G. C. L. 
Davey & A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and 
treatment. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 
185, 1124-1131.  
Uleman, J. S. (1989). The self-control of thoughts: A framework for thinking about unintended 
thought. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 425-449). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Vasey, M., & Borkovec, T. D. (1992). A catastrophising assessment of worrisome thoughts. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15, 505-520. doi: 10.1007/BF01175138  
Västfjäll, D. (2002). Emotion induction through music: A review of the musical mood induction 
procedure. Musicae Scientiae, [Special issue 2001–2002], 173-211.  
Vaughn, L. A., Malik, J., Schwartz, S., Petkova, Z., & Trudeau, L. (2006). Regulatory fit as input 
for stop rules. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 601-611. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.601 
Velten Jr, E. (1968). A laboratory task for induction of mood states. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 6(4), 473-482. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(68)90028-4 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of 
positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(8), 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Weary, G., & Edwards, J. A. (1994). Individual differences in causal uncertainty. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 303-318. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.308 
Weary, G., & Jacobson, J. A. (1997). Causal uncertainty beliefs and diagnostic information seeking. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(839-848). doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.73.4.839 
Weisenberg, M., Raz, T., & Hener, T. (1998). The influence of film-induced mood on pain 
perception. Pain, 76(3), 365-375. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3959(98)00069-4 
Wells, A. (1994). Attention and the control of worry. In G. C. L. Davey & F. Tallis (Eds.), 
Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
224 
 
Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: A cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301-320. doi: 10.1017/S1352465800015897 
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders. A Practice manual and conceptual guide. 
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Wells, A. (1999). A metacognitive model and therapy for generalized anxiety disorder. Clinical 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, 6(2), 86-95. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0879(199905)6:2<86::AID-CPP189>3.0.CO;2-S 
Wells, A. (2006). The metacognitive model of worry and generalised anxiety disorder. In G. C. L. 
Davey & A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders. Chichester, Uk: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Wells, A., & Carter, K. (1999). Preliminary tests of a cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 585-594. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(98)00156-9 
Wells, A., & Carter, K. (2001). Further tests of a cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder: 
Metacognitions and worry in GAD, panic disorder, social phobia, depression, and 
nonpatients. Behavior Therapy, 32(1), 85-102. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7894(01)80045-9 
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (1998). Relationships between worry, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and meta-cognitive beliefs. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(9), 899-913. 
doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00070-9 
Westermann, R., Spies, K., Stahl, G., & Hesse, F. W. (1996). Relative effectiveness and validity of 
mood induction procedures: a meta-analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
26(4), 557-580. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199607)26:4<557::aid-ejsp769>3.0.co;2-4 
Wisocki, P. (1994). The experience of worry among the elderly. In G. C. L. Davey & F. Tallis 
(Eds.), Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 247-261). New 
York: Wiley. 
Wisocki, P., Handen, B., & Morse, C. K. (1986). The worry scale as a measure of anxiety among 
homebound and community elderly Behaviour Therapist, 5, 91-95.  
Wood, W., Kallgren, C. A., & Preisler, R. M. (1985). Access to attitude-relevant information in 
memory as a determinant of persuasion: The role of message attributes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21(1), 73-85. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(85)90007-1 
 
 
  
225 
 
11 Appendices 
11.1 Appendix A: Experiment 1 ethical approval certificate 
University of Sussex 
School of Life Sciences Research Governance Committee 
 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL 
Title of Project Mood as input and perseverative worry: The role of negative 
mood on worry and systematic processing facilitators 
Principal Investigator 
 
Graham Davey 
Student 
 
Suzanne Dash 
Collaborators  
Duration of approval  
(not greater than 4 years) 
6 months 
 
This project has been given ethical approval by the School of Life Sciences Research Governance 
Committee.   
 
NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of 
changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures. 
 
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions: 
Amendments to protocol. 
 Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the 
committee for authorisation prior to implementation. 
 
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects 
 Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the 
project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the committee.  
 
The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the committee, 
indicating the status and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be reviewed at the 
annual meeting of the committee.  A statement by the Principal Investigator to the Committee 
indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the following date(s): 
 
December 2009, 2010…………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
Signed: ………….. …Jennifer Rusted……………….. 
  Chair of the Research Governance Committee 
 
Date:   …………25 September 2009……………. 
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11.2 Appendix B: Experiments 2 and 4 ethical approval form  
 
University of Sussex 
School of Life Sciences Research Governance Committee 
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Principal Investigator 
 
Graham Davey 
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(not greater than 4 years) 
11 months 
 
This project has been given ethical approval by the School of Life Sciences Research Governance 
Committee.   
 
NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
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indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the following date(s): 
 
December 2010………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
Signed: ………….. …Jennifer Rusted……………….. 
  Chair of the Research Governance Committee 
 
Date:   ……22 January 2010…………………. 
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11.3 Appendix C: Experiment 3 ethical approval form 
Life Sciences & Psychology Cluster based Research Ethics Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL 
Reference Number:       GDSD0711 
Title of Project: Intolerance of uncertainty and systematic processing  
Principal Investigator: Graham Davey 
Student:        Suzanne Dash 
Collaborators:         
Duration of Approval 
(not greater than 4 years) 
3 months 
Expected Start Date:* 1st August 
This project has been given ethical approval by the Life Sciences and Psychology 
Cluster based Research Ethics Committee (C-REC).   
*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account 
of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures. 
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions: 
Amendments to protocol. 
 Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-
REC for authorisation prior to implementation. 
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects 
 Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the 
project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.  
 
The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the 
committee, indicating the status and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be 
reviewed at the annual meeting of the committee.  A statement by the Principal Investigator to 
the C-REC indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the 
following date(s): 
December 2011……….………………………………………………………………………………. 
Authorised Signature      Jennifer Rusted 
Name of Authorised Signatory  
(C-REC Chair or nominated deputy) 
Jennifer Rusted 
Date 25 July 2011 
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11.4 Appendix D: Experiment 5 ethical approval form 
Life Sciences & Psychology Cluster based Research Ethics Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL 
Reference Number:        GDSD0211 
Title of Project: The impact of negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty and problem-solving 
confidence on threat perception and perceived ability to cope with threat  
Principal Investigator:        Graham Davey 
Student:        Suzanne Dash 
Collaborators:         
Duration of Approval 
(not greater than 4 years) 
6 months 
Expected Start Date:* March 2011 
This project has been given ethical approval by the Life Sciences and Psychology 
Cluster based Research Ethics Committee (C-REC).   
*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account 
of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures. 
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions: 
Amendments to protocol. 
 Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-
REC for authorisation prior to implementation. 
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects 
 Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the 
project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.  
 
The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the 
committee, indicating the status and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be 
reviewed at the annual meeting of the committee.  A statement by the Principal Investigator to 
the C-REC indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the 
following date(s): 
December 2011……….………………………………………………………………………………. 
Authorised Signature      Jennifer Rusted 
Name of Authorised Signatory  
(C-REC Chair or nominated deputy) 
Jennifer Rusted 
Date      7 March 2011 
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11.5 Appendix E: Study 5 ethical approval form 
University of Sussex 
School of Life Sciences Research Governance Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL 
Title of Project Relationships between measures of anxiety and constructs known 
to increase perseverative worrying 
Principal Investigator Graham Davey 
Student Suzanne Dash 
Collaborators  
Duration of approval  
(not greater than 4 years) 
 
This project has been given ethical approval by the School of Life Sciences Research Governance 
Committee.   
NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this 
Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of 
changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures. 
 
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions: 
Amendments to protocol. 
 Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the 
committee for authorisation prior to implementation. 
Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects 
 Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the 
project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the committee.  
 
The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the committee, 
indicating the status and conduct of the approved project. These reports will be reviewed at the 
annual meeting of the committee.  A statement by the Principal Investigator to the Committee 
indicating the status and conduct of the approved project will be required on the following date(s): 
 
December 2009………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signed: ………….. …Jennifer Rusted……………….. 
  Chair of the Research Governance Committee 
Date:   …………16th October 2009……………. 
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11.6 Appendix F: Male high intolerance of uncertainty script 
Sean’s pension dilemma 
Sean has recently been giving serious thought to his financial security when he retires. 
Although he is only in his late 20’s, Sean wants to make the right decisions now to allow him 
to retire early and use his pension to fund his living costs as well as a six month holiday. With 
the recent changes to pension laws, he has set up his own self-managed fund so that he can 
save on management fees. Sean has identified a range of investment options for his pension 
money, including term deposits in the bank, property and the share market. 
When the time came to determine how he wanted to invest his pension however, Sean 
found that the returns which could be generated from each of the investment options were 
not guaranteed and could fluctuate substantially depending on a variety of issues, ranging 
from international issues such as terrorism, through to local issues such as the availability of 
land. Even term deposits with banks were not always guaranteed the same returns, with new 
offers advertised nearly every day. 
Sean didn’t really think that it was fair that such uncertainty should exist, believing 
that for something as important as a pension, returns should be guaranteed. As Sean pored 
over the mass of information he collected about different shares and property prices he found 
himself thinking that it wasn’t really acceptable that the prices should fluctuate so widely and 
with so little discernable pattern. He also found that he was unable to organise things as well 
as he would have liked because his pension projections were always changing as the returns 
he expected also changed. 
The more Sean investigated the different options, the more stressed he became with 
the uncertainty of the returns. Some shares would go up, but some shares would go down, 
some properties would appreciate while others would lose their value, even interest rates 
fluctuated from time to time. Sean found himself becoming more and more stressed about the 
different options, never sure about which would give him the best return on his pension. 
Whenever he thought about his pension he found that he would get worked up about it and 
was unable to relax. 
Even though Sean was unable to determine the returns accurately because of changes 
in the market, he was not helped by a lack of available information for some of his investment 
options. One thing which frustrated Sean in particular was a lack of information about the sale 
prices of recently sold properties. 
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Given all the uncertainty with the investments, Sean found it very difficult to settle on 
a decision. Even though he believed he had considered all the possible options, he still 
couldn’t bring himself to invest his pension money because he couldn’t be 100% sure of the 
outcome. Even though he had evaluated all the available information he was not confident in 
his decisions and the remaining uncertainty was enough to stop him from investing his 
money. 
Sean’s dating dilemma 
Sean was recently out with a group of his mates, having a few drinks on a Friday 
evening at his favourite bar. After a while, Sean noticed an attractive woman across the room 
whom he thought seemed to be looking back at him, although he wasn’t completely sure as by 
this stage he had had a few drinks. Even though Sean wanted to approach the woman and 
offer to buy her a drink, he felt unable to act because he wasn’t sure of how she would 
respond. Only after the woman’s glances had progressed to more lingering eye contact did 
Sean begin to feel more comfortable about approaching the woman. Only after the woman’s 
demeanour left Sean with no doubts that she wanted to speak with him, was he able to 
approach the woman and offer to buy her a drink. Sean felt though that it shouldn’t be the 
case that he had to take the chance to approach the woman, and would have been more 
comfortable if she had approached him. As the evening went on, Sean felt that he and the 
woman were getting along well, an impression confirmed when she gave him her number 
before leaving. 
Because he was busy for the rest of the weekend, Sean had to wait until late the 
following week before he thought about calling the woman he met at the bar. By this stage 
however, Sean had become anxious about calling her as he couldn’t really help feeling 
uncertain about the likelihood that the woman would still want to go out on a date with him. 
Sean didn’t really think it was fair that this uncertainty should exist, and chastised himself for 
not having arranged a date earlier when he was more certain of how she would respond; he 
even resolved to avoid this situation in future and to arrange a date immediately, when he was 
more sure of achieving a positive outcome. As days went by without calling her, Sean started 
feeling that he was less of a man because he wasn’t sure about how she would respond if he 
called her. As days turned into weeks without calling her, Sean eventually reached the point 
where he gave up on the idea of a date with the woman because he couldn’t gather the 
confidence to put aside his uncertainty and call her. 
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11.7 Appendix G: Female high intolerance of uncertainty script 
Sarah’s pension dilemma 
Sarah has recently been giving serious thought to her financial security when she 
retires. Although she is only in her late 20’s, Sarah wants to make the right decisions now to 
allow her to retire early and use her pension to fund her living costs as well as a six month 
holiday. With the recent changes to pension laws, she has set up her own self-managed fund 
so that she can save on management fees. Sarah has identified a range of investment options 
for her pension money, including term deposits in the bank, property and the share market. 
When the time came to determine how she wanted to invest her pension however, 
Sarah found that the returns which could be generated from each of the investment options 
were not guaranteed and could fluctuate substantially depending on a variety of issues, 
ranging from international issues such as terrorism, through to local issues such as the 
availability of land. Even term deposits with banks were not always guaranteed the same 
returns, with new offers advertised nearly every day. 
Sarah didn’t really think that it was fair that such uncertainty should exist, believing 
that for something as important as pension, returns should be guaranteed. As Sarah pored 
over the mass of information she collected about different shares and property prices she 
found herself thinking that it wasn’t really acceptable that the prices should fluctuate so 
widely and with so little discernable pattern. She also found that she was unable to organise 
things as well as she would have liked because her pension projections were always changing 
as the returns she expected also changed. 
The more Sarah investigated the different options, the more stressed she became with 
the uncertainty of the returns. Some shares would go up, but some shares would go down, 
some properties would appreciate while others would lose their value, even interest rates 
fluctuated from time to time. Sarah found herself becoming more and more stressed about the 
different options, never sure about which would give her the best return on her pension. 
Whenever she thought about her pension she found that she would get worked up about it 
and was unable to relax. 
Even though Sarah was unable to determine the returns accurately because of changes 
in the market, she was not helped by a lack of available information for some of her 
investment options. One thing which frustrated Sarah in particular was a lack of information 
about the sale prices of recently sold properties. 
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Given all the uncertainty with the investments, Sarah found it very difficult to settle on 
a decision. Even though she believed she had considered all the possible options, she still 
couldn’t bring herself to invest her pension money because she couldn’t be 100% sure of the 
outcome. Even though she had evaluated all the available information she was not confident 
in her decisions and the remaining uncertainty was enough to stop her from investing her 
money. 
Sarah’s dating dilemma 
Sarah was recently out with a group of her girlfriends, having a few drinks on a Friday 
evening at her favourite bar. After a while, Sarah noticed an attractive man across the room 
whom she thought seemed to be looking back at her, although she wasn’t completely sure as 
by this stage she had had a few drinks. Even though Sarah wanted to approach the man, she 
felt unable to act because she wasn’t sure of how he would respond. Only after the man’s 
glances had progressed to more lingering eye contact did Sarah begin to feel more 
comfortable about approaching the man. Only after the man’s demeanour left Sarah with no 
doubt that he wanted to speak with her, was she able to approach the man and ask if he 
wanted to buy her a drink. Sarah felt though that it shouldn’t be the case that she had to take 
the chance to approach the man, and would have been more comfortable if he had approached 
her. As the evening went on, Sarah felt that she and the man were getting along well, an 
impression confirmed when he gave her his number before leaving. 
Because she was busy for the rest of the weekend, Sarah had to wait until late the 
following week before she thought about calling the man she met at the bar. By this stage 
however, Sarah had become anxious about calling him as she couldn’t really help feeling 
uncertain about the likelihood that the man would still want to go out on a date with her. 
Sarah didn’t really think it was fair that this uncertainty should exist, and chastised herself for 
not having arranged a date earlier when she was more certain of how he would respond; she 
even resolved to avoid this situation in future and to arrange a date immediately, when she 
was more sure of achieving a positive outcome. As days went by without calling him, Sarah 
started doubting herself because she wasn’t sure about how he would respond if she called 
him. As days turned into weeks without calling him, Sarah eventually reached the point where 
she gave up on the idea of a date with the man because she couldn’t gather the confidence to 
put aside her uncertainty and call him. 
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11.8 Appendix H: Male low intolerance of uncertainty script 
Sean’s pension dilemma 
Sean has recently been giving serious thought to his financial security when he retires. 
Although he is only in his late 20’s, Sean wants to make the right decisions now to allow him 
to retire early and use his pension to fund his living costs as well as a six month holiday. With 
the recent changes to pension laws, he has set up his own self-managed fund so that he can 
save on management fees. Sean has identified a range of investment options for his pension 
money, including term deposits in the bank, property and the share market. 
When the time came to determine how he wanted to invest his pension however, Sean 
found that the returns which could be generated from each of the investment options were 
not guaranteed and could fluctuate substantially depending on a variety of issues, ranging 
from international issues such as terrorism, through to local issues such as the availability of 
land. Even term deposits with banks were not always guaranteed the same returns, with new 
offers advertised nearly every day. 
Sean thought it was fair that such uncertainty should exist, believing that for 
something as important as pension, returns should be determined by the time and effort put 
into identifying the best performing options. As Sean pored over the mass of information he 
collected about different shares and property prices he found himself comfortable with the 
fact that the prices fluctuated so widely and with so little discernable pattern. Although his 
pension projections were always changing because the returns he expected also changed, 
Sean nonetheless felt he was adequately organised to accommodate this.  
The more Sean investigated the different options, the more comfortable he became 
with the uncertainty of the returns. Some shares would go up, but some shares would go 
down, some properties would appreciate while others would lose their value, even interest 
rates fluctuated from time to time. Sean found himself becoming less and less stressed about 
the different options, even though he was never sure which would give him the best return on 
his pension. Whenever he thought about his pension he noticed that he was calm and 
collected and actually found it quite relaxing.  
Even though Sean was unable to determine the returns accurately because of changes 
in the market, he was not helped by a lack of available information for some of his investment 
options; in particular, information was unavailable regarding the sale prices of recently sold 
properties. Not knowing all this information didn’t bother Sean though because he accepted 
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that he probably wouldn’t be able to get all the information he needed and would have to base 
his judgements on incomplete information. 
Even though there was a lot of uncertainty with the investments, Sean found it 
reasonably easy to settle on a decision. After he believed he had considered all possible 
options, he felt comfortable investing his pension money even though he couldn’t be 100% 
sure of the outcome. Feeling that he had evaluated all the available information he was 
confident in his decisions and the remaining uncertainty was not enough to stop him from 
investing his money. 
Sean’s dating dilemma 
Sean was recently out with a group of his mates, having a few drinks on a Friday 
evening at his favourite bar. After a while, Sean noticed an attractive woman across the room 
whom he thought seemed to be looking back at him, although he wasn’t completely sure as by 
this stage he had had a few drinks. Even though Sean wasn’t sure of how the woman would 
respond to his advances, he felt comfortable approaching the woman and offering to buy her a 
drink. Sean thought that it was ok that he had to take the chance to approach the woman, and 
wasn’t concerned that she hadn’t taken the first step. As the evening went on, Sean felt that he 
and the woman were getting along well, an impression confirmed when she gave him her 
number before leaving. 
Because he was busy for the rest of the weekend, Sean had to wait until late the 
following week before he thought about calling the woman he met at the bar. Even though 
there had been quite a delay, Sean was comfortable about calling her, although he couldn’t 
help feeling uncertain about the likelihood that the woman would still want to go out on a 
date with him. Sean realised that this uncertainty was a necessary part of the dating game, and 
wasn’t concerned that he hadn’t called her earlier in the week when he was more certain of 
how she would respond; in fact, although he would have been more certain of a positive 
reaction from the woman earlier in the week, if the same situation occurred in the future, Sean 
didn’t think that he would do anything differently.  As yet more days went by before he had 
the opportunity to call her, Sean felt good about himself that he wasn’t concerned that he 
didn’t know how she would respond. As days turned into weeks without calling her, Sean 
eventually found the time to call her, and was quite confident, even though he really had no 
idea how she might react given he had taken so long to call her. 
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11.9 Appendix I: Female low intolerance of uncertainty script 
Sarah’s pension dilemma 
Sarah has recently been giving serious thought to her financial security when she 
retires. Although she is only in her late 20’s, Sarah wants to make the right decisions now to 
allow her to retire early and use her pension to fund her living costs as well as a six month 
holiday. With the recent changes to pension laws, she has set up her own self-managed fund 
so that she can save on management fees. Sarah has identified a range of investment options 
for her pension money, including term deposits in the bank, property and the share market. 
When the time came to determine how she wanted to invest her pension however, 
Sarah found that the returns which could be generated from each of the investment options 
were not guaranteed and could fluctuate substantially depending on a variety of issues, 
ranging from international issues such as terrorism, through to local issues such as the 
availability of land. Even term deposits with banks were not always guaranteed the same 
returns, with new offers advertised nearly every day. 
Sarah thought it was fair that such uncertainty should exist, believing that for 
something as important as pension, returns should be determined by the time and effort put 
into identifying the best performing options. As Sarah pored over the mass of information she 
collected about different shares and property prices she found herself comfortable with the 
fact that the prices fluctuated so widely and with so little discernable pattern. Although her 
pension projections were always changing because the returns she expected also changed, 
Sarah nonetheless felt she was adequately organised to accommodate this.  
The more Sarah investigated the different options, the more comfortable she became 
with the uncertainty of the returns. Some shares would go up, but some shares would go 
down, some properties would appreciate while others would lose their value, even interest 
rates fluctuated from time to time. Sarah found herself becoming less and less stressed about 
the different options, even though she was never sure which would give her the best return on 
her pension. Whenever she thought about her pension she noticed that she was calm and 
collected and actually found it quite relaxing.  
Even though Sarah was unable to determine the returns accurately because of changes 
in the market, she was not helped by a lack of available information for some of her 
investment options; in particular, information was unavailable regarding the sale prices of 
recently sold properties. Not knowing all this information didn’t bother Sarah though because 
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she accepted that she probably wouldn’t be able to get all the information she needed and 
would have to base her judgements on incomplete information. 
Even though there was a lot of uncertainty with the investments, Sarah found it 
reasonably easy to settle on a decision. After she believed she had considered all possible 
options, she felt comfortable investing her pension money even though she couldn’t be 100% 
sure of the outcome. Feeling that she had evaluated all the available information she was 
confident in her decisions and the remaining uncertainty was not enough to stop her from 
investing her money. 
Sarah’s dating dilemma 
Sarah was recently out with a group of her girlfriends, having a few drinks on a Friday 
evening at her favourite bar. After a while, Sarah noticed an attractive man across the room 
whom she thought seemed to be looking back at her, although she wasn’t completely sure as 
by this stage she had had a few drinks. Even though Sarah wasn’t sure of how the man would 
respond to her advances, she felt comfortable approaching the man and asking if he wanted to 
buy her a drink. Sarah thought that it was ok that she had to take the chance to approach the 
man, and wasn’t concerned that he hadn’t taken the first step. As the evening went on, Sarah 
felt that she and the man were getting along well, an impression confirmed when he gave her 
his number before leaving. 
Because she was busy for the rest of the weekend, Sarah had to wait until late the 
following week before she thought about calling the man she met at the bar. Even though 
there had been quite a delay, Sarah was comfortable about calling him, although she couldn’t 
help feeling uncertain about the likelihood that the man would still want to go out on a date 
with her. Sarah realised that this uncertainty was a necessary part of the dating game, and 
wasn’t concerned that she hadn’t called him earlier in the week when she was more certain of 
how he would respond; in fact, although she would have been more certain of a positive 
reaction from the man earlier in the week, if the same situation occurred in the future, Sarah 
didn’t think that she would do anything differently.  As yet more days went by before she had 
the opportunity to call him, Sarah felt good about herself that she wasn’t concerned that she 
didn’t know how he would respond. As days turned into weeks without calling him, Sarah 
eventually found the time to call him, and was quite confident, even though she really had no 
idea how he might react given she had taken so long to call him. 
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11.10 Appendix J: Example problem-solving feedback sheet 
 
Problem-Solving Ability Feedback Sheet 
 
You have just completed the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Test. 
Below, are your scores. If you require any more information, 
please speak to the experimenter at the end of the experiment. 
 
Age bracket 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
 
 
Score 
 
 
Percentile 
 
 
Average score for this band 
 
 
 
For a __________________ aged _________________ the average score 
expected on the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Task is _________. You 
scored _____________. This means you are in the __-
______________________ for your age and gender. 
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11.11Appendix K: Regression assumption tests 
 
Regression 1: Worry promoters and threat perception 
There were an acceptable amount of outliers, with only 6 cases (3.33%) having standardised 
residuals falling outside of ±2, and only 1 case (0.56%) with a standardised residual falling 
outside ±2.5 (Field, 2009). The distribution of the threat scores approximated the Normal 
distribution, as shown in the histogram (Figure X) and P-P plot (Figure X). 
 
Figure 11.11 Histogram of threat residuals            Figure 11.12 P-P Plot of threat residuals 
The assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of errors also 
appear to have been met because the residual z-score vs. predicted z-score plot (Figure 11.13) 
shows an absence of funnelling. The Durbin-Watson statistic was 2.10, which is very close to 
Field’s (2009) recommended criterion of 2, and well within the recommended boundary of 1-
3, which supports that the residuals are independent. Furthermore, it does not appear that the 
predictor variables are affected by multicollinearity because all VIF values are below 10 
(Field, 2009): VIF = 1.05 (experimental condition), 1.85 (negative mood), 1.70 (IU), and 1.23 
(PSC). As such, despite the inclusion of data following experimental manipulations, the model 
appears to be a reliable fit of the data. 
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Figure 11.13 Scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted residuals for threat 
 
Regression 2: Worry promoters and coping beliefs 
The standardised residuals indicate concerns about outliers: 15 cases (8.33%) had 
standardised residuals falling outside of ±2, 8 cases (4.44%) with a standardised residual 
falling outside ±2.5, and 3 cases with a standardised residual outside ±3 (Field, 2009). Despite 
this, the distribution of the threat scores approximated the Normal distribution, as shown in 
the histogram (Figure 11.14) and P-P plot (Figure 11.15). 
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Figure 11.14 Histogram of coping residuals              Figure 11.15 P-P Plot of coping residuals 
 
The assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of errors also appear to 
have been met because the residual z score vs predicted z score plot (Figure 11.16) shows an 
absence of funnelling. The Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.81, which is in the region of Field’s 
(2009) recommended value of 2, and well within the recommended boundary of 1-3, which 
supports that the residuals are independent. Furthermore as reported above, it does not 
appear that the predictor variables are affected by multicollinearity because all VIF values are 
below 10 (Field, 2009): VIF = 1.05 (experimental condition), 1.85 (negative mood), 1.70 (IU), 
and 1.23 (PSC). As such, despite some indications that there may be more outliers than typical 
(perhaps due to the use of experimental manipulations of the predictor variables) overall the 
model appears to be a reliable fit of the data. 
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Figure 11.16 Scatterplot beliefs of standardised residuals against predicted residuals 
for coping beliefs 
 
